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The first Left Book Club (1936–48) had 57,000 members, had 
distributed 2 million books, and had formed 1,200 workplace 
and local groups by the time it peaked in 1939. LBC members 
were active throughout the labour and radical movement at the 
time, and the Club became an educational mass movement, 
remodelling British public opinion and contributing substan-
tially to the Labour landslide of 1945 and the construction of 
the welfare state.
Publisher Victor Gollancz, the driving force, saw the LBC as 
a movement against poverty, fascism, and the growing threat of 
war. He aimed to resist the tide of austerity and appeasement, 
and to present radical ideas for progressive social change in the 
interests of working people. The Club was about enlighten-
ment, empowerment, and collective organisation. 
The world today faces a crisis on the scale of the 1930s. 
Capitalism is trapped in a long-term crisis. Financialisa-
tion and austerity are shrinking demand, deepening the 
depression, and widening social inequalities. The social fabric 
is being torn apart. International relations are increasingly 
tense and militarised. War threatens on several fronts, while 
fascist and racist organisations are gaining ground across much 
of Europe. Global warming threatens the planet and the whole 
of humanity with climate catastrophe. Workplace organisation 
has been weakened, and social democratic parties have been 
hollowed out by acceptance of pro-market dogma. Society has 
become more atomised, and mainstream politics suffers an 
acute democratic deficit. 
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Yet the last decade has seen historically unprecedented levels 
of participation in street protest, implying a mass audience for 
progressive alternatives. But socialist ideas are no longer, as in 
the immediate post-war period, ‘in the tea’. One of neoliberal-
ism’s achievements has been to undermine ideas of solidarity, 
collective provision, and public service. 
The Left Book Club aspires to meet this ideological 
challenge. Our aim is to offer high-quality books at affordable 
prices that are carefully selected to address the central issues of 
the day and to be accessible to a wide general audience. Our list 
represents the full range of progressive traditions, perspectives, 
and ideas. We hope the books will be used as the basis of 
reading circles, discussion groups, and other educational and 
cultural activities relevant to developing, sharing, and dissem-
inating ideas for change in the interests of the common people 
at home and abroad.
The Left Book Club collective 
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My understanding of the Russian Revolution has been shaped 
by countless lectures, meetings, and discussions involving 
hundreds of revolutionary activists. It is impossible to recall, 
let alone list, all those who, at different times and in different 
ways, have influenced my perspective.
I should perhaps record that, from 1980 to 2010, I was an 
active member of the Socialist Workers Party in Britain. For 
much of that time, especially in the 1980s, I believe the SWP 
to have been a small but effective revolutionary organisation 
that punched above its weight. I also believe it to have been 
a powerhouse of Marxist theory. Its degeneration into a self-
referencing and self-perpetuating sect is, in my view, a tragic 
development in the history of the British Left.
But it would be dishonest not to make it clear that most of 
what I know about revolution – both as historian and activist 
– I owe to the SWP of the 1980s. I therefore owe a deep debt 
of gratitude to all the SWP comrades alongside whom I fought 
the Nazis, supported the miners, refused to pay the poll tax, 
and, when we had time, debated the history of the interna-
tional working-class movement.
Since 2010, I have formed many new and rewarding political 
friendships, and these have contributed, I believe, to a richer, 
more nuanced understanding of the Russian Revolution. Not 
least, the degeneration of the British Left over the last two 
or three decades – which is a generic process, not something 
restricted to the SWP – has given me a clearer understanding 
that revolutionary parties are built by the masses themselves in 
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struggle; that is, they do not arise from voluntarism, from acts 
of will by self-appointed revolutionary ‘vanguards’; they do 
not arise from what has sometimes been called ‘the primitive 
accumulation of cadre’. Revolutionaries should organise. But 
they should never proclaim themselves to be the party. Only 
the masses in struggle can create a party of revolution.
I should give special thanks to two of those new friends, 
David Castle of Pluto Press and Nik Gorecki of Housmans 
Bookshop and the Left Book Club, for critical comments on 
the first draft of this book. The final version is, in consequence, 
much improved.
Dates, Names, Prices,  
and Wages
Russia used the Julian Calendar until 1918. This was 13 
days behind the Gregorian Calendar. Thus, for example, the 
Storming of the Winter Palace took place on 25/26 October 
according to the Julian Calendar, but 7/8 November according 
to the Gregorian. I have used Julian dates for events in Russia 
before the adoption of the Gregorian system.
The transliteration of Russian names into English is 
inconsistent. In each case, I have tried to choose a convenient 
form and stick to it. A further problem arises from changes 
in name, of which there have been many, due to war and 
revolution, in the last century of Russian history. St Petersburg 
is an obvious example: it has been St Petersburg (before 
the First World War), Petrograd (1914–24), Leningrad 
(1924–91), and is now St Petersburg again. 
There are occasional references to prices, so it is worth 
knowing that one rouble was equal to about 50 US cents, and 
there were 100 kopeks to a rouble, so one kopek was worth 
about half a cent. A loaf of black bread cost about 40 kopeks 
in 1914, but more than three times as much in 1917. Wartime 
inflation averaged about 500 per cent across the full range of 
consumer necessities. Wages increased at barely half this rate, 
from perhaps two roubles a day for a skilled worker to four or 
five; low-paid workers might receive as little as the price of a 
loaf. It is safe to assume that living standards, already pitifully 
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1 Russky Renault Factory
2 New Lessner Factory
3 Moskovsky Regiment Barracks
4 Sukhanov’s Apartment












17 Pavlovsky Guard Barracks
18 Liteiny Prospect
19 Lithuanian Guard Barracks
20 Preobrazhensky Guard Barracks
21 Volynsky Guard Barracks
22 Finland Guard Barracks
23 Cruiser ‘Aurora’
24 Nikolaevsky Bridge
25 Central Telegraph Office
26 Central Post Office
27 Keksgolmsky Regiment Barracks
28 War Ministry
29 Admiralty
30 St Isaac’s Cathedral
31 Marinsky Palace






38 Semenovsky Guard Barracks
39 Kronstadt Naval Base
40 Ismailovsky Guard Barracks
41 Warsaw Station
42 Putilov Factory
43 Tsarskoe Selo Palace
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The Russian Revolution is probably the most misunderstood 
event in world history. This book aims to mark the centenary 
of the revolution by setting the record straight. It is an attempt 
to describe a lived experience of mass democracy and popular 
revolt that ‘shook the world’; an attempt to show that it was the 
collective action of millions of ordinary men and women that 
powered the historical process between 1917 and 1921; and an 
attempt to show a new generation of people eager for change 
that another world is indeed possible, and that it all depends 
on what we, all of us, rising from our slumber, choose to do. 
In essence, the Russian Revolution was an explosion 
of democracy and activity from below. It transformed the 
millions of people who took part in it, and inspired tens of 
millions who watched. It shook the world capitalist system to 
its foundations and came close to bringing it down. It offered 
a tantalising glimpse of a radically different world – a world 
without bosses and police, a world of democracy, equality, 
and peace.
But, sadly, only a glimpse. In the end, the forces defending 
the system – the millionaires, the statesmen, the generals, 
the churches, the tabloid press, the fascist squads, the fake 
‘socialists’ in red ties, the ‘sell-out’ union bureaucrats – these 
forces, across most of Europe, proved too powerful. The revolu-
tionary tide receded. The Russian Revolution was left isolated 
and besieged. And eventually – impoverished, devastated 
by war, threatened with invasion – it fell to pieces and was 
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consumed by the most murderous counter-revolutionary 
terror in history. 
This book sets out to nail three bogus arguments about the 
Russian Revolution – arguments we are likely to hear repeated 
many times this centenary year. It aims to show that:
• Lenin was a democrat, not a ‘democratic centralist’, 
and that the Bolshevik Party was a mass democratic 
movement, not a pseudo-revolutionary sect.
• The revolution was a mass movement of the people 
based on participatory democracy, not a coup to set up a 
dictatorship.
• Stalinism was a counter-revolutionary movement that 
destroyed the Bolshevik Party and Soviet democracy.
This does not mean that the book is original. This is an odd 
thing for an author to admit, since we mostly want to claim 
‘originality’ for our work. Why read it otherwise? Let me 
explain.
Readers who like this book – especially readers interested 
in the lessons for present-day activism – should immediately 
consider reading Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution. It 
is very long, but it is written with such style and panache, the 
story it tells is of such drama and significance, and the author, a 
leading participant as well as the revolution’s supreme historian, 
was gifted with an intellect of such astonishing interpretive 
power, that you are likely to find it one of the most important 
books you ever read. It is not simply the greatest narrative of 
one of history’s most earth-shaking events; it is, quite simply, a 
complete manual of revolutionary strategy and tactics.
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I cannot claim originality because Trotsky has been my guide 
throughout. I have, of course, read much else. Some of this 
wider reading I have drawn upon and referenced. But much I 
have not. This is because much of it is poor fare. The reason is 
political. Until the end of the Cold War, Western scholarship 
was dominated by a caricature of the Bolshevik Revolution 
which saw it as a ‘Leninist’ coup to install a dictatorship, while 
Eastern scholarship provided a distorted image of this caricature 
by proclaiming the monstrous Stalinist dictatorship of the 1930s 
to be a lineal descendant of the workers’ state of 1917–21.
Since the Eastern European revolutions of 1989 and the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, archives have opened and scholarship 
has become more relaxed. Much good, honest, fresh research 
has been done. But this has either amplified aspects of the 
interpretation offered here, or, following the principle ‘better 
informed but none the wiser’, has been deployed in the service 
of the dreary conspiracy theories of the Cold War past.
Here, on the other hand, we celebrate the creative power of 
the common people when they organise together and rise in 
struggle against their oppressors. For revolution is essentially 
a concentrated expression – concentrated in time and space – 
of the common people’s age-old yearning for freedom, justice, 
and decency. It is a moment when the drip-drip of partial 
reform in normal times – always too little, too late – accelerates 
into a sudden cascade of change, a torrent of transformation, 
that ‘shakes the world’ and threatens to ‘turn it upside down’.
This is a book about the past for the present. It is not a book for 
academics who merely study the world, but one for activists 
who want to change it. And we must change it, for, a century 
on, the world capitalist system that the Bolsheviks attempted 
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to destroy now constitutes an existential threat, a clear and 
present danger, to the well-being, even survival, of humanity 
and the planet. 
So the book is weighted heavily towards the lead-up to the 
revolution as opposed to its aftermath. That reflects our place 
in history, standing before the revolution we need to make, not 
after it. The immediate questions we face concern how you 
make a revolution, not what you do during one, let alone how 
you remake the world after one.
I find a lot of contemporary discussion about how we 
should reconfigure the world – about what a ‘post-capitalist’ 
world will be like – wearisome. I suspect a lot of it amounts to 
little more than a retreat into utopian fantasy among activists 
daunted by the power of capital and the state. I suspect it is a 
way of avoiding facing up to the real political task of building 
mass movements on the scale necessary to take on the rich, the 
banks, and the corporations.
So this is a book that focuses on just that. It is not utopian, 
because it describes the most powerful revolution from below 
in history; a moment when the common people, organised 
in their millions, marched onto the stage of history and took 
control of their own destiny. While it lasted, the Russian people 
‘stormed the heavens’ – as Marx described the experience of 
the Paris Commune in 1871 – and showed the world what was 
possible when you did so. The Russian Revolution revealed the 
enormous potential for social transformation – for attempting 
to solve all of humanity’s problems – inherent in mass popular 
democracy. It showed us what we can achieve when we take 
the power. But precisely because anti-capitalist revolution is, 
at this moment, despite being an imperative need, still only a 
distant possibility, the focus of the book is on the preparation 






Medieval mysticism. Russian soldiers – peasants in uniform – kneel 
as the Tsar passes by waving a holy icon.
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The war was going badly, so the Tsar, the supreme ruler of 130 
million Russians, had gone to the front to assume personal 
command. ‘A new page begins, and only God Almighty knows 
what will be written on it’, he announced. The Tsarina, who 
had stayed behind at the palace, wrote reassuringly: ‘It will 
be a glorious page in your reign and Russian history.’ He had 
nothing to fear, she added, because ‘Our Friend’s prayers arise 
night and day for you to Heaven, and God will hear them.’ She 
reminded him that he had been supplied with a holy icon by 
this ‘Friend’ before setting out – ‘to guard and guide you’ – and 
later she sent an apple from the hands of the same, one Grigori 
Rasputin, a Siberian peasant faith-healer, urging her husband 
to eat it to strengthen his will. Rasputin was a drunkard, a 
lecher, and a charlatan. With a display of piety and a claim that 
he could cure her son’s haemophilia, he had insinuated his way 
into the Court and become the Tsarina’s closest advisor.1
When did this happen? A monarch going to war waving 
holy icons and eating sacred apples. Not in the twelfth century, 
but at the beginning of the twentieth.
Tsar Nicholas II, the last of the Romanovs, was a bloodless 
non-entity riddled with prejudice and superstition, a weak man 
paralysed by his own stupidity as the fires of war and revolution 
rose around him. His German wife, the Tsarina Alexandra, was 
equally benighted and gullible, yet more wilful. Men of talent 
were dismissed from Court and their places taken by fawning 
favourites, the appointees of the Alexandra/Rasputin clique, 
what one former minister called ‘the leprous court camarilla’. 
In the shallow mind of the Tsarina, this was interpreted as 
strength. ‘Being firm is the only saving’, she told the Tsar. ‘You 
are autocrat and they dare not forget it.’ He was to ‘crush them 
1. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 85; Lincoln 1986, 160–1.
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all’, for he was ‘the autocrat without which Russia cannot exist’. 
As this German aristocrat in a Russian palace explained it: 
‘Russia loves to feel the whip. That is her nature. Tender love, 
and then the iron hand to punish and guide.’2 Thus did the last 
of the Romanovs meet the challenges of a world of railways, 
steelworks, and howitzers: with the barbarism of the Middle 
Ages.
How to explain this travesty? Georgi Plekhanov, the founder 
of the Russian socialist movement in the late nineteenth 
century, considered Russia ‘too Europeanised in comparison 
with Asia, and inadequately Europeanised in comparison 
with Europe’.3 It was, he implied, an historical hybrid which 
had entered the industrial age still saddled with an absolute 
monarch and a state-feudal social structure inherited from the 
sixteenth century.
To understand the revolution that exploded inside Russia in 
1917, we must begin with a ‘deep time’ perspective – a sense, 
that is, of what the French historians of the Annales tradition 
call la longue durée. If revolution is ‘compressed’ history – the 
progress of a century becoming the achievement of a year – it 
becomes so only because long-accumulating contradictions 
have reached a critical mass.
The autocratic rule of the Tsars – and the militaristic 
manner in which Russia came to be ordered – was the result 
of the interaction of three factors: the backwardness of the 
economy; the weakness of civil society; and competition with 
rival powers. Let us consider this interaction in detail, for it 
provides the seed-bed of the revolutionary crisis to come.
2. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 73–81; Lincoln 1986, 29.
3. Chamberlin 1935/1965, 2.
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Old Russia
Tsarist Russia eventually comprised a vast territory of diverse 
geography, multiple ethnicities, and only the most rudimentary 
communications. It stretched from Poland and the Baltic Sea 
in the west to the Pacific Ocean in the east, from the icebound 
wastes of the Arctic in the north to the baking steppes of 
Central Asia in the south. The continental climate – cold in 
winter, hot in summer – was harsh. Great tracts of the country 
– the frozen tundra and taiga forest of the north – remained 
uncultivated wilderness. Much of the rest was poor land. The 
belt in which Moscow stands, the historic heart of Old Russia, 
where the taiga grades into mixed forest, is a region of sand and 
clay, bogs and marshes, with acidic soils low in humus. Further 
south again, where the woodland opens into vast expanses of 
steppe, lies the ‘black earth’ region, where the soil is better, but 
agriculture is hampered by unreliable rainfall, a short growing 
season, and, in the past, primitive technique.
Because land was plentiful but poor, Russian agriculture 
developed extensively: peasant pioneers from the old regions 
would trek into the wilderness to hack out new farms in 
successive waves of colonisation. Low yields also encouraged 
diversification: agriculture was supplemented by fur-trapping, 
fishing, bee-keeping, and cottage industries producing tools, 
household goods, clothes, icons, even musical instruments. 
Village people might be poor, but they were fairly self-sufficient.
This, combined with distance and lack of easy transport, 
meant that trade and towns were little developed. Most 
Russians lived in relative isolation. Civil society remained 
fragmented and unorganised.4 The yeomanry and 
4. Pipes 1974/1977, 3–22.
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‘mechanicals’, the merchant-adventurers and industrial 
entrepreneurs, the classes of men that had pioneered the 
development of capitalism in north-west Europe between the 
sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, were largely absent in Old 
Russia. ‘The meagreness not only of Russian feudalism, but of 
all the old Russian history,’ wrote Leon Trotsky, who was both 
leader and historian of the Russian Revolution, ‘finds its most 
depressing expression in the absence of real medieval cities as 
centres of commerce and craft.’5 
The extreme centralisation of the Tsarist state was the flipside 
of Russian society’s atomisation. The autocracy of the Tsar was 
made possible by the stagnation of urban life, the absence of 
culture, the void where strong public institutions had failed to 
develop. But instead of offering a paternal hand, Tsarism was 
like a brutal rider forcing forwards an overburdened mule; the 
state followed its own independent historical path, regarding 
the inert mass of humanity over which it presided as mere 
raw material for fashioning into a military machine. Under 
the pressure of geopolitical competition with rival powers, 
the Tsarist state became an end in itself. Its inner essence was 
politico-military accumulation: the amassing of manpower 
and military hardware as a means of empire-building. The Tsar 
did not exist to serve the people; they existed to serve him.
The last Tsar, Nicholas II, clung to this principle to the 
very end. With discontent rising all around him, isolated even 
within the Court itself, the British ambassador, Sir George 
Buchanan, asked the Tsar in late 1916 whether he should not 
make some effort to regain the confidence of his people. There 
was a long pause. Then Nicholas Romanov replied: ‘Do you 
5. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 29.
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mean that I am to regain the confidence of my people, or that 
they are to regain my confidence.’6
Because of primitive technique, rural poverty, and medieval 
infrastructure, only a regime of exceptional ruthlessness could 
accumulate the resources necessary to sustain the apparatus 
of global power. Russia’s engine of war was fuelled by peasant 
muscle and blood. The method of extraction, from a hundred 
thousand villages spread across 5,000 miles, was necessarily 
crude and brutal. 
The combination of backwardness and militarism gave 
to the Tsarist autocracy what Georgi Plekhanov and other 
contemporary Marxists considered an ‘Asiatic’ character. 
Russian history knew no Reformation, barely any Enlight-
enment, and only a most belated Industrial Revolution. 
Nothing compared with the Dutch, English, American, or 
French Revolutions. And in that great ‘Springtime of Peoples’ 
in 1848 – a rolling wave of popular insurrection sweeping 
through Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, and Rome – the Tsar, 
stepping forth as ‘gendarme of Europe’, employed his servile 
peasant-conscripts to shoot down the democratic revolution-
aries on the barricades.
Militarism
The Russian tsars inherited much of their historic character 
from the Mongol khans. In the early thirteenth century, 
the Mongols had thundered across the steppes to create an 
empire that stretched the length of Asia. When their empire 
broke up in the later thirteenth century, a Mongol-Tartar 
6. Lincoln 1986, 311.
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(or Mongol-Turkic) khanate known as ‘the Golden Horde’ 
emerged in the north-western region of Central Asia. The 
princes of Moscow – protected somewhat by their location 
deep within the Russian hinterland, and enriched by the 
trade lines that ran through their territory – maintained a 
precarious semi-independence on the borders of the Golden 
Horde through craven submission to their Tartar overlords, 
serving them, in Marx’s words, as ‘hangman, sycophant, and 
slave-in-chief ’. Then, as Tartar power waned, the princes of 
Moscow – formed in a mould of ‘Asiatic’ despotism, imbued 
with the instincts of the bully and the barbarian – took stage as 
masters in their own right.7
Landlocked, without defensible ‘natural frontiers’, 
surrounded by enemies, the embryonic state of Muscovy was 
compelled to fight for survival – and, eventually, supremacy – 
against the Tartar khanates of the disintegrating Golden Horde 
in the south-east, the feudal kingdom of Poland-Lithuania 
in the west, and the mercantile city-state of Novgorod in the 
north. The creation of a national state was mainly the work of 
Ivan the Great (1462–1505). During his reign, and that of his 
son, the territory of Muscovy increased six-fold. As it grew, a 
new class of dependent feudal landowners was created, men 
who held estates in return for service.8 Yet greater conquests 
followed.
Ivan the Terrible (1533–84) was the first Muscovite ruler 
to proclaim himself Tsar (‘Caesar’). So feared was he by his 
own people that they tolled the church bells to warn of his 
approach. A mentally deranged tyrant, he used mass murder 
7. Kochan and Abraham 1962/1990, 22–8; Pipes 1974/1977, 54–64.
8. Kochan and Abraham 1962/1990, 29–40.
14 ◆  A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
to create a centralised royal dictatorship and double the size 
of Muscovy from 2.8 to 5.4 million square miles. Novgorod 
lost its independence. Rival Slavic princes were struck down. 
And, equipped with cannon, muskets, and holy icons, the 
Orthodox Christian soldiers of the Tsar dispersed the Islamic 
horse-archers of the Golden Horde to push the boundaries of 
the state to the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea.
To support these wars of conquest, Ivan turned Muscovy 
into a military camp. The private estates of the boyars – the 
landowning nobility – were expropriated and became the 
personal property of the ruler. The Tsar was elevated into 
both proprietor and sovereign of a ‘patrimonial’ state. The 
nobility was organised into a service class of government 
officials and army officers. The peasantry, by legal diktat, lost 
its freedom and was reduced to serfdom, tied to the land and 
in thrall to the landlord, the tax-collector, and the recruiting 
sergeant. The towns, too, succumbed to the rising power of 
the autocracy. Novgorod was destroyed in 1570, its medieval 
timber buildings consumed by fire, its people hunted down 
and massacred in a bloody rampage that lasted for weeks.9
The terror almost brought matters to naught. The monstrous 
excesses of Ivan the Terrible provoked violent reaction after 
his death, a ‘Time of Troubles’, when usurpers and adventurers 
contested a vacant throne, popular rebels seized much of the 
countryside, and towns were sacked and villages burned by 
military freebooters. As Russia disintegrated internally, the 
Swedes took Novgorod, the Poles Moscow.
But as so often in its history when violated by foreign 
invasion, Russia found within itself unsuspected reserves of 
9. Kochan and Abraham 1962/1990, 41–6; Pipes 1974/1977, 79–111. 
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strength. Behind the banners and icons of Orthodoxy, an army 
of liberation was raised. The Russians recaptured Moscow. 
Then a great assembly – the Zemski Sobor – was summoned 
to the Kremlin, and this, on 21 February 1613, proclaimed 
Michael Romanov the Tsar. The new dynasty would last for 
slightly more than 300 years.10
The rule of the Romanovs was based on the goon and 
the priest. Its watchwords were Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and 
Nationalism. The aristocracy had become a class of state 
officials. The peasants were scattered and enslaved. The 
towns were few and small. Trade was often state-controlled. 
Civil society was weak, apathetic, without enterprise or 
self-organisation. The active forces in Russian life – the forces 
that imparted dynamism to its inner processes – were the 
Tsarist state and the threat from foreign powers. So surpluses 
were hoovered upwards by a process of politico-military 
accumulation, draining it from towns and villages, which 
languished at a level of development grindingly medieval. 
In the mid fifteenth century, when it was breaking free of 
the Golden Horde, Muscovy was about the size of Germany. 
By 1600, it had expanded to the size of the rest of Europe 
combined. By 1650, having absorbed Siberia, it was three 
times larger. In these two centuries, the Tsars of Russia gained 
territory equivalent to the size of Holland every year.11
By this time, however, parts of Europe were developing 
far more rapidly than Russia, and the modernisation and 
enlargement of the armed forces became a pressing imperative. 
Under Peter the Great (1682–1725), military expenditures 
consumed more than four-fifths of state revenue, the army 
10. Kochan and Abraham 1962/1990, 60–72.
11. Pipes 1974/1977, 79–84.
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swelled to a third of a million, and the state was at war every 
year bar one. The tax burden tripled. Conscription – of three 
recruits per thousand inhabitants – became an annual draft. 
State feudalism was bureaucratised: Tsar Peter’s ‘Table of 
Ranks’ set out, in the manner of an Excel spread-sheet, a 
new ‘Westernised’ hierarchy of ranks, duties, and privileges. 
St Petersburg was founded as Russia’s ‘window on the West’ 
– but it was done with the brutal forced-labour methods of 
Asiatic despotism. Tsarist Russia came to resemble a gigantic 
barracks, in which a military autocrat employed 100,000 
landowners and 50,000 bureaucrats to tax, conscript, and 
police a hundred million peasants.12
In the Great Northern War (1700–21), Peter defeated 
Sweden, conquered the east coast of the Baltic, and turned 
Russia into one of Europe’s great powers. Under Catherine the 
Great (1762–96), Russian expansionism surged again. The 
Kingdom of Poland was destroyed, and Russia, Prussia, and 
Austria partitioned it between them. The Ottoman-Turkish 
Empire was rolled back, and Russia seized territory in the 
Balkans, the Crimea, and the Caucasus. Then, between 
1812 and 1814, Russia played a central role in the defeat 
of Napoleonic France, helping to inaugurate 30 years of 
reactionary ‘throne and altar’ politics in Europe.13 Tsarist 
Russia henceforward formed, alongside Habsburg Austria, 
one of the two main pillars of conservatism on the continent. 
Surveying the prospects in early 1848, the young Frederick 
Engels declared that, in order to make the democratic 
12. Pipes 1974/1977, 112–29.
13. Dupuy and Dupuy 1970, 614–7, 697–9, 756–63.
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revolution, it would be necessary ‘to fight the barbarian hordes 
of Austria and Russia’.14
Industrialisation
But the military machine was obsolescent by the mid 
nineteenth century. When wars were mainly a matter of 
masses of men, dragooned into line, bludgeoned forwards, 
Russia was well provided. The muskets and cannon needed to 
equip them were easy enough to turn out. These methods won 
the war of 1812, and still sufficed in wars of empire against 
Islamic khanates and Turkic tribesmen in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia as late as the 1860s and 1870s. The Tsar at this 
time was as pre-eminent an imperialist as any, pushing Russia’s 
frontiers forwards until they met those of Persia, Afghanistan, 
and China.
But elsewhere, in conflict with other great powers, the 
Russian Imperial Army proved less formidable. Defeat in the 
Crimean War (1853–6) – fought on home territory against 
British and French invasion forces – revealed military weakness 
amounting to national crisis. Road and rail links to the front 
were virtually non-existent, the army’s supply-line collapsed, 
and tens of thousands died unnecessarily of cold, disease, and 
hunger. The infantry were equipped with outdated muskets, 
so the prevailing military doctrine still favoured the bayonet 
over the bullet. Many officers were ignorant, corrupt, and 
brutal. The rank and file were sullen, cattle-like. The army was 
held together by ferocious discipline. The maximum number 
of lashes permitted was 6,000: a death sentence several times 
over. Leo Tolstoy, who fought in the Crimea, wrote that ‘we 
14. Engels 1848/1973, 108.
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have no army: we have a horde of slaves cowed by discipline, 
ordered about by thieves and slave-traders’.15
Reform was essential. Other parts of Europe were indus-
trialising. Russia was not. The gap between the capitalist 
nation-states of Western Europe and the medieval empire 
of the Tsars was widening. By the late nineteenth century, 
great-power status depended on railways, howitzers, and 
machine-guns. To remain a great power, Russia had to 
have them, and that meant she had to have the coal mines, 
steelworks, and engineering plants to produce them. An 
industrial revolution had become a matter of national survival.
Lacking a sufficient stock of private capital, Russian 
economic development took a distinctive form. Under Sergei 
Witte, who held a succession of government economic posts 
between 1891 and 1903, the Tsarist state set about constructing 
an advanced military-industrial complex. As Witte complained 
in a confidential memorandum to the Tsar in 1899:
The economic relationship of Russia to Western Europe 
is precisely similar to the relationship between colonial 
countries and their metropolises. But … Russia is a 
politically independent and mighty power; it has the right 
and the power not to want to pay tribute forever to the 
economically more advanced states … Russia wishes to be 
a metropolis itself.
Witte saw no alternative to large-scale state investment, with 
high taxes and foreign loans to fund it, and a protective wall of 
tariffs to keep out imports.
15. Goodlad 2015, 20–1.
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Between 1892 and 1900, two-thirds of government 
spending was devoted to economic development, mainly 
railways, the principal driver of early twentieth-century indus-
trialisation. The length of Russia’s railway network doubled in 
less than 15 years. Pig-iron production almost trebled in ten. 
The overall industrial growth rate in the Witte years was 8 per 
cent per year: higher than that of any other major state at the 
time, and a phenomenal rate by any standards. By 1914, Russia 
ranked fifth in the world for industrial output, behind the US, 
Germany, Britain, and France, but ahead of Austria-Hungary, 
Italy, and Japan. 
State debt spiralled, but the foreign loans to fund it poured 
in. French financiers in particular were more willing to 
lend in Russia than at home; Belgian, German, and British 
bankers also invested heavily. Foreigners may have supplied 
as much as a third of Russian capital in 1890, almost half 
by 1900. This flow of capital funded not only the railways 
and the heavy industries that supplied them – coal, iron, 
steel, machine-building – but other sectors too, like textiles, 
chemicals, oil. The number of weaving spindles in Russia, 
for example, increased by three-quarters between 1890 and 
1900.16
Russia’s new industries were of the most advanced kind. 
Such large-scale investment meant big modern factories and 
cutting-edge technology. Russian capitalism was able to leap 
the early phases of industrialisation in a single bound. Thus, by 
1914, whereas small enterprises of less than 100 workers still 
employed 35 per cent of US factory workers, they employed 
only 18 per cent of their Russian counterparts. By contrast, 
16.  Kochan 1967/1970, 24–31; Kochan and Abraham 1962/1990, 226–9; 
Pipes 1974/1977, 192–3.
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giant enterprises of 1,000 or more employed 18 per cent in the 
US and no less than 41 per cent in Russia.
These new industries were concentrated in a handful of 
economic zones. Two-thirds of Russia’s industrial workers were 
employed in just three hotspots: St Petersburg (metallurgy, 
machinery, armaments), Moscow (textiles, metal-processing, 
chemicals), and the Ukrainian Donbass (coal, iron, chemicals). 
Also important were Russian Poland (textiles, coal, iron, 
chemicals), the Urals (mining, metallurgy), and Baku (oil).17
On the other hand, the industrial sector as a whole remained 
relatively small; some four-fifths of Russians still worked on 
the land, compared with less than a third in the US. Despite 
the boom, Russian infrastructure and output were still dwarfed 
by those of Imperial Germany, the fast-rising titan of European 
capitalism. On the eve of war in 1914, Germany’s railway density 
was 30 times greater than Russia’s; even Austria-Hungary’s 
was 18 times greater. Early twentieth-century Tsarist Russia 
was a mixture of the most advanced technique and primeval 
backwardness: an extreme example of what Trotsky called 
‘combined and uneven development’.18
It was not simply that the new industries made a contrast 
with a vast, languid, primitive countryside. Tradition and 
modernity interpenetrated everywhere; the entire social order 
was destabilised as market forces eroded the solidarity of the 
village, uprooted young peasants, and cast them into the mines, 
mills, and metal-works of Russia’s exploding slum-cities. 
The central contradiction of Tsarism – between, on the one 
hand, the great-power status of the regime and its geopolitical 
imperatives, and, on the other, the relative underdevelopment 
17. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 31–2; Kochan 1967/1970, 35.
18. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 31; Cliff 1989, 128.
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of economy, society, and culture – yawned wider as Russia 
commenced its belated, catch-up industrial revolution. In 
1905, the contradiction exploded into crisis, as military defeat 
in the Far East detonated proletarian revolution in Europe.
The 1905 Revolution
Russian imperialism’s three pressure-points were the Black 
Sea, Central Asia, and the Far East. Pushing against the 
decaying Ottoman Empire, Russia’s advance in the Black Sea 
region had been blocked by combinations of other European 
powers, during both the Crimean War of 1853–6 and the 
Russo-Turkish War of 1877–8. The conquest of Central 
Asia had also come up against a barrier: here, through the 
nineteenth century, among the petty potentates of Persian 
steppes and Afghan mountains, Britain and Russia played out 
a diplomatic ‘Great Game’ whose outcome was stalemate. The 
Far East appeared to offer better prospects.
The ‘Scramble for China’ was well underway by the late 
nineteenth century, as rival powers hacked off chunks of the 
ancient empire’s territory (‘concessions’ in the diplomatic 
language of the time) to found a string of coastal trading ports. 
The magnetic pull of easy pickings in northern China drew the 
attention of Tsarist statesmen, and the Trans-Siberian Railway 
was constructed across Manchuria to Vladivostok. But the 
port was ice-bound three months a year and gave direct access 
only to the Sea of Japan, from which passage to the Pacific was 
through the narrow and easily defended Straits of Tsushima. 
The supreme prize was Port Arthur on the Liaotung Peninsula: 
a warm-water port on the Yellow Sea.19
19. Connaughton 2003, 11–15.
22 ◆  A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
But there was a rival for influence here. In the war of 1894–5, 
exploiting (and laying bare) China’s weakness, the Japanese 
had bludgeoned their way into Korea, Manchuria, and Port 
Arthur. At the time, the threat of combined naval action by 
Russia, Germany, and France had forced the Japanese to 
disgorge their gains. The Russians had then filled the vacuum, 
obtaining a lease on Port Arthur, building a rail link with the 
Trans-Siberian, and pushing troops into Manchuria and Korea. 
Meantime, the Japanese had embarked on a crash programme 
of ship-building. Eight years later they were ready, and on 8 
February 1904 they renewed the struggle for northern China 
by attacking the Russian forces holding Port Arthur.20
The war was a disaster for the Russians. The Japanese 
forces were efficient, up-to-date, and highly motivated. They 
were also fully mobilised in a war fought close to home. The 
Russians, by contrast, could deploy only part of their strength, 
and had to operate at the end of a 5,000-mile railway line. Local 
transport and supplies were inadequate, officers corrupt and 
incompetent, troops badly equipped, tactics antiquated. The 
Siberian peasant-soldier was tough but neither resourceful 
nor enthusiastic. The Tsarist assumption that Japan was a 
second-rate Asian power turned out to be groundless. After 
a succession of shattering victories on land which hurled the 
Russians out of Port Arthur and back 250 miles north of the 
Yellow Sea, the Japanese annihilated the Russian Baltic Fleet 
– just arrived after a voyage of seven months – at the Battle 
of Tsushima on 27 May 1905.21 Well before this, awakened 
by news of defeat in the East, revolution had broken out in 
the West.
20. Kochan and Abraham 1962/1990, 248; Connaughton 2003, 16–24.
21. Dupuy and Dupuy 1970, 920–6; Connaughton 2003, 25–36.
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‘We need a small victorious war to stem the tide of 
revolution’, Prime Minister Plehve had announced when the 
war against Japan began.22 In the event, as Trotsky observed, 
the war ‘drastically speeded up the natural process of 
destruction of the autocracy’.23 Military defeat and political 
agitation intermeshed in the autumn of 1904 as middle-class 
liberals ratcheted up a campaign for constitutional reform in 
the face of an intransigent regime. In December came the news 
that Port Arthur had fallen to the Japanese. And on 9 January, 
the working class of St Petersburg entered the political fray. 
Marching from four or five assembly points in the suburbs, 
the workers converged on the Winter Palace in the centre of 
the city, perhaps 200,000 strong, the biggest demonstration in 
Russian history. Led by Father Gapon – a simple priest, part 
gullible tool of the Tsarist police, part well-meaning man of the 
people – they were wearing their Sunday best, singing hymns, 
and carrying portraits of the Tsar and icons of the Virgin. A 
black thronging mass standing in the snow, they had come to 
petition their ‘Little Father’ for redress of grievance.
Then it began: Bloody Sunday. The Cossacks – cavalry 
armed with carbines and sabres – charged into the crowd, 
hacking down men, women, and children. As people fled, they 
ran into rolling volleys from lines of Guardsmen. In places, 
the panic-stricken crowd was corralled and cut down where 
it stood. Elsewhere, sporadic killing spilled down the streets 
around the Winter Palace. No-one is sure how many died, but 
it was probably more than a thousand.24 
22. Cliff 1975/1986, 139.
23. Glatter 2005, 42.
24. Chamberlin 1935/1965, 47–9; Kochan 1967/1970, 91–2.
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The following day, 125,000 St Petersburg workers went on 
strike in protest at the massacre. From that moment, though 
it ebbed and flowed, a gigantic movement of mass strikes 
and demonstrations, of peasant insurrections, and of military 
mutinies surged across Russia. It reached its climax that 
autumn. For 50 days, from mid October to early December, 
the Tsarist capital was virtually ruled by the St Petersburg 
Soviet of Workers’ Deputies, a strike committee which had 
evolved into a revolutionary assembly representing some 
200,000 workers. The regime was hammered by a mass strike 
in St Petersburg in October, another in November, and then 
armed insurrection in Moscow in early December.
But the movement could not break through, and the regime 
counterattacked. During October, around 3,500 people 
had been killed in anti-Semitic pogroms organised by the 
secret police and right-wing paramilitaries known as ‘Black 
Hundreds’. In early December, the St Petersburg Soviet was 
suppressed and its leaders arrested; the proletarian suburbs 
of Moscow were shelled and prisoners shot down in cold 
blood. Then, punitive expeditions were dispatched to regions 
of national revolt and peasant insurrection – to Poland, 
the Caucasus, and the Baltic provinces; to Siberia and the 
black-earth regions of Central and European Russia. The toll 
eventually reached 15,000 dead, 18,000 wounded, and 79,000 
imprisoned. The retreating movement collapsed under the 
blows of the Tsarist terror. In 1905, there had been 24 million 
strike-days in Russia; by 1908, it was less than a million.25
Lenin described 1905 as Russia’s great ‘dress-rehearsal’. 
So it was. On the stage of war and revolution, the rottenness 
25.  Serge 1930/1972, 40–1; Chamberlin 1935/1965, 49–58; Kochan 
1967/1970, 86–114; Cliff 1989, 88–116.
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of Tsarism had been laid bare, and the full cast of players 
in the drama of its destruction had appeared – the liberal 
bourgeoisie, the peasantry, the workers, the soldiers and 
sailors, and the political parties, some revolutionary, some not 
so revolutionary. 
Though the millions stirred into motion by the heady events 
of 1905 lapsed back into the apathetic routines of everyday life, 
they had been changed. A river of blood now divided regime 
and people. Never again would a working-class demonstration 
parade behind the symbols of Tsarism and Orthodoxy. And 
among the people, embedded especially in the ranks of the 
urban proletariat, were thousands of activists who, though 
demoralised and disorganised, had been transformed by the 
experience of 1905 into the cadre of a much more extensive 
revolutionary underground.
Not just a dress-rehearsal, then: also a university. And 
as little groups of defeated revolutionaries came together, 
meeting secretly in apartments in the workers’ districts, or 
in foreign towns where as exiles they had taken refuge, they 
discussed the significance of what had happened, and debated 
what had gone wrong.
None more so than those who called themselves ‘Social 
Democrats’ (though today we would call them ‘revolutionary 
socialists’). About two things there was wide agreement: that 
the St Petersburg movement had exhausted itself and subsided 
before the Moscow workers were fully mobilised; and that 
the soldiers – peasants in uniform – had remained loyal to the 
regime.26 
Beyond this, however, the Social Democrats agreed on 
little. Having been welded together in the fires of 1905, they 
26. Serge 1930/1972, 41–3.
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now splintered into fragments as the fires went out; and 
then slowly reformed around three distinct positions. The 
century-old riddle of Russian history – what form must the 
anti-Tsarist revolution take in order to be victorious? – was 
now reconfigured in the light of white-hot experience. The one 
who grasped it best – the inner dynamic of the drama-to-come 
as revealed in its dress-rehearsal – was the man who more than 
any other embodied its living spirit: the 25-year-old Jewish 
intellectual Leon Trotsky, the effective leader of the short-lived 
St Petersburg Soviet. But his was, for long, a minority voice. To 
understand why, we must delve deep into the murky world of 
Russian revolutionary politics between 1825 and 1917.
CHAPTER TWO
The Revolutionaries
Bloody Sunday. The Tsar’s soldiers shoot down demonstrators 
outside the Winter Palace in St Petersburg in 1905.
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Revolutions always take the world by surprise. Often, the 
revolutionaries themselves – always a small minority before 
the revolution actually begins – are the most surprised of 
all. And always, the revolution confounds expectations: it 
invariably plays out differently from the way in which revolu-
tionaries imagined it would. The great German philosopher 
Georg Hegel – who inspired Marx – remarked that ‘The owl 
of Minerva spreads its wings only with the coming of the 
dusk.’ He meant that wisdom follows from experience; first is 
the deed, then the understanding. So it was with the Russian 
Revolution.
Until it happened, hardly anyone could figure out how it 
would happen – even though anti-Tsarist revolutionaries had 
been debating the issue for almost a century. However, the 
false preconceptions mattered, because they affected how 
people acted when the revolution finally arrived. Things then 
unfolded very quickly, and people struggled to think clearly 
amid the profusion of events and cacophony of opinions. 
So they fell back on prior assumptions. Unable to keep pace 
with the actual revolution, they acted according to their 
preconceived notion of how the revolution ought to be. In 
this way, old ideas that did not correspond to real experience 
became a barrier to progress. To understand the clash of rival 
factions during 1917, therefore, it is useful to know something 
of the prehistory of the Russian revolutionary movement.
The first blow in the century-long struggle between Tsarism 
and the Russian Narod (‘people’) had been struck on 14 
December 1825. There was a new tsar, Nicholas I, and the 
soldiers were to take their oath of allegiance in St Petersburg’s 
Senate Square. That allegiance was contested, and for some 
six hours loyalist and rebel soldiers confronted one another 
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across the open space. Then, as the sun went down, the rebels 
having rejected a summons to surrender, cannon were trained 
on them and the square was finally cleared. The Decembrist 
Revolt had collapsed with hardly a shot fired. About 600 
conspirators were later investigated. Of these, five were hanged 
and a hundred or so exiled to Siberia.
Colonel Paul Pestel, one of the Decembrist leaders, said of 
their failure that ‘We wanted the harvest before we had sown.’ 
The British minister in St Petersburg concurred, writing, in 
an analysis that was both accurate and prophetic, that ‘The 
late conspiracy failed for want of management, and want of a 
head to direct it, and was too premature to answer any good 
purpose, but I think the seeds are sown which one day will 
produce important consequences.’
Though the eighteenth-century Russian Enlightenment 
had been a shallow affair, noble officers campaigning against 
Napoleon had been brought face-to-face with the relative 
backwardness of their own society. They found themselves 
commanding an army of serfs and fighting an army of 
citizen-soldiers. And when they followed the retreating French 
into the heart of Europe, marching eventually into Paris itself, 
they saw a new world in the making. So they began plotting 
for change. And being officers and gentlemen, they imagined 
that an aristocratic conspiracy would suffice. The abolition of 
serfdom and a republican constitution were to be achieved 
by a military coup. The Decembrist Revolt was the failed 
revolution of men like Leo Tolstoy’s character Pierre Bezukhov 
in War and Peace: idealists with a sense of noblesse oblige.
The conspirators were a minority of their class, and lacked 
support from other classes. Even their own ranks were shaky: 
they haemorrhaged defectors, and then hesitated in the breach 
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that fateful December day.1 But they were not forgotten. 
‘From a spark a flame will flare up’, wrote one of the exiled 
Decembrists in reply to a sympathetic poem addressed to 
them by Alexander Pushkin. And in 1900, when Russian Social 
Democrats founded a revolutionary newspaper, they called it 
Iskra – ‘The Spark’ – because they looked back in admiration 
to their Decembrist forebears. Grigori Zinoviev, a leading 
Bolshevik, considered them ‘the cream of the aristocracy’, 
men who had ‘detached themselves from their class, broken 
from their families, abandoned privileges, and joined battle 
with the autocracy’.2
The radical intelligentsia
In the wake of the failed revolt, Russian radicalism retreated 
into the intimacy of the salon. It was the currency of the intel-
ligentsia – writers, professional men, liberal bourgeois, young 
nobles – not yet of the common people. Alexander Herzen 
(1812–70) was one its brightest stars. To find the freedom to 
speak out, he chose permanent exile. He was in Paris during 
the 1848 Revolution, and his magazine, The Bell, which 
circulated inside Russia, was later published in London. When 
radical students were expelled from St Petersburg University, 
he wrote to tell them where they should go:
From all corners of our enormous land, from the Don and 
the Ural, from the Volga and the Dnieper, a moan is growing, 
a grumbling is rising. This is the first roar of the sea-billow, 
which begins to rage, pregnant with storm, after a long and 
1. Kochan and Abraham 1962/1990, 152–60.
2. Zinoviev 1923/1973, 17, 71. 
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tiresome calm. V Narod. To the people. That is your place, 
O exiles of knowledge.3
Here was an idea: to the Narod. And Herzen’s cry would call 
forth a generation of revolutionaries with just that aim: the 
Narodniks.
Nikolai Chernyshevsky (1828–89) was another icon of 
radicalism. Arrested in 1862 and incarcerated for almost two 
years in the Peter and Paul Fortress, a grim Tsarist prison in 
St Petersburg, he there wrote his greatest work, What is to 
be Done? He was then sent to hard labour in Siberia for 20 
years. Chernyshevsky represented a change of tone in the 
radical intelligentsia. The ‘men of the forties’, like Herzen, had 
been liberal romantics, whereas the ‘men of the sixties’ were 
social revolutionaries. ‘I do not like those gentlemen who say 
“Liberty! Liberty!” and do not destroy a social order under 
which nine-tenths of the people are slaves and proletarians’, 
wrote the young Chernyshevsky in his diary. ‘The important 
thing is not whether there is a tsar or not, whether there is 
a constitution or not, but that one class should not suck the 
blood of another.’4
Though only a minor character in What is to be Done?, 
Rakhmetov, a renegade young noble, became a role model 
for two generations of Russian revolutionaries. Seeking to be 
‘loved and esteemed by the common people’, he was an extreme 
ascetic, eating only simple food, working as a barge-hauler, 
avoiding drink, and remaining celibate. He read voraciously, 
but chose only original works, and was deliberately brusque of 
3. Chamberlin 1935/1965, 22–3.
4. Chamberlin 1935/1965, 25–7.
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manner to avoid wasting time on formalities and trivia. Cher-
nyshevsky presents Rakhmetov as a new and special type:
They are few in number, but through them the life of all 
mankind expands; without them it would have been stifled. 
They are few in number, but they put others in a position 
to breathe, who without them would have been suffocated. 
Great is the mass of good and honest men, but Rakhmetovs 
are rare. They are the best among the best, they are the 
movers of movers, they are the salt of the salt of the earth.5
Chernyshevsky’s image of the revolutionary as heroic 
champion of the people appealed to his readers because it 
idealised their own situation. In the distant past, the peasants 
had risen in revolt under leaders of their own class – under 
Razin in the 1670s, Bulavin in the 1700s, Pugachev in the 
1770s. But between the defeat of Pugachev in 1775 and the 
outbreak of revolution in 1905, there were no peasant revolts 
in Russia. The popular movements of the eighteenth century 
had lacked leadership: but the radical intelligentsia of the 
nineteenth century lacked a movement.
The intelligentsia is not a class. A class is formed by 
economic processes and social relationships centred on 
exploitation. The intelligentsia is merely a social layer defined 
by occupation, education, and lifestyle. Mass mobilisation of 
an entire social class – the peasantry or the proletariat (the 
industrial working class) – can transform society. The intel-
ligentsia has no such power. Because it is concerned with the 
creation and dissemination of ideas, it may generate critiques 
that give expression to a range of discontents, especially where 
5. Chernyshevsky 1863/1961, ix‒xviii, 221–61, esp. 241.
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the institutions of civil society – as opposed to those of the 
state – are underdeveloped. The intellectuals can then become 
– or imagine themselves to have become – ‘the voice of the 
people’. But critique, however trenchant, cannot be acted 
upon unless it connects with social forces powerful enough 
to overcome the resistance of vested interests. This was the 
impasse confronting Russia’s radical intelligentsia throughout 
the nineteenth century.
For sure, the number of professionally trained persons was 
rising – with the expansion of both the state bureaucracy and 
the industrial economy, from some 20,000 to 85,000 between 
1860 and 1900. Almost 50,000 of these were eventually 
employed by local government institutions (the zemstva) as 
teachers, doctors, engineers, agronomists, and statisticians. To 
meet the demand for professional labour, turn-of-the-century 
Russia had 52 institutions of higher education and 25,000 
enrolled students. This enlarged intelligentsia met in the 
zemstva, the colleges, and numerous semi-clandestine 
discussion ‘circles’, where they debated the polemics published 
in a plethora of radical periodicals known as ‘fat journals’.6
But there was no unified view in this intermediate social 
layer. Nobility and intelligentsia overlapped, especially in a 
country where the landowning class traditionally dominated 
state service. The upper echelons of government were still 
aristocratic, the bureaucracy was organised in a rigid hierarchy 
of ranks and titles, and most men of education, irrespective 
of social origin, sought advancement within this framework. 
Many, unsurprisingly, were out-and-out reactionaries, 
espousing a mystical conservative-nationalist Pan-Slavism, 
which translated in practice into support for Tsarism, 
6. Pipes 1974/1977, 261–5.
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Russian Orthodoxy, and the ‘Black Hundreds’ (semi-official 
paramilitary bands of anti-Semitic thugs). These, for sure, were 
a minority, but most members of the elite, whether noble or 
bourgeois, were moderates; at best, they might be anti-Tsarist 
liberals who advocated parliamentary government.7 This 
strand in Russian life would eventually find its main political 
expression in the Constitutional Democratic Party (the 
Cadets), a liberal bourgeois organisation founded in 1905. 
Only a minority of Russian intellectuals favoured social 
revolution. But it was among this group that debate raged 
about how the autocracy could be overthrown and Russia 
transformed. And it was from this group that virtually all 
senior revolutionary leaders emerged.
Most of the radicals were Narodniks (‘Populists’). 
Russia, even in 1914, remained predominantly a country of 
agriculture and peasants, and the traditional, pre-capitalist 
village commune (the mir) seemed to offer a model for wider 
social reform. The Narodnik vision was of a peasant revolution 
to overthrow the Tsar, the landlords, and the priests, and of 
a post-revolutionary utopia based on villages, free farms, and 
local production.
But how were the dark masses of the Russian countryside 
– the peasants (muzhiks in Russian) – to be stirred into 
action? In 1874, about 2,500 radicals literally ‘went to the 
people’, travelling into the countryside, often wearing peasant 
dress, to agitate among villagers for revolution. Some – like 
those who immediately denounced the Tsar or denied God 
– were reported to the authorities. Others – focusing on 
economic grievances – got a better hearing. But that was all: 
no organisation was built, no struggle sparked. Even so, the 
7. Fitzpatrick 1982/1984, 16–17.
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authorities took no chances, treating the whole movement as 
an attempted revolution, and by the autumn they had more 
than 1,500 young people under arrest. A second ‘going to the 
people’ the following year had similar results.8
Other methods were attempted. On 6 December 1876, a 
small demonstration – probably no more than a few hundred – 
assembled in front of Kazan Cathedral in St Petersburg to hear 
a young student called Georgi Plekhanov deliver a speech and 
unfurl a red banner inscribed ‘Land and Liberty’. Among those 
present were advocates of ‘propaganda of the deed’. Frustrated 
by the inertness of the villages, they argued for campaigns of 
terrorism to jump-start the revolution. Their thinking was 
muddled, but the gist was that terrorism would destabilise the 
state, expose its weakness and repressive character, and inspire 
the peasants with examples of heroic action. The Kazan 
Cathedral demonstration was, of course, broken up by the 
police. ‘Land and Liberty’ then became the name of a secret 
underground organisation. But the group soon split. The 
supporters of ‘Black Partition’ argued for propaganda in the 
countryside, but this faction soon faded away. The supporters 
of ‘People’s Will’ (Narodnya Volya), on the other hand, about 
200 strong, carried out a series of high-profile assassinations, 
culminating in a bomb attack which killed Tsar Alexander II 
in 1881.9
It did not work. The modus operandi of terrorists requires 
them, in the interests of security, to cut their links with the 
masses, who, even if they approve, are left mere spectators. 
The state, on the other hand, can use ‘outrages’ to justify 
intensified repression against all forms of opposition. So 
8. Kochan and Abraham 1962/1990, 215–6.
9. Serge 1930/1972, 25–6; Kochan and Abraham 1962/1990, 216–19.
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it was now. Even the assassination of a tsar failed to trigger 
revolution. What it did instead was to give the government 
its excuse for constructing a fully fledged police state during 
the following decade. All political activity was effectively 
banned, and a greatly expanded police apparatus was granted 
unlimited powers of surveillance, search, arrest, interrogation, 
imprisonment, and exile to deal with ‘crimes against the state’. 
To help track down tiny numbers of revolutionaries, the work, 
movements, and pastimes of ordinary citizens were made 
dependent on official authorisation and hedged around with 
restrictions. To stop a handful of gunmen, nothing was to be 
permitted to any of Russia’s 130 million inhabitants without a 
licence, a passport, or a government stamp.10
The most heroic of the intelligentsia had tried to bring 
down Tsarism with a proclamation and a bomb. All they had 
achieved was to conjure a police state that destroyed them. 
The muzhik masses they had wished to rouse remained in 
political slumber. Why was this?
The peasantry
Peasant life was shaped by agricultural routine and social 
isolation. The long, cold winter was spent largely indoors, in 
family log-cabins warmed by earthen stoves, doing craftwork 
and repairs, resting and sleeping, telling stories, getting drunk. 
Spring would come suddenly with the thaw, the ice breaking 
on the rivers, the waters flooding across the fields, the frozen 
land turning green in their wake. Then, through the short 
growing season from April to September, toil was relentless. 
Typically, Russian peasants operated a three-year cycle, one 
10. Pipes 1974/1977, 305–13.
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field sown with spring oats, a second with winter rye, a third 
left fallow: a primitive, low-yield, medieval system.11
The villages were haunted by poverty, hunger, and disease. 
Horses provided the sole source of power, yet in the 1880s 
one-quarter of the peasants did not own one: they were forced 
to pull their own ploughs. ‘Your majesty has 130 million 
subjects’, Witte wrote to the Tsar in 1898. ‘Of them, barely 
more than half can live; the rest vegetate.’ As a 1905 police 
report explained: ‘Very often the peasants do not have enough 
allotment land, and cannot during the year feed themselves, 
clothe themselves, heat their homes, keep their tools and 
livestock, secure seed for sowing, and, lastly, discharge all 
their taxes and obligations to the state, the zemstvo, and the 
commune.’12
The joint family and the village commune constituted 
almost the whole of the peasant’s social ambit, one in which he 
submerged his own identity, and from the security of which he 
viewed the outside world with suspicion. Most were loyal to 
their ‘Little Father’, who would surely receive them warmly if 
they took their complaints to the palace, and would be as angry 
as they if only he knew the injustices perpetrated by landlords 
and officials in his name. The more devout found adequate 
expression for their weary fatalism in the rituals of Russian 
Orthodoxy, all incense, icons, and ignorance. Most could not 
read, and few journals in any case reached the villages. The 
more broken-spirited took to the bottle.13 Little wonder that 
the Narodnik missionaries of the early 1870s, exotic creatures 
from another world, had hit a wall.
11. Pipes 1974/1977, 141–4.
12. Kochan 1967/1970, 57–8.
13. Pipes 1974/1977, 155–62.
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Yet there was brooding discontent in the hearts of the 
muzhiks. Serfdom had been abolished in 1861, and the 
authorities’ fear of revolt had been a motive. ‘It is better to 
abolish serfdom from above than to wait for the time when 
it will begin to abolish itself from below’, Tsar Alexander II 
had explained to a gathering of Moscow notables in 1856. 
Another motive was the lamentable condition of the Russian 
armed forces. In the wake of the disastrous Crimean War, the 
Tsarist state had urgent need to raise the quality of its military 
conscripts: browbeaten serfs made bad soldiers.14
But the hopes of peasants for a better life – for both the 
abolition of serfdom and a ‘Black Partition’ that would give every 
man a decent-sized farm – were dashed. The Emancipation 
Edict turned out to be a landlord’s charter. Nobility, gentry, 
and rich farmers retained two-thirds of the land, including 
most pasture and woodland. The result was that in European 
Russia, while the 30,000 richest families owned 76 million 
hectares, some 10.5 million peasant households owned only 
a fraction more, 82 million, between them. Even the one-third 
allocated to the peasants had to be paid for. The government 
advanced 80 per cent of the cost to the landlords, but required 
the peasants to pay this back in the form of ‘redemption 
payments’ over a period of 49 years. The remaining 20 per 
cent of the purchase price was paid directly to the landlords 
by the peasants in money or in kind. In consequence, the 
post-emancipation peasantry was crippled by both land 
shortage and debt repayment. Most, therefore, remained in 
thrall to big landowners, the politico-juridical compulsion of 
serfdom now replaced by economic compulsion. The effect 
was to deepen the poverty of the villages. Chronic undernour-
14. Kochan and Abraham 1962/1990, 182.
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ishment raised the death rate by almost a third between 1800 
and 1880. Travellers in the Russian countryside around 1900 
found the muzhik sullen and hostile.15
The abolition of serfdom had another effect: it hastened the 
development of capitalist farming, widening the division in 
the villages between a minority of rich peasants (kulaks) and 
the rest. The process was analysed by the Russian revolution-
ary Vladimir Lenin in The Development of Capitalism in Russia 
(1898). One in five peasants, he observed, constituted a rural 
‘petty-bourgeoisie’ (a class of small-business owners); these 
were evolving into a class of capitalist farmers. They had large 
farms, often supplemented by rented land, well supplied with 
horses (for traction), cattle (for manure), and farm implements 
(like metal ploughs); and they would often hire additional 
labour at busy times. Fully half the peasants, by contrast, 
owned too little property for even basic subsistence. They were 
forced to rent land, hire out their labour, supplement income 
with craftwork, or join the great southward migration of poor 
labourers each spring in search of work on the commercial 
estates of the Ukraine. For Lenin, ‘the real trend of economic 
development of the peasant members of village communes is 
precisely in the direction of the creation of a rural bourgeoisie 
[a class of big-business owners] and of forcing the mass of 
the poorest farmers into the ranks of the proletariat [a class 
of wage-labourers]’. Instead of the village commune being 
a short-cut to socialism, as the Narodniks envisaged, ‘the 
new economic organism which is emerging from the shell of 
serfdom in Russia is commercial agriculture and capitalism’.16
15.  Lenin 1908/undated, 148; Kochan and Abraham 1962/1990, 193; 
Pipes 1974/1977, 164–8.
16. Lenin 1898/undated, 200, 207, 231–2, and passim.
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Others, too, noticed this trend. But where Lenin detected 
revolutionary potential in the emerging rural proletariat, 
the Tsar’s ministers identified potential allies in the peasant 
petty-bourgeoisie. With the spring thaw in 1905, the 
peasants had joined the revolution, looting and burning 
estates, seizing the land they had been so long denied. Once 
order was restored, the government undertook a belated 
agrarian reform, abolishing redemption payments, allowing 
peasants to consolidate holdings and leave the commune, 
and providing funds for the purchase of additional land. The 
village thereby lost control over land and labour as peasant 
farms were privatised and deregulated. Instead of communal 
control over pasture and woodland, and periodic redistribu-
tion of arable, farms became the exclusive private property of 
individual peasants. Altogether 12 million peasant households 
and 130 million hectares were involved. By 1916, independent 
peasants owned two-thirds of the cultivated land in private 
possession in European Russia, had leases on most of the rest, 
and held 90 per cent of the livestock.17 Stolypin, the minister 
chiefly responsible for this policy, was, according to Lenin, 
attempting ‘a bourgeois evolution of the landlord type’; his 
aim was ‘to turn the old autocracy into a bourgeois monarchy’ 
by providing the Tsar with a base of support among a new class 
of agrarian entrepreneurs.18
He failed (and Lenin misjudged how far he had got). The 
peasants gained confidence and strength from the concessions 
won in 1905, and they would join the revolution in 1917 to 
finish the business, seizing the forests of the state, the fields 
of the big landlords, and the warehouses of the commercial 
17. Kochan and Abraham 1962/1990, 270–1; Pipes 1974/1977, 169.
18. Kochan 1967/1970, 142.
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estates – liquidating, that is, remaining large-scale property in 
rural Russia.19 Instead of the village being divided against itself, 
rich peasants against the rest, locked in a new, modern kind 
of class war, it marched as one to settle old scores inherited 
from the feudal past. The middle peasants still had land and 
wanted more. The poor peasants dreamed of a farm of their 
own. Neither Stolypin’s attempted ‘embourgeoisement’ of the 
rich peasants nor Lenin’s imagined ‘proletarianisation’ of the 
poor had yet fractured the medieval solidarity of the village.
Russia’s peasants were still, as Marx had once described 
those of France, ‘a sack of potatoes’: not a collective per se, but 
a mass of individuals bound together as a class by the actuality 
or the hope of petty-proprietorship.
In so far as millions of families live under economic 
conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their 
interests, and their cultural formation from those of the other 
classes, and bring them into conflict with those classes, they 
form a class. In so far as these small peasant proprietors are 
merely connected on a local basis, and the identity of their 
interests fails to produce a feeling of community, national 
links, or a political organisation, they do not form a class. 
They are therefore incapable of asserting their class interest 
in their own name … They cannot represent themselves; 
they must be represented.20
The peasants were the overwhelming majority of Russian 
society, but they were scattered, isolated, and parochial in 
outlook. They were capable of revolutionary action: 1905 had 
proved that. But they considered their revolution complete 
19. Pipes 1974/1977, 169.
20. Marx 1852/1869/1973, 238–9.
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when they had seized the land and divided it up. And if the 
towns remained unconquered, the Tsarist state would survive; 
and in that case, sooner or later, the soldiers would come to 
‘restore order’ in the villages. Successful revolution required 
centralised national leadership. Who was to provide this?
The Social Democrats
Peasant revolt was an essential condition of the Russian 
Revolution. Without it, the army, formed overwhelmingly 
of peasant-conscripts, would remain loyal and shoot down 
the revolutionaries. But it was not a sufficient condition, for 
peasants, an amalgam of petty-proprietors rather than a class 
collective, could not create their own revolutionary party and 
leadership. They had to be led from the outside – by the towns.
The Narodniks had grappled unsuccessfully with this 
problem. While exaggerating the revolutionary potential of the 
peasantry, and the socialist character of the village commune, 
they had imagined themselves, a small party of radical intel-
lectuals, as sufficient to trigger a peasant land-war, either by 
speeches or direct action. By the early 1880s, under intensified 
police crackdown, it was clear they had failed. And some of the 
Narodniks of the 1870s now became the Social Democrats of 
the 1880s. The most important of these was Georgi Plekhanov, 
who, in 1883, founded the Emancipation of Labour Group 
in St Petersburg and, also that year, published the first major 
work of Russian Marxism, Socialism and the Political Struggle.21
All Social Democrats – as socialists in general tended to be 
known a century ago – were agreed that the coming revolution 
would not be led by the countryside, but by the towns. Beyond 
21. Cliff 1975/1986, 25.
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that, however, there was disagreement. Most believed that 
Russia’s backwardness meant that only ‘bourgeois revolution’ 
was possible. It would – so the argument went – overthrow 
Tsarism, establish parliamentary democracy and civil liberties, 
and sweep away the survivals of feudalism in town and country. 
Capitalism would then develop rapidly, creating the precon-
ditions, in the long run at least, for a further revolution to 
achieve socialism. But who would lead this initial ‘bourgeois 
revolution’? Two factions emerged around this question.
The more moderate – known as ‘Mensheviks’ – argued 
that the liberal bourgeoisie, represented after 1905 by the 
Cadet Party, would spearhead the struggle against Tsarism, 
and that it was the job of Social Democrats to support them, 
while avoiding any ‘excesses’ or ‘extremism’ that might 
fracture the class alliance between (liberal) capitalists and 
(socialist) workers. ‘Therefore,’ argued the Mensheviks, 
‘Social Democracy must not aim at seizing or sharing power 
in the provisional government, but must remain the party of 
the extreme revolutionary opposition.’ To do otherwise, to 
seek state power itself, would be disastrous, because the Social 
Democrats ‘would not be able to satisfy the pressing needs of 
the working class, including the establishment of socialism, … 
and … would cause the bourgeois classes to recoil from the 
revolution and thus diminish its sweep’.22 
The more radical faction – known as ‘Bolsheviks’ – argued 
the opposite, claiming that the Russian bourgeoisie was small, 
weak, heavily dependent on Tsarism and foreign capital, and, 
as a class of big property-owners, terrified by the prospect of 
revolutionary upheaval; consequently, the revolution, albeit 
necessarily ‘bourgeois’ in its immediate historic purpose, 
22. Cliff 1975/1986, 197.
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would have to be led by the working class in alliance with 
the peasantry. ‘The only force capable of gaining a decisive 
victory over Tsarism’, declared Lenin in Two Tactics of Social 
Democracy in the Democratic Revolution (1905), ‘is the people, 
i.e. the proletariat and the peasantry … The revolution’s 
decisive victory over Tsarism means the establishment of the 
revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and 
the peasantry.’23
The phraseology was unfortunate. It had been the common 
practice of revolutionaries since the time of Marx, however, 
to describe any form of people power as a ‘dictatorship’. The 
implication was neither autocracy nor even minority rule; 
on the contrary, all revolutionaries were democrats. The 
term was used to express the idea that the majority – the 
working people organised democratically – would have to 
impose their will on the defeated ruling classes by force. But 
there was a far greater problem with Lenin’s formulation, ‘the 
revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and 
the peasantry’: the logic was tortuous. He seemed to be saying 
that only the workers and peasants could be relied upon, but 
having made the revolution, it would be the bourgeoisie – the 
capitalist class – that would end up in charge and reap most of 
the benefit.
He was, however, right about one thing: in 1905, at the 
first sound of gunfire, the Cadets had run for cover. At the 
beginning of the year, leading Cadet Peter Struve had declared 
that ‘every sincere and thinking liberal in Russia demands 
revolution’. By its end, in the wake of the October-November 
mass strikes, he spoke instead of ‘the pernicious anarchy of the 
Russian revolution’.24
23. Cliff 1975/1986, 198.
24. Cliff 1975/1986, 146–7.
THE REVOLUTIONARIES ◆  45 
But there is no question that Lenin’s formulation, however 
accurate its assessment of the bourgeoisie’s timidity, harboured 
a contradiction. Why would the workers, if they were to lead 
the revolution, impose upon themselves and their peasant 
allies a self-denying ordinance, handing over the power they 
had won to their class enemies, restricting themselves to the 
democratic reforms permitted by ‘bourgeois revolution’, 
postponing socialism to some distant and uncertain future?
It was the young Leon Trotsky, almost alone among Russian 
revolutionaries, who grasped the full implications of 1905.25 
His point of departure was the unity of the world, and the way in 
which economic and political competition had forced Tsarism 
into a belated attempt to catch up through a programme of 
rapid industrialisation funded by the state and foreign banks. 
The result was an exceptionally extreme example of ‘combined 
and uneven development’: on the one hand, an absolute 
monarch, a police state, a primitive agricultural system, an 
impoverished peasantry, a weak native bourgeoisie; on the 
other, a technologically advanced industrial sector of giant 
factories, and a concentrated, combative, politicised working 
class. The Bolsheviks appreciated some of the implications. 
Only the proletariat had the potential to lead the revolution. 
Only mass strikes in the cities could detonate peasant revolt. 
Only then would the army mutiny and the Tsarist state 
disintegrate. But there they had stopped. It was Trotsky – 
25.  The main exception to this generalisation is the role played in the early 
development of Trotsky’s thinking by Alexander Israel Helphand (aka 
Parvus). Trotsky met Parvus, a Russian Jewish exile 12 years his senior, 
in Munich in 1904. He later attributed to Parvus ‘the lion’s share’ of 
the thinking behind his own theory of permanent revolution. See Cliff 
1989, 80–7. 
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not at the time a Bolshevik (he joined the faction only in the 
summer of 1917) – who saw further.
To complete and consolidate the victory of democracy over 
autocracy – to prevent the forces of reaction regrouping to 
crush the revolution – the proletariat would have to establish 
a workers’ state. Any such state, being class-based, could not 
be other than an organ of proletarian interests – supporting 
workers’ control of the factories, peasant control of the land, 
and the dispossession of the rich. Anything less, indeed, would 
compromise the victory, for it would leave property and power 
in the hands of class enemies, and, by limiting their gains, 
would undermine the willingness of the workers and peasants 
to defend the revolution.26 Thus, to Lenin’s formulation of ‘the 
democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry’, 
Trotsky counterposed ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat’. In 
opposition to the schematic conception of two revolutions, 
different in character, separate in time, he envisaged ‘permanent 
revolution’ – that is, a revolution that would not stop part-way, 
but would instead spill across Russia’s borders to the rest of 
Europe, and would, at the same time, create a popular mass 
movement of such power that it would strike down all forms 
of class privilege and inaugurate a new democratic-egalitarian 
social order. Trotsky’s argument, in short, was that a Russian 
democratic revolution would inevitably ‘grow over’ into an 
international socialist revolution.27
The proletariat
In ascribing such primacy to the working class, the theory 
of permanent revolution was making an exceptionally bold 
26. Cliff 1989, 126–31.
27. Cliff 1989, 80–7, 123–39.
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claim. Despite record industrial growth rates since 1890, the 
Russian proletariat remained relatively small. Trotsky’s own 
estimate was that it comprised about a sixth of the population 
by 1914, up to 25 million people in all, but that most of these 
were either village-based rural poor or wage-labourers in small 
businesses in minor towns, often living and working in their 
employer’s house. The core proletariat – workers in large urban 
enterprises – numbered only about 3.5 million. Two-thirds of 
the industrial workers, moreover, were located in just three 
regions, St Petersburg, Moscow, and the Ukraine. Many of 
these were new arrivals. The composition of the proletariat 
reflected rapid industrialisation: many workers were young, 
many were women, and many retained strong links with the 
countryside from which they had recently migrated.28
Exploitation in the new factories was extreme, and 
conditions in the fast-expanding industrial quarters appalling. 
Wages were usually insufficient to support a family. Twelve 
hour days were common. The accident rate was 11 per cent 
per year in the mines, 4 per cent in the factories. Discipline was 
maintained by fines and even corporal punishment.
Aleksei Badayev, one of six Bolsheviks elected to the Duma, 
the Tsarist parliament, in 1912, reports numerous abuses. On 
12 March 1914, for example, he was called to the Treugolnik 
plant in St Petersburg, where 13,000 mainly women workers 
were employed making rubber galoshes. They worked a 
ten-hour day, without a dinner break, some for as little as 40 
kopeks, the price of a loaf of black bread. The owners were 
making 10 million roubles in profit a year.
28. Trotsky, 1932–3/1977, 33–4, 55; Kochan 1967/1970, 35–6.
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That morning, a new polish had been issued for galoshes … 
which emitted poisonous gases. Shortly afterwards, scores 
of women began to faint. Terrible scenes followed: in some 
cases the poisoning was so strong that the victims became 
insane, while in others blood ran from the nose and mouth. 
The small, badly equipped first-aid room was packed with 
bodies, and fresh cases were taken into the dining-room, 
while all who were able to move were sent out of the factory. 
‘If they drop down there, the police will pick them up’ – so 
ran the cynical excuse of the management.29
Housing in the workers’ districts was equally stygian. The 
Baku oil-workers, for instance, were herded into barracks 
of such squalor that it was, according to one of the bosses, 
impossible ‘without horror and trembling’ to pass by them. 
‘The workers, all in greasy, soot-covered rags, covered with a 
thick layer of grime and dust, swarm like bees in the extremely 
dirty and congested quarters. A repulsive smell hits you as 
soon as you try to approach the window.’
The St Petersburg and Moscow workers generally lived in 
suburban tenements, but these were no less monstrous. The 
following is typical of municipal reports at the time:
The apartment has a terrible appearance, the plaster is 
crumbling, there are holes in the walls, stopped up with rags. 
It is dirty. The stove has collapsed. Legions of cockroaches 
and bugs. No double window-frames and so it is piercingly 
cold. The lavatory is so dilapidated that it is dangerous to 
29. Reed 1926/1977, 274; Badayev 1929/1987, 143–4.
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enter and children are not allowed in. All the apartments in 
the house are similar.30
Russia’s rulers, eager to catch up industrially with the 
Western powers, made a virtue of the people’s poverty. ‘The 
Russian peasant is much less demanding than the Western 
European or more particularly the North American worker,’ 
proclaimed Witte, ‘and a low wage for Russian enterprise is 
a fortunate boon, which complements the riches of Russian 
natural resources.’31
But matters were not so simple. Uprooted from the 
countryside and plunged into a satanic process of break-neck 
capital accumulation, Russia’s young workers fought back 
in successive waves of mass strikes, each mixing economic 
struggle and political protest, each stronger and more 
threatening than the last – the first in the late 1870s, the 
second in 1896–7, the third in 1903–6, a fourth beginning in 
1912. Each time, the workers were hit by savage repression, 
and each time they learned lessons – about the bosses, the 
police, and the narks, about unity and solidarity, about whom 
they could trust in their own ranks, about how to organise and 
fight. Above all, they learned that economics and politics were 
inseparable: that when one fought the boss for a living wage, 
one faced the truncheons and sabres of the Tsarist state. So 
the fight in the workplaces turned the more determined of the 
proletarian militants into political revolutionaries – creating a 
new kind of Russian ‘intelligentsia’: one formed of self-taught 
‘worker-intellectuals’.
30. Kochan 1967/1970, 37–9.
31. Kochan 1967/1970, 40.
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The old radical intelligentsia – recruited from the educated 
elite – had peeled away from the underground movement after 
1905. Lenin sneered that nine-tenths of them, perhaps as many 
as 99 per cent, had gone off to become millionaires, get a cushy 
office job, or make money in some sort of swindling. ‘Young 
Russian workers’, he wrote later, ‘now constitute nine-tenths of 
the organised Marxists in Russia.’32 This was the general view. 
Alexander Shlyapnikov, himself a worker-intellectual as well as 
a leading underground organiser, put it thus: ‘The place of the 
petty-bourgeois intellectuals and student youth was taken up 
by the intellectual proletarian with calloused hands and highly 
developed head who had not lost contact with the masses.’33 
Leaflets, newspapers, and pamphlets – smuggled in and 
circulating illegally – would be read out in small clandestine 
gatherings and then passed on until they were in tatters and 
dropped to pieces. Such was the thirst for radical ideas that the 
underground struggled to satisfy it, especially in the war years, 
under intensified police repression. ‘The demand for illegal 
socialist literature’, recalled Shlyapnikov,
was so great that the poor illegal technology could not meet 
it. Private initiative came to its aid. Every sort of manuscript, 
hectographed or retyped copy of individual proclamations, 
articles from illegal publications abroad, etc., circulated 
among the workers. A typewritten copy of Lenin and 
Zinoviev’s The War and Socialism [a pamphlet] was passed 
from hand to hand around Moscow. Social Democrat and 
Communist [newspapers] were such luxuries that 50 kopeks 
or a rouble would be paid for one reading. There were 
32. Cliff 1975/1986, 353–4.
33. Le Blanc 1993/2015, 171–2.
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demands for hundreds of copies of Communist, and workers 
would readily put aside three roubles of pay for a copy.
When the underground printing presses could not produce 
enough, ‘enthusiastic amateurs existed who would copy out 
whole pamphlets by hand’.34
Much nonsense has been written about Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks. He has been caricatured as a ruthless and 
manipulative authoritarian, his followers as the cult-like dupes 
of a man set upon personal dictatorship and fulfilment of 
a messianic mission. Thus, the argument runs, the roots of 
Stalin’s Gulags are to be found in the ‘democratic centralism’ 
of Lenin’s party. The caricature has many facets. One is the 
claim that Lenin set out to build – and succeeded in building 
– a party in which middle-class intellectuals presided over 
working-class foot soldiers. The opposite is true: the Bolshevik 
Party of 1912–17 – the largely new party that emerged as the 
Russian labour movement recovered from the defeat of 1905 
– was, both by intention and in actuality, overwhelmingly 
working class in composition and thoroughly democratic 
in nature. What is true is that the building of that party was 
first and foremost the achievement of Lenin. And because his 
achievement is so contested and misconstrued, we must give 
the rise of the Bolsheviks – the party that made the revolution 
– detailed attention.
34. Shlyapnikov 1923/1982, 92, 156.
CHAPTER THREE
Lenin and the Bolsheviks
Lenin’s Iskra. Underground revolutionary propaganda  
ate like an acid into the social fabric of Old Russia.
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Early on the morning of 5 May 1887, a small steamer delivered 
five students, shackled in irons, to the Schlusselburg Fortress 
on the River Neva, a short distance from St Petersburg. They 
were held in separate cells, small and whitewashed, with 
stone floors and iron doors, for three days. Then, on 8 May, 
they were woken in the early hours and led into the prison 
courtyard, where three wooden scaffolds had been erected. 
They were hanged in two batches. Two of them, before they 
died, cried out the name of their party: ‘Long live Narodnya 
Volya!’
They had been condemned to death for membership of a 
‘criminal society attempting to overturn the existing state and 
social order by means of violent revolution’. They had, the 
prosecutors explained, organised a ‘secret circle for terrorist 
activity’ and were planning to assassinate Tsar Alexander III.
One of the five was called Alexander Ulyanov.1 The 
20-year-old son of a school inspector and minor notable, he 
had been brought up in Simbirsk, a dull provincial town on 
the River Volga. His younger brother was still attending high 
school there. His name was Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov. The 
world would come to know him as ‘Lenin’.
The man who became the leader of the Bolsheviks is incom-
prehensible without his Narodnik background. The young 
radicals of Narodnya Volya were the heroes of Lenin’s youth. 
Though he never spoke of his brother in public, there can be 
little doubt that Alexander’s martyrdom affected him deeply. 
He read and re-read What is to be Done?, and his private photo 
albums contained several pictures of Chernyshevsky. His wife 
and comrade, Nadezhda Krupskaya, tells us that he always 
held ‘the old revolutionaries of the Narodnya Volya in great 
1. Salisbury 1977/1978, 1–4.
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respect’.2 At the end of his own What is to be Done? (1902) – 
so-named, of course, in honour of Chernyshevsky – he wrote 
of Russia’s new generation of revolutionaries as follows:
Nearly all of them in their early youth enthusiastically 
worshipped the terrorist heroes. It was a great wrench 
to abandon the captivating impressions of these heroic 
traditions, and it was accompanied by the breaking off of 
personal relationships with people who were determined 
to remain loyal to Narodnya Volya and for whom the young 
Social Democrats had profound respect.3
This was autobiography: this was the difficult journey taken 
by the man whose brother had swung in the noose of a Tsarist 
hangman for his allegiance to Narodnya Volya.
The Narodniks failed because they attempted to substitute 
the individual terrorism of revolutionaries for the collective 
action of the masses. Lenin and his followers were inspired 
by the romantic heroism of the Narodniks, but appalled by 
the futility and waste. They understood – even admired – 
the impatience and idealism, but at the same time knew that 
history could not be forced. The essence of Lenin’s politics – 
worked out between 1888, when he first read Marx, and 1902, 
when he wrote What is to be Done? – was to think of revolution 
as a process for which an engine had to be constructed. 
His design had four main parts. These were: a vision of the 
world transformed by revolutionary action; an underground 
activist network to turn this vision into a framework political 
organisation; the growing of this organisation into a mass 
2. Krupskaya 1960/1975, 40, 47–8, 82–3; Lih 2011, 19–31.
3. Lenin 1902, 189.
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social movement through recruitment of the most militant 
people in every industrial centre; and the eventual role of 
this essentially proletarian-urban movement in detonating 
a country-wide insurrection of the Russian Narod. Let us 
consider this ‘blueprint’ for revolution in more detail.
The concept of revolution
Marxism can be defined as the theory and practice of 
international working-class revolution. When the young 
revolutionaries Karl Marx and Frederick Engels were first 
working out their ideas in the early 1840s, they confronted 
what appeared to be a historical riddle. The steady rise in 
the productivity of human labour throughout history meant 
increasing capacity to abolish want. Yet a minority continued 
to enjoy grotesque wealth while millions lived in poverty. The 
riddle was: who might so reorder the world that human labour 
served human need?
Their answer to this question was the new working class 
– or proletariat – being created by the Industrial Revolution. 
This was partly because it was an exploited class, one with 
no vested interest in the system, with, as they put it, ‘nothing 
to lose but its chains’. But this had been true of the slaves of 
ancient Rome and the serfs of medieval Europe. A second 
factor was decisive. The workers – unlike slaves or peasants 
– could not emancipate themselves through individual appro-
priation of private property. They were part of a complex 
international division of labour, such that only collective control 
over the means of production, distribution, and exchange 
could provide a credible alternative to capitalism. The village 
might march on the mansion, evict the landlord, and divide 
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up the estate into small plots. The situation of the workers 
was quite different. Concentrated in factories and cities, the 
workers were bound to act collectively. And, since they could 
not partition a textile mill, railway line, or telegraph network, 
were they to take power as a class, they would be obliged to 
rule collectively. The proletariat was therefore the first class in 
history with a general interest in the emancipation of humanity 
as a whole.
The 1848 Revolutions – which swept across Europe that 
year, with armed uprisings in Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, 
Prague, Rome, and a dozen other major cities – led Marx and 
Engels to another radical conclusion: that the proletariat was 
the only class capable of any sort of determined revolutionary 
action. During the armed uprisings, the liberal bourgeoisie, 
fearful of social upheaval, had stood paralysed as the cannon 
of counter-revolution cleared the barricade-fighters from 
the streets. ‘In the best of cases,’ Engels later wrote, ‘the 
bourgeoisie is an unheroic class. Even its most brilliant 
victories – in England in the 17th century or in France in the 
18th – had not been won by it itself, but had been won for it 
by the plebeian masses of people.’ This was quite so. Without 
action from below by revolutionary crowds in London, and 
later by the soldiers of the New Model Army, the English 
Revolution would have stalled. Equally, without repeat insur-
rections by the Parisian sansculottes – in 1789, 1792, and 1793 
– the Jacobins, the most resolute of the French bourgeois 
revolutionaries, would never have come to power. But the 
German bourgeoisie of 1848 seemed to have plumbed new 
depths of ‘stupidity and cowardice’, and the searing experience 
of its spinelessness, culminating in a comprehensive defeat for 
democracy, had compelled Marx and Engels to reconfigure 
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their conception of what they – like Trotsky much later – 
called ‘permanent revolution’.4 
This represented an extraordinary shift of perspective and 
strategy. Marx was, in effect, announcing that the bourgeois 
revolution was over, that the struggle for democratic reform 
was now inextricably bound up with that for social reform, 
and that henceforward the sole agent of revolution was the 
(at that time still embryonic) industrial proletariat. He, and to 
a greater extent Engels, later retreated from the radicalism of 
this conception (of 1849), and there seems to be little trace 
of it in late nineteenth-century Marxism. The Russian Social 
Democrats were therefore confused about the nature of their 
own imminent revolution – confused to the point of bitter 
controversy.
Lenin’s position (until 1917) was that of the mainstream – 
but with a Russian twist. He argued that revolutionary action 
by the proletariat and peasantry was necessary to accomplish 
the tasks of the ‘bourgeois revolution’ – the overthrow of 
the autocracy, the establishment of a democratic republic, a 
redistribution of land to the peasants, and an eight-hour day 
in the factories. The autocracy would not relinquish power 
voluntarily, therefore revolution was necessary. But the liberal 
bourgeoisie was bound to betray the revolution, so that ‘the 
only force capable of gaining a decisive victory over Tsarism 
is the people, i.e. the proletariat and the peasantry … The 
revolution’s decisive victory over Tsarism means the estab-
lishment of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the 
proletariat and the peasantry.’5
4. Draper 1978, 201–49, 268.
5. Cliff 1975/1986, 198.
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What the Marxist philosopher Georg Lukács called ‘the 
actuality of the revolution’ was at the very core of Lenin’s 
politics. He was, on his Russian side, a descendant of the 
Decembrists and Narodniks, and on his European, of Marx and 
Engels. In him, the romantic tradition of revolutionary heroes 
battling a police state was allied to the theory and practice of 
international working-class revolution. More precisely – and 
true to Marx’s axiom that ‘the emancipation of the working 
class will be the act of the working class’ – the two conceptions 
fused in Leninism, such that the heroic leader of the people 
became the revolutionary proletariat itself.6
Lenin’s touchstone became the revolutionary programme 
adopted by the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party 
at its Second Congress in 1903. Written by Plekhanov and 
effectively the party’s founding statement, Lenin, for the rest 
of his political career, would insist upon adherence to it – in 
opposition to backsliders and renegades – as the true measure 
of socialist commitment. It was unequivocal:
the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party takes as its 
most immediate political task the overthrow of the Tsarist 
autocracy and its replacement by a democratic republic 
… In striving to achieve its immediate aims, the RSDLP 
supports every oppositional and revolutionary movement 
directed against the social and political order prevailing in 
Russia … the RSDLP is firmly convinced that complete, 
consistent, and lasting realisation of … [radical change] … 
is attainable only through the overthrow of the autocracy 
6.  Lukács 1924/1970/2009, 9–13 and passim; Lih 2011, 14–15 and 
passim.
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and the convocation of a constituent assembly, freely elected 
by the entire people.7
The revolutionary underground
Radical ideas, if they are to become an historical force, must 
be turned into political organisation. A vision of the world 
transformed is pie in the sky without a revolutionary party. 
On the other hand, there is no blueprint for revolutionary 
parties. History reveals many different kinds. It also shows 
them forming, growing, and changing as organic parts of mass 
movements. The Levellers, the Chartists, the Jacobins, and the 
Communards can all be regarded as alternative forms of revo-
lutionary party. The Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social 
Democratic Labour Party was yet another kind. What all of 
these have in common is a) that they were mass parties rooted 
in social movements, and b) that they developed organically 
over time. The Bolshevik leader Grigori Zinoviev explained 
that a party
is a living organism connected by millions of threads with 
the class from which it emerges. A party takes shape over 
years and even decades … the living dialectical formation of 
a party is a very complex, lengthy, and difficult process. It is 
born amid sharp pangs, and it is subject to perpetual crystal-
lisations, regroupings, splits, and trials in the heat of struggle 
before it finally takes shape as a party of the proletariat…8
A revolutionary party, then, is not a thing that springs 
ready-made into existence – like Athena from the head of 
7. Plekhanov 1904/1978, 6, 9.
8. Zinoviev 1923/1973, 12–13.
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Zeus at the stroke of history’s hammer – but is something that 
evolves continuously in an organic relationship with the class 
movement of which it is part. The revolutionary party is never 
in a state of being, only ever in a state of becoming.9
So it was with the Bolsheviks. The ‘prehistory’ of Russian 
Social Democracy can be traced back to the establishment of 
a ‘Chaikovist’ group in St Petersburg in 1870, a ‘South Russian 
Workers’ League’ in Odessa in 1875, and a ‘North Russian 
Workers’ League’ in St Petersburg in 1878. All these organi-
sations, however, were tiny, short-lived, and intellectually 
inchoate. More substantial – and explicitly Marxist – was the 
‘Emancipation of Labour Group’ formed by Georgi Plekhanov 
in St Petersburg in 1883, after he and a handful of other intel-
lectuals had made the break with Narodnik populism and 
committed themselves to building a proletarian party.
But the impact of Russia’s socialist pioneers was minimal. 
Though the state-driven industrialisation programme was 
gathering steam, the working class remained relatively small. 
There had been a miniature strike wave in the late 1870s, but 
severe repression following the assassination of the Tsar in 1881 
smothered both incipient labour militancy and embryonic 
socialist organisation for a decade. Russian Social Democrats 
could be numbered in the tens, most of them exiles. Plekhanov 
remained their standard-bearer. ‘The Russian revolution will 
either triumph as a revolution of the working class,’ he declared 
at the First Congress of the Second International in 1889, ‘or it 
will not triumph at all.’10
There are desert plants that lie dormant for years only to 
erupt suddenly into life when finally it rains. Plekhanov’s big 
9. Lukács 1924/1970/2009, 37.
10. Zinoviev 1923/1973, 18–37 passim; Cliff 1975/1986, 21–7 passim.
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idea was of this kind. It was a seed hidden in the social depths 
awaiting an eruption of mass struggle that would allow it to 
burst forth. It was a long time coming, but then, in the mid 
1890s, Russia’s new industrial districts were rocked by strikes 
far bigger than those of the late 1870s. A new generation of 
revolutionary intellectuals – including a young Lenin, who 
had arrived in the capital from provincial Simbirsk two years 
previously – were active supporters of the strikes. In 1895, 
Lenin and others founded the St Petersburg League of Struggle 
for the Emancipation of the Working Class. The movement 
peaked in May 1896 with a three-week strike by 30,000 St 
Petersburg textile workers in which the League of Struggle 
played a leading organisational role. Russian Social Democracy 
thus became a small mass movement. Its committed activists 
were now to be numbered in the hundreds.
But the movement subsided. Lenin and five other members 
of the St Petersburg League had been arrested in December 
1895 and sentenced to terms of exile in Siberia. When the 
remnants of several groups met in Minsk in March 1898, this 
‘First Congress’ of Russian Social Democrats comprised just 
nine delegates. No party programme was adopted, and eight of 
the delegates, including two of the three newly elected Central 
Committee members, were arrested within days.11
Lenin, meantime, had three years of exile to reflect on his 
experience of the class struggle and the socialist underground. 
When he returned to active politics in 1899, he had a fully 
worked out strategy for building a revolutionary party in 
Russia. Much of the debate about ‘Leninism’ hinges on inter-
pretations of Lenin’s theory and practice in this crucial period, 
11. Zinoviev 1923/1973, 47–53 passim; Cliff 1975/1986, 42–68 passim. 
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between 1899 and 1903, when ‘Bolshevism’ emerged as a 
distinct current within Russian Social Democracy.
Despite much ill-informed commentary to the contrary – 
by both enthusiasts and detractors – Lenin’s Bolshevik Party 
was never a ‘democratic-centralist’ sect. A political sect can 
be defined as a small organisation run by a self-appointed 
‘vanguard’ that seeks to insert itself into a mass movement in 
order to grow parasitically like a tic. A ‘democratic-centralist’ 
organisation is one where power is concentrated in the hands 
of a (largely) self-perpetuating leadership, or even in the hands 
of a single cult-like guru. Small organisations of this kind exist 
in all periods. Mass revolutionary parties, on other hand, are 
never like this. The reason is simple: revolution ‘from below’ 
– that is, revolution where the emancipation of the masses 
is the act of the masses themselves – means an explosion of 
democracy. Here is how Trotsky described it in his History of 
the Russian Revolution:
The most indubitable feature of a revolution is the direct 
interference of the masses in historic events … at those 
crucial moments when the old order becomes no longer 
endurable to the masses, they break over the barriers 
excluding them from the political arena, sweep aside 
their traditional representatives, and create by their own 
interference the initial groundwork for a new regime … 
This history of a revolution is for us first of all a history of the 
forcible entrance of the masses into the realm of rulership 
over their own destiny.12
12. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 17.
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The ideal to which Lenin and the Bolsheviks aspired was 
therefore an open, mass, democratic party capable of giving 
effective expression to the revolutionary energy of the Russian 
working class. Their model was the German Social Democratic 
Party (SPD). The largest working-class organisation in the 
world, and the dominant force in the Second International (a 
confederation of European socialist parties), by 1912 the SPD 
had a million members, was publishing 90 daily papers, and 
ran a women’s section, a youth section, various trade unions 
and co-ops, and numerous sports clubs and cultural societies. 
In that year, it made a dramatic electoral breakthrough, 
winning one in three votes, becoming, with 110 seats, the 
largest party in the Reichstag, the German parliament. In the 
space of a generation, it had been transformed from a small 
outlawed minority into a mass social movement and electoral 
machine.13 The SPD’s theoretical foundation-stone was Karl 
Kautsky’s Erfurt Programme (1892), a book-length treatise on 
the perspective and strategy of the up-and-coming German 
workers’ party. That Lenin translated it into Russian in 1894 
tells us everything we need to know about his political debt to 
Kautsky and the SPD.14 That this debt was huge is confirmed 
by the testimony of other Bolsheviks, all of whom, 
without apparent exception, regarded the SPD as a model 
socialist party.15
13. Faulkner 2013, 186–7.
14.  Lih 2011, 42–3 and passim; here, and on a much grander scale in Lih 
2008/2013, Lars Lih sets out a compelling case that Lenin, so far from 
being a ‘democratic-centralist’ setting out to create ‘a party of a new 
type’, was in fact a mainstream European Social Democrat, at least up 
until 1914, and to some degree until as late as 1917.
15. Shlyapnikov 1923/1982, 16–17.
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The problem in Russia was the police. How do you build a 
mass democratic party in a police state? To organise openly 
was impossible, and without open organisation you could 
neither make democratic decisions nor hold democratic 
elections. Indeed, the looser the network, the more vulnerable 
it was to penetration by the police. The more people you had 
attending a meeting, especially when many were new and 
inexperienced in underground work, the greater the risk of 
discovery and arrests. How, in these circumstances, could the 
party make democratic decisions? How could the leadership 
be democratically chosen? The simple fact was that democracy 
and police repression were polar opposites. Two questions 
therefore imposed themselves on Russia’s Social Democratic 
underground: a) how best to build socialist organisation in 
Tsarist Russia; and b) how best to uphold the principles and 
programme of the party.
‘The closer the end of our exile drew in sight,’ wrote 
Krupskaya, Lenin’s partner, 
the more did Vladimir Ilyich think about the work facing us. 
The news from Russia was scanty. ‘Economism’ was gaining 
ground there, and there was no party to speak of. We had 
no printing plants in Russia … Party work was completely 
disorganised, and constant arrests made any continuity 
impossible.16
‘Economism’ was a reformist argument inside Russian Social 
Democracy to the effect that the workers should concern 
themselves with the ‘economic’ struggle for improved 
conditions and leave the ‘political’ struggle for democracy 
16. Krupskaya 1960/1975, 44.
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to the liberals. It reflected a mechanical view of the coming 
Russian revolution as ‘bourgeois’ rather than ‘proletarian’.17 
That this idea could gain so much traction among Russian 
socialists was, for Lenin, a symptom of the organisational and 
ideological disintegration of the party.
Lenin’s plan for the reconstruction of Social Democracy was 
two-fold. First, he proposed the publication of an all-Russian 
socialist newspaper. This would be produced abroad, smuggled 
into Russia, and then distributed to the underground groups 
across the country. A coherent set of revolutionary-socialist 
ideas disseminated in this way would cement together the 
party’s activist network and help it recruit new members. 
Moreover, the very process of illegal distribution would itself 
create and sustain the network. ‘A paper is what we need above 
all’, he wrote.
Without it we cannot systematically carry on that extensive 
and theoretically sound propaganda and agitation which is 
the principal and constant duty of the Social Democrats … 
Our movement, intellectually as well as practically (organ-
isationally), suffers most of all from being scattered, from 
the fact that the vast majority of Social Democrats are 
almost entirely immersed in local work, which narrows their 
point-of-view, limits their activities, and affects their con-
spiratorial skill and training … The Russian working class 
… betrays a constant desire for political knowledge – they 
demand illegal literature, not only during periods of unusual 
unrest, but at all times.
17. Cliff 1975/1986, 59–66.
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Political education was one function of the revolutionary 
paper. There was another. He continued:
the role of the paper is not confined solely to the spreading 
of ideas, to political education, and to procuring allies. A 
paper is not merely a collective propagandist and collective 
agitator; it is also a collective organiser. In that respect, it can 
be compared to the scaffolding erected around a building 
in construction … With the aid of, and around, a paper, 
there will automatically develop an organisation … The 
mere technical problem of procuring a regular supply of 
material for the newspaper and its regular distribution will 
make it necessary to create a network of agents of a united 
party … This network of agents will form the skeleton of 
the organisation we need.18
The second part of Lenin’s plan was to tighten party 
organisation to make it more impervious to police penetration. 
This is perhaps the most widely misconstrued aspect of 
Lenin’s work. An immediate practical response to the problem 
posed by the Tsarist police has been elevated into either a 
universal principle of revolutionary organisation (in the case 
of sectarians) or into a grand strategy for the construction of 
a totalitarian dictatorship (among right-wing commentators). 
Here is what Lenin actually proposed:
The leadership of the movement should be entrusted to 
the smallest possible number of the most homogeneous 
possible groups of professional revolutionaries with great 
practical experience. Participation in the movement would 
18. Lenin 1901, 112–15.
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extend to the greatest possible number of the most diverse 
and heterogeneous groups of the most varied sections of 
the proletariat (and other classes of the people) … We must 
centralise the leadership of the movement. We must also … 
as far as possible decentralise responsibility to the party on 
the part of its individual members, of every participant in 
its work, and of every circle belonging to or associated with 
the party. This decentralisation is an essential prerequisite 
of revolutionary centralisation and an essential corrective 
to it.19
This can be summarised as: keep the core cells of the party 
centralised and closed (to protect them from the police); but 
encourage the highest possible level of initiative and activity 
on the part of the wider mass movement within which the 
party is embedded.
The first all-Russian socialist newspaper – Iskra (‘The 
Spark’) – was launched in December 1900. Over the next 
three years, while Lenin was on the editorial board (he was 
destined to lose control of his own creation), a total of 51 
issues appeared.20 The establishment of Iskra was uncontro-
versial, but the other part of Lenin’s plan – to make the party 
more police-resistant – proved far more problematic: it was, 
in fact, the origin of a factional dispute that would divide the 
party for more than a decade.
It blew up – unexpectedly – at the Second Congress of 
the RSDLP (the first proper conference), held in Brussels 
and London in July‒August 1903. About 60 people attended 
(though not all with voting rights) and virtually all the 
19. Cliff 1975/1986, 91–2.
20. Lih 2011, 73–5.
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major industrial cities and regions were represented.21 Lenin 
worked hard in preparing the conference, hoping to match the 
achievement of founding Iskra with the creation of ‘a united 
solid party, merging into one all the detached groups … a party 
in which there would be no artificial barriers’ (Krupskaya).22 
He set out his vision in advance in a long pamphlet destined 
to become one of his most famous publications: What is to 
be Done? It ends with this rallying cry to all the revolutionary 
forces of Russia:
If we genuinely succeed in getting all or a significant majority 
of local committees, local groups, and circles actively to take 
up the common work, we would in short order be able to 
have a weekly newspaper, regularly distributed in tens of 
thousands of copies throughout Russia. This newspaper 
would be a small part of a huge bellows that blows up 
each flame of class struggle and popular indignation into a 
common fire. Around this task … an army of experienced 
fighters would systematically be recruited and trained. 
Among the ladders and scaffolding of this common organi-
sational construction would soon rise up Social Democratic 
Zheliabovs from among our revolutionaries, Russian Bebels 
from our workers, who would be pushed forward and then 
take their place at the head of a mobilised army and would 
raise up the whole Narod to settle accounts with the shame 
and curse of Russia.23 
21. Zinoviev 1923/1973, 84–5.
22. Krupskaya 1960/1975, 85.
23. Lih 2011, 82–3.
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This passage encapsulates the fusion of theoretical clarity, 
practical measures, and revolutionary romanticism that was 
the essence of Lenin’s politics – in contrast to the desiccated 
conceptions of both sectarians and reactionaries. The 
newspaper will create and bind together an underground 
network. The network will combine the heroism of Narodniks 
(like Zheliabov) with the politics of Social Democrats (like the 
German SPD leader Bebel). It will fan into flame a movement 
of the whole people (the Narod: workers and peasants) 
powerful enough to destroy the Tsarist regime.24
For some, the vision was an inspirational dream. For 
others, it was a nightmare. Though issues became tangled and 
allegiances shifted, in the succession of rows that divided the 
Second Congress can be detected a fundamental difference 
between those who sought compromises with others and 
those whose aim was proletarian revolution.
The most significant argument arose over a seemingly minor 
issue: the definition of a party member. Lenin proposed that 
the statutes should define a member as one ‘who recognises 
the party’s programme and supports it by material means and 
by personal participation in one of the party organisations’. Martov 
proposed deleting the final phrase and replacing it with ‘and by 
regular personal association under the direction of one of the party 
organisations’.25 The issue at stake was simple: was the party to 
be formed only of the activist vanguard, or was it to include 
anyone loosely ‘associated’ with the party?
There was nothing elitist about Lenin’s conception: anyone 
could choose to become a party activist. His point was that 
only those who committed themselves in this way should be 
24. Lih 2011, 82.
25. RSDLP 1904/1978, 320–34; Cliff 1975/1986, 108–10.
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empowered to make decisions. The risk otherwise was that 
the politics of the party would be diluted by a lukewarm 
swamp of passive ‘members’. At root, Lenin argued, Martov 
was confusing party and class:
the party must be only the vanguard, the leader of the vast 
masses of the working class, the whole (or nearly the whole) 
of which works ‘under the control and direction’ of the 
party organisations, but the whole of which does not and 
should not belong to a ‘party’ … when our activities have 
to be confined to limited, secret circles and even to private 
meetings, it is extremely difficult, almost impossible in fact, 
for us to distinguish those who only talk from those who do 
the work … It would be better if ten who do work should 
not call themselves party members … than that one who 
only talks should have the right and opportunity to be a 
party member.26 
Lenin was right. The revolutionaries were a minority 
swimming against the current. Confronting them was the 
whole power of official society, which, by force and by fraud, 
was deployed to contain the class struggle. When the workers 
came onto the streets, they faced force – the batons and bullets 
of the police. The rest of the time, they were sold a fraud – 
that God had ordained the social order, that the Tsar was their 
‘Little Father’, that the Jews were the enemy. Most workers, 
in consequence, had a ‘mixed consciousness’. Because they 
were victims of the system, they were open to the arguments 
of revolutionaries, especially in moments when they gained 
confidence through collective struggle. But because they were 
26. Cliff 1975/1986, 108–9.
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also ground down by the system, they were rarely wholly free 
of what Marx called ‘the muck of ages’ – the piety, deference, 
and racism that conspire to keep people in their place by their 
own decision.
If this were not the case – if the working class was instinc-
tively and spontaneously revolutionary – there would be no 
need for a party. Martov’s conception, where the party is 
dissolved into the mass, would then be the right one. But in 
reality class consciousness is contested and contradictory. A 
battle of ideas rages across society, with socialists on one side 
and the propagandists of the system on the other. Conscious-
ness is therefore uneven across the working class. Because of 
this, the party must comprise a vanguard of worker-activists 
who have broken decisively with the old order, who reject 
all its reactionary arguments, who embrace the vision of a 
world transformed, who come, individually and collectively, 
to embody ‘the actuality of the revolution’. Only a party so 
formed would be capable of resisting the pull to the right – 
towards what was called, in the political discourse of the time, 
‘conciliationism’ or ‘liquidationism’ – and instead constitute 
a solid pole of attraction for the accumulation of revolution-
ary forces. 
A line was drawn at the Second Congress between reformists, 
henceforward known as ‘Mensheviks’ (meaning ‘supporters of 
the minority’), and revolutionaries, henceforward ‘Bolsheviks’ 
(‘supporters of the majority’). Lenin lost some votes, won 
others, and emerged in control of the party leadership. But 
he later found himself displaced as allegiances shifted again 
inside the small groups of Russian political exiles whose 
self-appointed task it was to sustain the party infrastructure and 
supply it with literature. He fretted over the divisions, doubted 
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their significance, made overtures to repair relationships. It 
seemed absurd, with so much at stake, with such a sound plan 
in place, that the party should be wrecked by faction.
The divisions, however, were real. Time would show this. 
The mass of RSDLP members favoured unity. The workers 
were intolerant of squabbles among exiled party intellectu-
als, who appeared self-indulgent and irresponsible to those 
engaged in day-to-day struggle against the bosses and the 
police. Partly because of this, relations between the two 
factions see-sawed between split and semi-unity until January 
1912, when, at a small party congress in Prague convened 
by the Bolsheviks but boycotted by the Mensheviks, Lenin’s 
followers assumed authority over the RSDLP.27 What made 
this event decisive was that the Bolsheviks now enjoyed an 
overwhelming majority among the activists of the revolution-
ary underground inside Russia, and that the working-class 
movement in which they were embedded was entering upon 
a new phase of mass struggle.
So the division in the RSDLP was not a sudden event 
engineered by a dogmatic ‘splitter’ in 1903; it was a decade- 
long process in which a powerful instinct for unity was 
eventually overwhelmed by intractable differences. Nor was 
the substantive issue – as the common caricature would have 
it – Bolshevik ‘centralism’ versus Menshevik ‘democracy’. As 
soon as police repression was lifted and open party-building 
became possible – as during the 1905 Revolution – Lenin 
starting denouncing the centralism and conservatism of Social 
Democratic activists. ‘We need young forces’, he wrote in 
February 1905:
27. Le Blanc 1993/2015, 159–66.
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I am for shooting on the spot anyone who presumes to say 
that there are no people to be had. The people in Russia are 
legion; all we have to do is to recruit young people more 
widely and boldly … without fearing them. This is a time 
of war. The youth – students, and still more so the young 
workers – will decide the issue of the struggle. Get rid of 
all the old habits of immobility, of respect for rank, and so 
on. Form hundreds of [party] circles … from among the 
youth and encourage them to work full blast … Allow every 
sub-committee to write and publish leaflets without any 
red tape (there is no harm if they do make a mistake) … 
Do not fear their lack of training, do not tremble at their 
inexperience and lack of development … Only you must be 
sure to organise, organise, and organise hundreds of circles, 
completely pushing into the background the customary, 
well-meant committee (hierarchic) stupidities.28
Lenin’s problem in 1905 was the inherent conservatism 
of all human organisation. Without a degree of routine and 
continuity, no stable political party can exist. But when the 
tide turns, the party must go with it or be left washed up on 
the beach. The ‘professional revolutionaries’ of 1903 – the 
Comitetchiki (committee-people) – became barriers to the 
creation of a mass democratic party in 1905. They feared 
‘dilution’ of the party. Lenin railed against them, demanding 
mass recruitment of young workers and the replacement of 
intellectuals by workers on party bodies. ‘The inertness of 
the committee-people has to be overcome’, he proclaimed. 
‘Workers have the class instinct, and, given some political 
experience, they pretty soon become staunch Social 
28. Cliff 1975/1986, 171–2.
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Democrats. I should be strongly in favour of having eight 
workers to every two intellectuals on our committees.’29
What is to be Done? and the 1903 split have become 
fetishised – transformed into the holy text and founding ritual 
of a mythological ‘party of a new type’. The truth is that Lenin 
was ‘a man of the people’ to his inner core; that all his political 
instincts were deeply democratic; and that his politics were 
rooted in a profound belief in the transformative power of 
mass working-class action. Everything else was secondary: 
a matter of the strategy and tactics necessary to unleash the 
torrential force of a democracy shackled by a police state. As 
Krupskaya explained it, reflecting on Lenin’s early years as a 
propagandist and agitator among the St Petersburg workers:
Vladimir Ilyich had implicit faith in the proletariat’s class 
instinct, its creative powers, and historic mission. This 
faith had not come suddenly to Vladimir Ilyich, but had 
been hammered out during the years when he had studied 
and pondered Marx’s theory of the class struggle, when 
he had studied Russian realities, and learnt, in fighting 
the ideas of the old revolutionaries [the Narodniks], to 
offset the heroism of the solitary fighter by the strength 
and heroism of the class struggle. It was not just blind 
faith in an unknown force, but a deep-rooted belief in the 
strength of the proletariat and its tremendous role in the 
cause of working-class emancipation, a belief founded on a 
profound knowledge and thorough study of the facts of life. 
His work among the St Petersburg proletariat had helped to 
29. Cliff 1975/1986, 174.
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identify this faith in the power of the working class with real 
live people.30
The activist vanguard
Osip Piatnitsky was an active socialist for more than 40 years. 
A Polish Jew and apprentice tailor, he was introduced to 
Social Democratic politics by his two older brothers and his 
workmates at the age of 14. He was soon active in the illegal 
tailors’ union, in the Bund, the Jewish socialist party affiliated 
to the RSDLP, and in a clandestine political discussion circle 
(the boundaries between union, party, and circle were highly 
porous in the underground movement). Experience of strikes 
and street clashes with Cossacks and police hardened his 
politics. In the winter of 1900/1, he broke with the Bund in 
opposition to its Jewish separatism, becoming an ‘Iskra-ist’, 
a member of the group that would soon evolve into the 
Bolsheviks. Despite awesome personal sacrifice – periods of 
unemployment, poverty, homelessness, and hunger; periods 
of imprisonment and Siberian exile – his will remained 
unbroken.31 He was an archetypal ‘worker-Bolshevik’, a 
‘professional revolutionary’ in the manner of Lenin’s What is 
to be Done?, the kind who, in Trotsky’s description, ‘dedicates 
himself completely to the labour movement under conditions 
of illegality and forced conspiracy’.32 A rare survivor from 
the earliest years, he was, like so many of the Old Bolsheviks, 
eventually murdered by Stalin’s police (in 1938). 
30. Krupskaya 1960/1975, 108.
31. Piatnitsky 1935, 15–28 and passim.
32. Le Blanc 1993/2015, 14. 
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How did the revolutionary underground to which Piatnitsky 
belonged operate? Leaflets might be printed on a secret 
press, reproduced on a hectograph machine, or even copied 
out by hand. They would then be distributed in bundles at a 
clandestine meeting and each activist allocated one or more 
streets for delivery. Copies of revolutionary pamphlets and 
newspapers might be smuggled across the Russo-German 
frontier in Poland or (later) across the Russo-Finnish border 
in the far north, and from there distributed across Russia in 
suitcases with false bottoms, in ‘breastplates’ (coats with 
literature sewn into the lining), and even in picture-frames 
and book-covers. Wafer-thin paper was used, and the margins 
might be cut off to reduce weight further.33
Because demand exceeded the supply that could be 
smuggled, efforts to run illegal print-shops were relentless. 
The ‘Caucasian Fruit Shop’ in Moscow’s Rozhdestvensky 
Boulevard, for instance, was the front for a secret printing-press 
in the basement. The ‘shopkeeper’ was a party member, 
and deliveries of printing supplies and dispatches of printed 
material were boxed as ‘Caucasian fruit’. The print-shop, a 
small room artificially lit, contained an American press, a 
work-bench, trays of type, and boxes of paper. The thud of the 
press could be heard in the shop above, so a bell was installed 
to give warning to stop when a customer entered. Urgent work 
would be done by two activists working through the night. 
The press existed for eight months, from September 1906 
to April 1907, before being discovered by the police. In this 
period, 45 separate publications were issued. These included 
addresses, manifestos, pamphlets, journals, numerous leaflets 
33. Piatnitsky 1935, 25, 39, 57–8, 69.
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(these with a total print-run of 1.5 million), and a small May 
Day poster (print-run 350,000).34 
In this way, the exiled leadership reached deep into the 
Russian proletarian movement. But success depended upon 
a painstakingly constructed top-down network. Piatnitsky, 
appointed Odessa organiser in 1905, explains:
The organisation of that time, in Odessa as well as in the rest 
of Russia, was built from top to bottom on the principle of 
co-optation. In the plants and factories and in the workshops, 
the Bolsheviks who worked there invited (co-opted) 
workers whom they considered to be class-conscious and 
who were devoted to the cause.35 
On this foundation, through careful selection, was constructed 
an edifice of district, regional, and city-wide committees.
City committees had the right to co-opt new members. 
When a city committee was arrested as a body, the central 
committee of the party designated one or more members 
to form a new committee, and those appointed co-opted 
suitable comrades from the workers of that region to 
complete the new committee.36
There was no other way. The risks were too high. Any 
open organisation would immediately have been penetrated 
by informers. Any amateur slip-up could lead the Tsarist 
police direct to a meeting-place and result in mass arrests. 
34. Piatnitsky 1935, 107–10, 120–1.
35. Piatnitsky 1935, 76–7.
36. Piatnitsky 1935, 77.
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Underground revolutionary work required skill, experience, 
and exceptional precautions. Prison, torture, even death 
stalked the movement’s activists. Piatnitsky was mortified 
when one of his collaborators, a foundry worker, was caught 
with illegal literature:
They beat Solomon Rogut until he lost consciousness, and 
dragged him naked from the police station to the police 
headquarters, demanding the names of his comrades and 
where he got the literature … Solomon Rogut was sent 
to the Kovno prison. A month later, we learned that he 
had hanged himself (it was never established whether he 
really committed suicide or was beaten to death) … it left 
an indelible impression on me: I had caused the death of a 
comrade.37
For a revolutionary to remain at large in Tsarist Russia was 
to play an exhausting game of cat-and-mouse with the police. 
Activists travelled under false names, with made-up identities, 
carrying forged passports, often wearing disguises. If aware, 
or suspecting, that they were under surveillance, they would 
take long detours on the way to a rendezvous, dodging down 
alleyways and disappearing through tenements and backyards; 
jumping onto passing tramcars was an especially popular way 
of getting away from a police tail. More wearisome still was the 
lack of a home. Activists known to the police might have to 
change lodgings every few days. Piatnitsky would sometimes 
find himself trudging the streets or sleeping rough, unable to 
return to lodgings being watched by the police, unable to find 
37. Piatnitsky 1935, 32–3.
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alternative accommodation. Just to exist as a revolutionary 
could be a full-time occupation.38
Most veterans of the struggle endured periods of 
imprisonment and exile. The experience was variable. In 
the Lukyanovskaya prison in Kiev in 1902, the regime was 
exceptionally relaxed. Piatnitsky found it full of rebellious 
middle-class students, who had forced major concessions 
from the governor. On the political wing, where large numbers 
of Iskra-ists were being held, cell doors were open from 
morning till night, as was the door to the exercise yard, and 
inmates spent their time reading and debating. ‘The prison 
thus became my university’, Piatnitsky recalled. ‘I began to 
read systematically under the guidance of an educated Marxist 
who knew the revolutionary and Marxist literature very well.’39
Twelve years later, however, awaiting dispatch into Siberian 
exile, the Samara prison was far worse – head shaved, forced 
to wear prison uniform, no mixing with other politicals, hard 
labour cleaning cells, solitary confinement for minor offences, 
strip searches in the bitter cold. After a six-month wait, the 
passage to Siberia was made partly on foot, sleeping in filthy 
peasant huts without washing facilities; ‘there were biting 
frosts with snow-storms which made our progress on the 
snow-covered roads difficult’. The end of the long trek was the 
benighted wilderness village of Fedino, where the inhabitants 
slept in their clothing all year round, the beds, walls, and 
floorboards were infested with bugs and cockroaches, and life 
was ‘unbearably dull’.40 
38. Piatnitsky 1935, 96, 114, 123–4.
39. Piatnitsky 1935, 36–41.
40. Piatnitsky 1935, 205–20.
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Again and again, organisation was destroyed by mass arrests 
and had to be built anew, the scattered fragments reassembled, 
new forces recruited to replace those lost to the prisons. Long 
before the final split with the Mensheviks in 1912, this spider’s 
web, spread across Russia and connected by long threads to the 
exiled leadership abroad, was Lenin’s party. Here, in the revo-
lutionary underground, under the searching gaze of the Tsarist 
police, there was no place for the half-hearted, the fair-weather 
friend, the salon intellectual. To operate in the netherworld 
of illegal activism required high levels of commitment and 
endurance. The revolutionary paper provided the cohesive. It 
was, explained Piatnitsky, ‘the centre of gravitation for all the 
heterogeneous revolutionary elements of the Russian working 
class’; and when Lenin lost control of Iskra and was forced to 
create a new organ – Vperyod (‘Forward’) – the same network 
distributed it, for ‘the transport apparatus in Russia was in the 
hands of the party majority’. Here, in the lower depths of the 
social order, the mole of history was at work: one of the secrets 
of the Bolshevik Revolution is that the activist vanguard of the 
RSDLP was, from the earliest days, instinctively Leninist.41 
The effectiveness of this vanguard is incomprehensible 
if we imagine them to be the cult-like groupies of a remote 
guru – as the caricatures of Bolshevism would have it. Even 
had Lenin been ‘democratic-centralist’ in intent, he could 
not have been so in practice, since there was no mechanism 
for imposing the rule of exiled party leaders on a network of 
small, widely scattered, secretly organised socialist groups 
with whom communications were intermittent and highly 
tenuous. Indeed, any such thing would have been madness, for 
the leadership was in no position to know how, say, the Baku 
41. Piatnitsky 1935, 52, 69.
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oil-workers, the Moscow textile-workers, or the Petersburg 
engineering-workers should best operate in the circumstances 
confronting them. Any attempt to presume such knowledge 
from an exile enclave in distant Zurich (or wherever) would, 
given the intensity of police repression, have been the height 
of irresponsibility, quite possibly exposing activists to arrest 
and whole groups to liquidation. 
Here is Piatnitsky:
The initiative of the local party organisations, of the cells, was 
encouraged. Were the Bolsheviks of Odessa, or Moscow, or 
Baku, or Tiflis, always to have waited for directives from the 
Central Committee, the provincial committees, etc., which 
during the years of the reaction and of the war did not exist 
at all owing to arrests, what would have been the result? The 
Bolsheviks would not have captured the working masses 
and exercised any influence over them.42 
The July Days of 1914
Lenin’s genius was embodied in the Bolshevik faction of the 
Russian Social Democratic Labour Party which he led from 
1902 to 1917. The Bolsheviks were a network of proletarian 
activists with a clear mission: to unite the masses, support their 
struggles, and fan the flames into a revolutionary conflagration 
powerful enough to destroy the Tsarist regime. Sometimes it 
was a matter of bare survival for tiny, scattered, hounded groups 
of revolutionaries in the most forbidding of circumstances. 
42.  Faulkner 2014. I quoted this in a blog article without a reference, and I 
cannot now find the source, so must crave the reader’s indulgence. It is 
in Piatnitsky somewhere! 
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Other times it was a matter of opening the gates of the party 
to thousands of angry young workers brought to life by a great 
upsurge of struggle from below. As circumstances changed, to 
remain what they aspired to be – the revolutionary leadership 
of the Russian proletariat – the Bolsheviks had to be flexible, 
responsive, able to adapt, yet at the same time immune to both 
‘liquidationism’ (a collapse into reformist acceptance of the 
existing social order) and ‘ultra-leftism’ (issuing slogans and 
calls to action that were too radical to evoke a mass response in 
current circumstances). Getting the balance right was a matter 
of constant adjustment as circumstances changed.
The 1905 Revolution had involved Lenin in a head-on 
collision with the party’s Old Guard, who feared ‘dilution’ in a 
sea of new members. The defeat of the revolution created a far 
more serious crisis. ‘The years of Stolypin’s counter-revolution’, 
reported Zinoviev, 
were the most critical and most dangerous in the party’s 
existence … the party as such did not exist; it had disinte-
grated into tiny individual circles, which differed from the 
circles of the 1880s and early 1890s in that, following the 
cruel defeat that had been inflicted upon the revolution, 
their general atmosphere was extremely depressed.43  
Under the hammer blows of repression, many Mensheviks 
became explicitly liquidationist, arguing for the abandonment 
of illegal work, the dissolution of underground networks, an 
exclusive focus on the economic struggles of the workers, 
and political support for the liberals in the Duma, the Tsarist 
semi-parliament set up in 1906. Many Bolsheviks, however, 
43. Zinoviev 1923/1973, 165.
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drew the opposite conclusion, arguing that a new revolu-
tionary upsurge was imminent, that the underground was 
the only proper field of action, and that the Duma and other 
Tsarist institutions should be boycotted. Lenin opposed both 
the liquidators on the right and the sectarians on the left. 
‘Since the accursed counter-revolution has driven us into this 
accursed pigsty [the Duma],’ he declared, ‘we shall work there, 
too, for the benefit of the revolution, without whining, but also 
without boasting.’44 
The argument was not easily carried. ‘The whole of our 
party was fragmented into groups, sub-groups, and factions’, 
recalled Zinoviev. ‘In those hard days our central task consisted 
in assembling the party piece by piece, preparing its rebirth, 
and, above all, defending the principles of Marxism against 
all possible distortions.’45 The aim was always the same: 
proletarian insurrection in the cities, peasant revolution in 
the countryside, the overthrow of Tsarism. But strategy had to 
conform to the prevailing balance of class forces, with tactics 
geared to the confidence, consciousness, and combativity of 
the workers. Until the revolution burst forth again, even the 
Tsarist Duma could be used as a platform for propaganda. 
But only for that, as Lenin made clear: ‘The Bolsheviks regard 
direct struggle of the masses … as the highest form of the 
movement, and parliamentary activity without the direct 
action of the masses as the lowest form of the movement.’46
The downturn lasted from 1907 to 1911. Then the strike 
rate doubled in a year, and the movement seemed to be 
reviving. The regime overreacted. On 4 April 1912, with 6,000 
44. Cliff 1975/1986, 252.
45. Zinoviev 1923/1973, 164.
46. Cliff 1987, 8.
84 ◆  A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
workers on strike in the Lena goldfields in Siberia, the police 
opened fire and shot down more than 500 people. Nothing like 
it had happened since Bloody Sunday in January 1905. More 
workers – 500,000 – struck in protest in April 1912 than in the 
whole of the preceding four years. Nor was it momentary rage. 
May Day that year saw a massive 400,000-strong protest, and 
the industrial and political unrest continued for the next two 
years, reaching its peak in the first half of 1914, when almost 
1.5 million workers took strike action, a level comparable with 
1905. Most of the strikes were openly political.47
The Bolshevik Party surged. Lenin, determined to drive 
the liquidators out of the RSDLP, organised a party congress 
in Prague in January 1912. Other Social Democratic factions 
refused to attend (organising an alternative congress in Vienna 
in August). The result was that the Bolsheviks took full control 
of the RSDLP, since their party opponents, ‘the August Bloc’, 
lacked any real influence in the underground movement 
inside the country. The two tendencies – the split at the top, 
the balance on the ground – henceforward reinforced each 
other. Ideologically unified around an uncompromising rev-
olutionary programme – encapsulated in the party’s ‘three 
whales’: the eight-hour day, the confiscation of landed estates, 
and a democratic republic – the Bolsheviks now consolidated 
their grip on the advanced workers. Reformists and intellec-
tuals drifted away. The party became at once more Bolshevik 
and more proletarian.48 It also became younger: the veterans 
in their thirties (rarely older) were reinforced after 1912 by a 
flood of new members in their teens and twenties.49 
47. Kochan 1967/1970, 161–2; Cliff 1975/1986, 319–22.
48. Le Blanc 1993/2015, 156–78.
49. Le Blanc 1993/2015, 183.
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Alexander Shlyapnikov, another veteran working-class 
activist, returned from exile in April 1914 and got a job in an 
engineering factory in the Vyborg district of St Petersburg. The 
place was in ferment. Life was an endless round of leafleting, 
paper drops, solidarity collections, clandestine discussions, 
mass meetings, strikes, rallies, demonstrations, clashes with 
the police.50
Every conflict, small or large, irrespective of its origin, 
provoked a protest strike or walk-out. Political meetings and 
skirmishes with the police were everyday occurrences. The 
workers began to make contacts among the soldiers at the 
nearby barracks … An extremely active part … was taken 
by women workers, the weavers and mill-girls: some of the 
soldiers were from the same villages as the women workers, 
but for the most part the young people came together on the 
basis of ‘interests of the heart’ … It was totally impossible to 
turn such troops against the workers.51
By early July 1914, Petersburg was on the brink of revolution. 
A token strike called by the Bolsheviks in solidarity with the 
oil-workers of Baku in the distant Caucasus erupted into a 
massive confrontation when state forces opened fire in the 
streets of the capital. The entire proletariat was soon in action 
as 300,000 workers joined a week-long general strike. Veterans 
of 1905 advised on the erection of barricades and wire entan-
glements using knocked-down telegraph poles. Factory 
workers blocked streets by overturning carts and lacing 
them with wire. Children ripped up cobblestones, and young 
50. Shlyapnikov 1923/1982, 1–8.
51. Shlyapnikov 1923/1982, 6–7.
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workers hurled them at the Cossacks and the police. Across 
the city there were mounted charges, beatings, shootings, mass 
arrests. But when the workers returned to work, they did so 
unbeaten, their mood buoyant, expectant.52
Everyone was overjoyed and encouraged by the recent 
strike, which had united a huge army of labour in one vivid 
upsurge of anger. This solidarity could not be smashed 
either by the police, or by the ‘glorious’ Cossackry, or by the 
threats of starvation from the coalition of factory-owners … 
Everyone felt that a decisive and nationwide battle was just 
around the corner.53 
But it was not. Suddenly, as if by magic, the movement 
dissolved into nothing. The Tsar had declared war on 
Germany, and the revolutionary mood was transformed into 
patriotic fervour. On 2 August, a huge crowd, wholly different 
in demeanour from those manning the barricades a few days 
before, assembled in the square outside the Winter Palace. 
White uniforms appeared briefly on the balcony and then 
retired – perhaps testing the popular mood? Then others 
appeared, and, reports the British journalist and writer Arthur 
Ransome, who was there, 
this time the Tsar was indeed among them, showing himself 
to the people for the first time in many years, to be greeted 
with extraordinary emotion and a tremendous singing 
of the national anthem. The strikes of a few days before 
were forgotten. War, as so often before and after, had for 
52. Shlyapnikov 1923/1982, 9–13; Kochan 1967/1970, 161–5.
53. Shlyapnikov 1923/1982, 13.
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the moment welded the nation into one, or had seemed to 
weld it.54 
The Tsar’s declaration of war had been a gamble. How would 
an insurrectionary people react? Would they rally round the 
Tsar? Or would they follow the revolutionaries and proclaim 
the international solidarity of the working class? 
Russia’s corrupt, vicious, tottering regime now had its 
answer. War had cauterised revolution. Nationalism had 
suffocated socialism. Portraits of the Tsar had replaced the 
banners of Bolshevism. Soon, millions would be marching to 
the front.
54. Ransome 1976, 168.
CHAPTER FOUR
The Great War
Russian peasant-conscripts (in German captivity). Millions were 
consumed in industrialised carnage for profit and empire.
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The Guards Army was Russia’s military elite: 65,000 strong, 
they had been held back from the front line until now, 
having been designated the Tsar’s personal reserve. But the 
one-month-old Brusilov Offensive was losing momentum. 
The success had been stupendous. It had been Russia’s 
greatest victory of the war. The enemy had suffered 1.5 
million casualties and been pushed back 50 miles. But the 
Russians had lost half a million men, their logistics were 
breaking down the further they advanced, and the Germans 
had rushed reinforcements from the Western Front to bolster 
their Austro-Hungarian allies. So the Guards were now sent 
into the line.
But their attack was mismanaged – by an incompetent high 
command packed with aristocratic favourites – and they found 
themselves chest-deep in a swamp, where they were destroyed 
by the relentless machine-gunning of swarms of German 
planes. ‘The wounded sank slowly in the marsh, and it was 
impossible to send them help’, wrote one senior observer. ‘The 
Russian command for some unknown reason seems always to 
choose a bog to drown in.’ In two weeks, during the horrendous 
Battle of Kowel, the Guards Army lost 80 per cent of its men. 
Soon afterwards, as the enemy lines continued to thicken 
and the autumn rains rendered the swamps impassable, the 
Brusilov Offensive closed down in renewed stalemate.1
So numerous were the rotting corpses in the swamps of 
Kowel that the Russians sought a truce to clear them away. It 
was often thus on the Eastern Front. Hecatombs of Russian 
dead. ‘No-one knows the figures’, wrote Field-Marshal 
Hindenburg after the war. ‘All we know is that sometimes in 
our battles with the Russians we had to remove the mounds of 
1. Lincoln 1986, 250–7.
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enemy corpses from before our trenches in order to get a clear 
field of fire against fresh assaulting waves.’2 
Modern industrialised warfare
Russia’s greatest victory was also Russia’s last throw. Embroiled 
in a war of mass and machines, a war of attrition decided by 
industrial power, Russia, despite its prodigious economic 
development since 1890, lacked the factories and railways to 
fight a modern war. The First World War was the culmination 
of a military revolution. The infantryman of 1914 could fire 
ten times as fast and at five times the range of his predecessor 
a century before. Heavy machine-guns, with ranges of two 
miles, could spray 250 bullets across a 500-yard expanse in 
a single minute. Field guns, with ranges of four miles, could 
maintain a steady four rounds a minute – firing shells filled 
with high-explosive, shrapnel, or gas. Such firepower created 
an impenetrable ‘storm of steel’ and an ‘empty battlefield’. Men 
crawled from shell-hole to shell-hole, sheltered in the rubble 
of bombed-out buildings, or tunnelled into the ground. To 
reach them, guns became heavier and more numerous, and 
attacks would be preceded by terrific bombardments in which 
trenches, dug-outs, and bunkers were blasted apart. 
Industrial output was decisive: the demand was always for 
more guns, more shells, more explosive. Mass production 
provided the uniforms, equipment, guns, munitions, and 
supplies to sustain armies of millions. Brusilov began his 
offensive in 1916 with 600,000 men: an army five times the size 
of the Russian army at Borodino in 1812. His total casualties 
were 15 times greater. These figures are dwarfed by those for 
2. Lincoln 1986, 259.
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the war as a whole. In 1914, the Russian army numbered five 
million; by the end of the first year, a million had been killed, 
wounded, or captured. Before the war ended, the Russians 
would have mobilised no less than 12 million, of whom 75 per 
cent would have become casualties. This was the scale of the 
world’s first modern industrialised war.
Tsarist Russia was unequal to the challenge. The breakdown 
began immediately with a crushing defeat at Tannenburg in 
East Prussia in the first month of the war, then a second at the 
Masurian Lakes in September; each time, the Russians lost 
125,000 men, ten times the losses of the Germans. Further 
defeats followed in 1915, first at Augustowo in February, 
then at Gorlice-Tarnow in May‒June, when the entire front 
collapsed and the Tsar’s armies retreated 300 miles; total 
Russian casualties for the year – killed, wounded, and captured 
– were estimated at two million.3
The reasons were obvious. Though each Russian conscript 
had, on average, to travel three times as far as his German 
counterpart to reach the front, European Russia’s railway 
density was only a tenth that of Germany’s. In addition, Russia 
had less rolling stock than her enemies, her trains moved at 
only half the speed, and her rail system could accommodate 
barely a third the number of trains on each section of track. 
Provision of motor transport was yet more dire: only 420 
transport vehicles for an army of five million at the start of 
the war. In any case, most Russian roads were unpaved tracks 
that turned to mud in winter. It could take units stationed in 
Central Asia two months or more to reach Europe’s Eastern 
Front. When they got there, it was sometimes impossible to 
arm them. The Russian army began the war a million rifles 
3. Dupuy and Dupuy 1970, 942, 950–2.
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short, and with ammunition reserves a billion cartridges lower 
than the recommended minimum. The state of the artillery 
was worse: the Germans and Austrians frequently enjoyed 
a four-to-one battlefield advantage in gun-power, and the 
Russian cannon often fell silent for lack of shells.4 
The supply situation deteriorated as the strain of war 
increased. Medical services for the avalanche of wounded 
and crippled men were soon overwhelmed. The wounded 
were dumped on the ground in rain and mud, piled up 
on freight-car floors and abandoned, or shipped to filthy, 
overcrowded, disease-ridden hospitals managed by a corrupt 
military bureaucracy and staffed by untrained personnel. In 
the front line, uniforms and boots fell to bits and could not 
be replaced; many soldiers had nothing more than canvas 
wrappings on their feet in the winter of 1914/15. Two years 
later, when the mood in the trenches was mutinous, soldiers 
refused to advance, shouting at their officers, ‘Give us boots 
and warm clothing first!’ Arms production was also in crisis 
as flows of coal and iron failed to match demand: in early 
1915, Russian factories were producing only 40,000 rifles a 
month when battlefield losses were running at six times the 
rate. General Alexeyev considered it an achievement worth 
reporting when, in January 1916, as many as seven in ten of his 
front-line infantry were equipped with rifles.5 
The Brusilov Offensive was the fruit of one of those great 
surges from deep inside Russia that can be triggered by defeat 
and invasion. The Tsarist regime and Russian industrialists 
collaborated to create a more efficient, state-managed war 
economy. By the spring of 1916, the annual production rate for 
4. Lincoln 1986, 24, 54–8.
5. Lincoln 1986, 94–7, 101–7, 259–60. 
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rifles was 1.3 million, for machine-guns 11,000, for cartridges 
1.5 billion, for field guns 5,000, and for artillery shells 20 
million. An additional two million men had been drafted, and 
most of these were held back from the front line and given 
extensive training.6
But this prodigious effort was matched on the far side of 
no-man’s-land. The stalemate of 1915 had prompted all the 
warring powers to ramp up their manpower and munitions, 
and to plan for great offensives, on an unprecedented scale, in 
1916. And the truth is that the Brusilov Offensive – victory 
though it was – wrecked the Russian army. For the impetus of 
the initial breakthrough was absorbed, a new line of trenches 
solidified, and the war entered its third winter. 
The elites – the courtiers, generals, landowners, and indus-
trialists – had proclaimed the war as a noble struggle for 
Tsar, Holy Russia, the Orthodox Church, and the Pan-Slavic 
cause: a cocktail of feudal mumbo-jumbo and blood-and-soil 
mysticism. At first, voices of reason, in Russia as elsewhere, 
were drowned in the reactionary tide. ‘Despite our attitude 
toward the government’s policy,’ announced the liberal Cadet 
leader Pavel Milyukov,
our first duty is to preserve the integrity and unity of our 
country, and to defend her position as a world power. Let us 
remember well that, at this moment, our first and only task 
is to support our soldiers, inspiring them with faith in the 
rightness of our cause, with calm courage, and with hope in 
the triumph of our arms.7
6. Lincoln 1986, 241–2.
7. Lincoln 1986, 44.
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That ‘cause’ was, of course, the cause of bankers, profiteers, 
and imperialists. Russia’s industrialists were tied by a thousand 
golden threads to French finance-capital. Some 80 per cent 
of Russian capital was foreign-owned, and the largest share 
was held by French capitalists, who controlled 60 per cent 
of the country’s pig-iron production, 50 per cent of its coal 
production, and 55 per cent of the reserves in the St Petersburg 
banks. This gave the Franco-Russian military alliance a firm 
economic foundation.8 Not that Russian capitalists were 
without good reasons of their own for supporting the war. As 
demand for military supplies soared, so did profits. Hundreds 
of millions of roubles flowed through a swelling system of 
speculation and enrichment at the top, while the apparatus of 
wartime repression crushed working-class resistance to keep 
hours long and wages low. ‘Enormous fortunes arose out of the 
bloody foam’, wrote Trotsky.
The lack of bread and fuel in the capital did not prevent 
the court jeweller Faberget from boasting that he had never 
before done such a flourishing business. Lady-in-waiting 
Vyrubova says that in no other season were such gowns to 
be seen as in the winter of 1915/16, and never were so many 
diamonds purchased … Nobody had any fear of spending 
too much. A continual shower of gold fell from above. 
‘Society’ held out its hands and pockets, aristocratic ladies 
spread their skirts high, everybody splashed about in the 
bloody mud – bankers, heads of the commissariat, industri-
alists, ballerinas of the Tsar and the grand dukes, Orthodox 
prelates, ladies-in-waiting, liberal deputies, generals of 
the front and rear, radical lawyers … All came running to 
8. Serge 1930/1972, 45–6.
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grab and gobble, in fear lest the blessed rain should stop. 
And all rejected with indignation the shameful idea of a 
premature peace.9 
Much more was anticipated at the war’s end. With a seat at 
the victors’ feast, the Russian imperial elite hoped for an ample 
share in the planned re-division of the world. Bismarck once 
remarked of Italy that she had ‘a large appetite but bad teeth’. He 
might have said the same of Russia in 1916. Tsarist statesmen 
dreamed of an enlarged Eastern European empire more 
ambitious in scope than anything planned by their German or 
Austrian enemies. Poland (then partitioned between the three 
Eastern powers) was to be reunited ‘under the sceptre of the 
Russian Tsar’. Galicia was to be taken from Austria-Hungary, 
and much of Posen, Silesia, and perhaps East Prussia from 
Germany. The intention was not only to grab territory rich in 
resources, but to cripple German power for a generation, and to 
trigger the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Equally 
covetous eyes were laid upon the decaying Ottoman-Turkish 
Empire to the south, where the Russians wanted Istanbul and 
the Bosphorus, control of Armenia, and influence in Persia.10
But a great unknown cast its shadow over these heady 
visions of imperial domination. A shadow that grew darker 
as the war ground on, the death toll mounted, the privation 
increased, the corruption spread, and the gangrenous nature 
of the regime and its ruling class became more apparent in the 
chaos. The great unknown was the mind of the muzhik – the 
Russian peasant. 
9. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 46–7.
10. Stevenson 2004, 137–41.
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Eleven out of twelve Russian conscripts were peasants. 
When called to the colours, 96 per cent of draftees had reported 
for duty. But what they thought about the war remained a 
mystery. For, as Milyukov put it, ‘In the depths of rural Russia, 
eternal silence reigned.’ What did the silence mean? The cities 
had shouted loudly for war; politicians, generals, industrialists, 
and newspapers had all been in favour. But beyond that – in a 
Tsarist police state where free expression was a crime – who 
could tell?
The mood of the Narod was history’s secret. Especially that 
of the village Narod. The peasantry, as Social-Revolutionary 
Party leader Viktor Chernov put it, had always been ‘the sphinx 
in the political history of Russia’.11 And never had the silence 
of the sphinx been more ominous. For the peasantry had been 
armed. Russia’s eight million serving conscripts might be, 
for the time being, soldiers of the Tsar in an imperialist war. 
But what if something stirred in their dark hearts? What if, 
somehow, they came to a contrary view: that the real enemy 
was not in fact the Kaiser, but the profiteer and the landlord? 
Might they not then become the armed vanguard of peasant 
revolution?
The great betrayal
The war had come suddenly. Despite the arms race, the jingo 
press, and rising tension in the years before, few expected war 
in the summer of 1914. When people heard the news that an 
Austrian royal had been assassinated in a remote Balkan town 
– the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June – 
hardly anyone imagined that this event would lead to world 
11. Lincoln 1986, 44–8.
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war in five weeks. This included Europe’s socialists, even 
though many – like the Polish-German revolutionary Rosa 
Luxemburg – had for long argued that the contradictions of 
the global imperialist order made a terrible war increasingly 
probable.
For Luxemburg and her comrades, the war came as a double 
shock. The German Chancellor had been holding private 
meetings with the leaders of the SPD and the unions. Despite 
its radical rhetoric, the leadership of the German labour 
movement was essentially bureaucratic and reformist. On 1 
August 1914, in return for a government pledge not to ban 
them, the union leaders agreed not to call strike action in the 
event of war.12 On 3 August, fearing a Russian invasion, their 
own political isolation, and the possible destruction of the 
party by military dictatorship, the SPD parliamentary caucus 
voted almost six to one in favour of approving government war 
credits – funds for arms – in the Reichstag the following day. 
A week before, the SPD Executive had boomed anti-militarist 
defiance: ‘The class-conscious German proletariat … raises 
a flaming protest against the criminal machinations of the 
warmongers … Not a drop of any German soldier’s blood 
must be sacrificed to the power hunger of the Austrian ruling 
clique, to the imperialist profiteers.’ Hot air: the only real test 
of anti-militarism is war itself. By 3 August, as leading SPD 
right-winger Eduard Bernstein recalled, 
it was now exclusively a matter of deciding whether at a time 
when the enemy had already entered the country and [that 
enemy] anyhow was Russia, a party representing a full third 
of the German people could deny the means of defence and 
12. Strachan 2001/2003, 122–3.
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protection to those called upon to defend them and their 
families … Impossible.13
On 4 August, the Reichstag voted unanimously for war 
credits, the SPD’s anti-war minority obeying party discipline 
and voting with the majority. The contradiction in the politics 
of the party between nationalism and socialism – between the 
interests of a national-capitalist bloc and those of the inter-
national working class – had been resolved. Twenty million 
would die in consequence.
The SPD leaders’ betrayal gutted working-class resistance 
to the war drive and delivered their supporters into the hands 
of the Junker officer-caste. During the last major international 
crisis, in 1911, SPD peace rallies had drawn up to 250,000 
people. Three years later, at a rally on 28 July 1914, there had 
again been 100,000 anti-war demonstrators on the streets of 
Berlin. Across Germany, during four days of mass protest in 
the last days of peace, there were no less than 288 anti-war 
demonstrations involving up to three-quarters of a million 
people. The SPD leadership stopped this movement dead in 
its tracks. The German working class did not go willingly to 
war: it was led there, grim-faced, by its own leaders.14
When Lenin (in Zurich) read the report of the Reichstag 
vote in the SPD paper Vorwärts, he assumed it was a forgery. 
Trotsky (in Vienna) was equalled stunned: ‘The telegram 
telling of the capitulation of the German Social Democracy 
shocked me even more than the declaration of war.’15 
Shlyapnikov had to deal with the bewildered reaction of the 
13. Nettl 1966/1969, 367–9.
14. Sender 1940, 52–3; Strachan 2001/2003, 119–24.
15. Cliff 1976, 2–3.
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advanced workers inside Russia. Because ‘it was from the 
Germans that all Social Democrats of that time “learned” how 
to be socialists’, the expectation had been that the SPD would 
lead the European anti-war movement:16 
when we learned what was happening, it struck us as an 
absurdity. Newspaper articles spoke about the leaders of 
German Social Democracy justifying the war and voting 
for war credits. Our first thought was that the government 
wire-services were false, and that they wanted to whip us 
Russian Social Democrats into line … Workers showered 
us with questions as to the meaning of the behaviour of 
the German socialists, whom we had always presented as 
models for ourselves. Where was all that world solidarity? 
… It took a lot of effort to explain to thinking workers that 
betrayal by some must not lead to universal betrayal, as 
only capitalists would stand to gain from that. It was vital 
to restore international contact between workers over the 
heads of the leaders.17
This would not be easy. War has its own momentum. 
Two moods take hold. Once armies are mobilising, there is 
fear – the visceral fear of invasion, killing, rape, destruction, 
displacement. Primeval nightmares of the barbarian horde, of 
ferocious soldiery, of untrammelled violence become motors 
of action. The other mood is aggression, hatred, an urge to 
kill, a mood fostered by a flood of hysterical propaganda 
demonising the enemy. To these impulses may be added the 
general excitement engendered by war. Trotsky watched with 
16. Shlyapnikov 1923/1982, 25.
17. Shlyapnikov 1923/1982, 16–17.
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bemusement the reaction in Vienna to the outbreak of war. 
What was it, he asked, that drew a bootmaker’s apprentice, 
Popischil, half German, half Czech, or the local greengrocer, 
Frau Maresch, or the cabman Frankl to a patriotic demonstra-
tion in front of the War Ministry?
People whose lives, day in and day out, pass in a monotony 
of hopelessness are many; they are the mainstay of modern 
society. The alarm of mobilisation breaks into their lives like 
a promise; the familiar and long-hated is overthrown, and 
the new and unusual reigns in its place. Changes still more 
incredible are in store for them in the future. For better 
or worse? For better, of course. What can seem worse to 
Popischil than ‘normal’ conditions?18
There was, perhaps, a brief moment when the war might 
have been stopped. But with the SPD leaders’ capitulation 
to Prussian militarism, the moment passed. Middle-class 
Germany came onto the streets to cheer for Kaiser and Army, 
the backward workers followed them, and the anti-war revolu-
tionaries found themselves isolated and beleaguered.
Just seven people attended a meeting in Rosa Luxemburg’s 
Berlin apartment on the evening of 4 August. Only one person 
– Clara Zetkin – cabled immediate and unreserved support 
from among the 300 to whom Luxemburg sent telegrams 
after the meeting.19 The anti-war movement appeared to be 
dead. And with the mighty SPD now cheerleaders for the 
Kaiser’s war, the other European socialist parties collapsed like 
dominoes.
18. Trotsky 1971/1975, 240–1
19. Nettl 1966/1969, 372.
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The anti-war movement
The July movement – Russia’s ‘semi-revolution’ – evaporated. 
Most activists were young and liable for military service: many 
were called up and went to the front. Others, like the Petrograd 
metalworkers, were in ‘reserved’ occupations, but now, in 
wartime, they found themselves ‘under military conscrip-
tions and so governed by military regulations’.20 The small 
official space given to radical voices since 1905 was blocked 
off. The anti-war newspaper Pravda had been suppressed in 
July, and a new underground paper, Sotsial-Demokrat, had to 
be set up and smuggled in from the outside. Informers led 
the secret police to an underground Bolshevik conference in 
November: everyone was arrested. Later the same month, the 
five Bolshevik members of the State Duma were arrested and 
condemned to hard labour in Siberia. This, explained Alexei 
Badayev, one of the arrested deputies, completed ‘the rout of 
all revolutionary organisations’. The factories protested.
But … the working class had not the strength to undertake 
any far-reaching movement; the war terror was clutching 
the country by the throat, and all revolutionary activity 
entailed either death by court-martial or long periods of 
penal servitude. The arrest of the faction meant that the 
chief party centre in Russia was destroyed. All the threads of 
party work had been centred in the Duma ‘five’ and became 
now disconnected.21
20. Shlyapnikov 1923/1982, 35.
21. Badayev 1929/1987, 211–25.
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State security worked hand-in-glove with industrialists to 
smash labour organisation. Militants were blacklisted and 
either dismissed or conscripted into the army. Meal breaks 
were shortened and works canteens monitored to prevent 
meetings; some bosses even installed gramophones to play 
loud music and drown out discussion!22 As wartime orders 
flowed in, the employers extended the working day, made 
overtime compulsory, scrapped health safeguards, and 
lobbied for ‘the militarisation of labour’. Women, children, 
peasants, and foreign workers entered the factory on low 
wages, depressing established rates, dissolving old networks 
of solidarity. Even prisoners-of-war and convicts were pressed 
into service. War, profit, and ‘patriotism’ formed an alliance to 
ratchet up the rate of exploitation.23
But the war churned the deep waters of Russian society 
like no previous national crisis. The newspaper threat of 
‘German domination’ was soon displaced by a real experience 
of hunger. The transport system broke down, food supplies 
failed, and prices skyrocketed beyond the reach of city 
workers. By late 1915, Petrograd was receiving only a quarter 
of the rail shipments it required. A third of the city’s bakeries 
closed for lack of flour and oil. Two-thirds of the butchers had 
no meat for sale. That winter, women queued for hours in 
sub-zero temperatures to buy handfuls of food and fuel. The 
following year, peasant riots erupted across the grain-growing 
provinces of European Russia. Shops were looted in protest 
against shortages and inflation. Meantime, unwilling to sell 
at fixed government prices when there was nothing to buy, 
the peasants hoarded or consumed the food they produced. 
22. Shlyapnikov 1923/1982, 80–3.
23. Shlyapnikov 1923/1982, 89–91; Lincoln 1986, 107–8.
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A ‘scissors crisis’ that would recur: whenever the supply of 
manufactured goods from the cities failed, so did the return 
flow of agricultural produce from the villages.24
Though war fever had overwhelmed the class struggle in 
the summer of 1914, the effect was superficial. To be cowed 
is not to concede. The advanced workers’ reaction to the war 
was sullen suspicion. Alexander Shlyapnikov was riding on an 
overcrowded tram in August 1914 when a man ‘who looked 
like a police clerk’ launched into an anti-Semitic tirade: all the 
‘Yids’, he told fellow passengers, should be arrested as German 
spies. The Bolshevik answered him. A row erupted and blows 
were exchanged. The tram stopped and the police were 
called. Shlyapnikov was asked to alight, but the working-class 
passengers rallied to his side, refusing to let him be taken away, 
and the conductor tugged the bell and the tram moved off.25 
A tiny incident: but like the speck of light in the distance 
that signals the approach of an express train in the night, this 
scuffle on the top deck of a tram in which Petrograd workers 
sided with a revolutionary against a racist heralded the mighty 
conflagration to come.
The Bolsheviks recovered quickly from the shock of ‘the 
great betrayal’. The Petrograd RSDLP Committee had an 
anti-war leaflet out within days. ‘Workers of the world, unite!’ 
it began. ‘To all workers, peasants, and soldiers! Comrades!’
A bloody spectre hangs over Europe. The capitalists’ 
greedy competition, the politics of violence and plunder, 
dynastic calculation, and fear for privileges in the face of 
the rising international workers’ movement are driving the 
24. Lincoln 1986, 207, 219–20, 297. 
25. Shlyapnikov 1923/1982, 27.
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governments of all countries along the path of militarism 
… ‘Down with the war!’ ‘War on war!’ must roll powerfully 
across city and hamlet alike … Workers must remember 
that they do not have enemies over the frontier: everywhere 
the working class is oppressed by the rich and the power 
of the property-owners. Everywhere it is oppressed by the 
yoke of exploitation and the chains of poverty.26 
The Bolshevik underground needed no ‘centralist’ direction. 
The party’s anti-war politics were an automatic reaction: the 
activists on the ground knew what to argue. But it was Lenin 
who gave the internationalist position its classic exposition. 
Facing squarely the crisis of the world war, taking to its logical 
conclusion the reality that the worker’s enemy was the boss, 
the landlord, and the policeman – not the German or Austrian 
conscript – he opposed both the chauvinism of the ruling 
class and the pacifism of milk-and-water ‘internationalists’, 
proclaiming instead ‘revolutionary defeatism’. A victory for 
Tsarism would strengthen the regime. Support for the Tsarist 
war-effort would undermine the class struggle. Therefore the 
defeat of Russia was to be welcomed. The imperialist war 
between the great powers was to be transformed into a civil 
war of workers and peasants against their own ruling classes.
Any ‘peace programme’ will deceive the people … Not 
‘peace without annexations’, but peace to the cottages, war 
on the palaces; peace to the proletariat and the working 
people, war on the bourgeoisie! … An oppressed class 
which does not strive to learn to use arms, to acquire arms, 
only deserves to be treated like slaves … Our slogan must 
26. Shlyapnikov 1923/1982, 20.
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be: arming of the proletariat to defeat, expropriate, and 
disarm the bourgeoisie.27
Between January and June 1916, the exiled Bolshevik leader 
worked on a long pamphlet, Imperialism: The Highest Stage 
of Capitalism. Written for working-class activists, its purpose 
was to explain the world war in the context of contemporary 
capitalism. At the heart of Lenin’s conception was the growing 
concentration of capital in giant corporations, creating 
monopolies and cartels which dominated the world economy. 
Because of its dependence on loans to fund investment, 
industrial capital had merged with finance capital. And because 
of their scale, the resulting industrial-financial conglomerates 
needed overseas markets for the export of both commodities 
and capital. This brought them into competition with each 
other on a global scale; and it was this struggle for markets and 
colonies that explained the arms race and the world war.28
For Lenin, the world war – this vortex of mass industrialised 
killing on an unprecedented scale – was the bitter fruit of a 
new stage in the development of capitalism, one in which the 
system was divided into rival national-capitalist blocs, each 
dominated by giant corporations, each heavily armed, each 
competing for a re-division of the world in the interests of 
profit. Here was the theoretical underpinning of the anti-war 
instincts of the advanced workers in Russia.
The battles of 1915 had consumed two and a half million. 
To those killed, maimed, or captured was added a rising toll 
of deserters. ‘Many men are running away’, wrote one soldier. 
‘In one platoon of 65 men, there are now only 30, because 35 
27. Cliff 1976, 3–5.
28. Faulkner 2013, 174–7.
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have deserted.’ ‘The number of soldiers travelling without 
documents on the railroads is increasing’, reported General 
Ivanov. There were ‘hordes of soldiers wandering through 
towns and villages, along railroads, and, in general, across the 
face of the entire Russian land’, complained the Minister of 
Agriculture. But when the Tsarist military attempted to draft 
male breadwinners from the peasant villages, the resistance 
was violent. The police were mobbed and bricked at the 
assembly points. ‘Go ahead and shoot’, people shouted. ‘Better 
that we should die here than be sent to war without bullets!’ 
Those taken often jumped the trains at stations and headed 
back home. ‘When we finally stopped at Uvarovka,’ reported 
one escorting soldier, ‘it turned out that 372 out of 800 had 
escaped.’29
The factories and the proletarian suburbs smouldered 
with discontent. Moscow’s workforce had grown by a tenth 
each year of the war, Petrograd’s by a fifth. At first, the new 
proletarians were rendered docile by the shock, the unfamiliar-
ity, the lack of roots, the absence of a tradition of resistance. Not 
for long. Police repression, long hours, dangerous conditions, 
low wages, shortages of food and fuel, the overcrowding in 
the workers’ districts, all combined to educate the newly pro-
letarianised in the malevolence of the system that held them 
bound. Between April and September 1915, almost 800 strikes 
involving 400,000 workers cost Russia’s bosses a million days 
of lost production. From then on, strikes were frequent; and 
sometimes the contagion spread to the soldiers. A hundred 
workers had been shot down by soldiers firing into a crowd 
chanting ‘Down with the war!’ in Ivanovo-Voznesensk in 
September 1915. But men of 181st Infantry Regiment joined 
29. Lincoln 1986, 179–82.
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a crowd of 30,000 striking workers in singing the Marseillaise 
at Petrograd’s Finland Station in October 1916. A red light was 
flashing for Russia’s ancien regime.30
The social crisis was going critical. The political tension 
became electric. It affected all levels of society. The court 
camarilla of the Tsarina and Rasputin found itself friendless 
even in the gerrymandered State Duma. Vladimir Purishkevich 
– an arch-monarchist, proto-fascist, and rabid anti-Semite 
– lambasted a regime of favourites and lickspittles in which 
ministers had to ‘throw themselves at the sovereign’s feet, beg 
the Tsar for permission to open his eyes to the horror of the 
current state of affairs, and plead with him to deliver Russia 
from Rasputin and all his corrupt band’.31
The assessment was universal, but few expressed it so 
openly, and fewer still were willing to act. Purishkevich was an 
exception, as were Prince Felix Yusupov and the Grand Duke 
Dmitri Pavlovich. These three luminaries of the Russian Right, 
along with two others, an army captain and a doctor, conspired 
to lure Rasputin to Yusupov’s palace in order to murder him, 
baiting their trap with the prospect of a night with the Prince’s 
beautiful young wife.
A semi-basement room was made into a sumptuous salon 
for the reception, with tapestries, Chinese vases, a bearskin 
rug, and much fine furniture. A steaming samovar of tea, 
bottles of Madeira and Marsala, and plates of cream cakes were 
provided. The wine and the cakes were laced with cyanide.
Rasputin was led to the room and invited to drink and 
eat pending the arrival of the Princess. He was eventually 
persuaded to consume several glasses of wine and some cream 
30. Lincoln 1986, 189, 220, 225–7. 
31. Lincoln 1986, 304.
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cakes. To the horror of his hosts, they had no discernible effect. 
Yusupov then fetched a revolver, returned to the salon, and shot 
‘the filthy, depraved, corrupt peasant’ in the heart. Rasputin 
let out a roar and collapsed on the bearskin rug. It seemed 
he was dead. The plotters relaxed. Then, suddenly, Rasputin 
hauled himself to his feet and staggered out of the palace into 
the night. Purishkevich pursued him, armed with a revolver. 
It took four shots to bring the fugitive down. Even then he lay 
unconscious, but still alive. Rasputin only finally expired when 
the plotters heaved his body into the ice of the River Neva. It 
was about 3.30 on the morning of 16 December 1916.
The comic-opera revolution of the Russian aristocracy 
changed nothing. The conspirators had hoped to solve the 
terminal crisis of Old Russia with a phial of poison. But the 
assassination of a religious mystic could hardly be expected 
to redeem the entire rotten Romanov regime. The Tsarina’s 
favourite minister, the sycophantic Alexander Protopopov, 
closed the matter with the announcement that he was in com-
munication with Rasputin’s ghost. Tsarism staggered its last 
few steps to the abyss guided by a spectre.32
Ten weeks later, the real revolution began. It was led by the 
working women of Petrograd.






Mass participatory democracy. The Petrograd Soviet in session.
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The first day: 23 February
No-one expected it. Lenin, in exile in Zurich, told a meeting 
of young socialists a month beforehand that ‘We of the 
older generation may not live to see the decisive battles of 
this coming revolution.’1 No-one planned it or called for it. 
‘Not one party was prepared for the great overturn’, wrote 
the Menshevik Sukhanov. ‘The Revolution was a great and 
joyous surprise for us’, reported the Social-Revolutionary 
Zenzinov. ‘No-one thought of such an imminent possibility of 
revolution’, recalled the Bolshevik Kayurov.2 The day – Inter-
national Women’s Day – was to be marked only by meetings, 
speeches, and leaflets. Even the Vyborg Committee of the 
Bolshevik Party in the heart of proletarian Petrograd opposed 
the call for strikes. The danger of a clash with the police, and a 
bloody defeat, was too great.3
The revolutionaries were behind the curve. They had 
missed the meaning of the 9th of January. On the anniversary 
of 1905’s Bloody Sunday massacre, 150,000 workers from a 
hundred factories had come onto the streets of the capital. 
It had turned into a massive protest against war, inflation, 
and low wages. The Petrograd demonstration was mirrored 
elsewhere: 30,000 out in Moscow, 14,000 in the Baku oil fields, 
10,000 in Kharkov in the Ukraine. The one-day protest had 
then turned into a strike wave, rolling on for weeks, gaining 
momentum. By the end of January, a quarter of a million 
workers had taken action, the simple demand for bread mixing 
1. Chamberlin 1935/1965, 131.
2. Chamberlin 1935/1965, 73.
3. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 121.
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with political demands for an end to the war, the overthrow of 
the government, a second revolution.4
But strikes sap the fighting power of the workers. The 
weapon had to be kept sharp. So no strikes had been called 
when the 23rd of February dawned. The bread lines had 
already formed, many working women up since three, standing 
grim-faced in the bitter cold. It could take four hours to secure 
two rolls. Or it might take four hours to secure nothing as the 
‘No More Bread’ sign was posted. Then 12 hours in the mill or 
the metal-bashing shop. 
The working women of Petrograd were doubly oppressed: 
ground down in the workplace by wretched conditions, long 
hours, and low pay; ground down at home by the toil and 
poverty of everyday existence. Many were on their own, their 
brothers, husbands, and sons conscripted. Many were grey 
with hunger and exhaustion. Sometimes they would go two 
or three days without eating. Sometimes they would cross 
themselves and weep with joy when they managed to buy 
bread.5 When a loaf can induce tears, revolution is close.
It began in these lowest depths of proletarian Russia. Seven 
thousand low-paid women workers of the Vyborg District’s 
textile mills came onto the streets demanding ‘Bread’. They 
marched to neighbouring factories and called them out. By ten 
o’clock, 20,000 were on strike. By noon, 50,000. That afternoon, 
the numbers swelled further as men from the engineering 
factories joined them. Before the day was out, 90,000 were 
involved, and crowds of women and teenagers were smashing 
open the food shops in two districts of the city.6
4. Lincoln 1986, 317–18.
5. Lincoln 1986, 320–1.
6. Lincoln 1986, 321.
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What did it mean? No-one could be sure. Less than a 
quarter of the city’s workers had taken part, and the action had 
been confined to the northern Vyborg and Petrograd Districts. 
In particular, the male engineering workers at the Putilov 
factory, 40,000 strong, the largest and most militant workforce 
in Russia, had not gone onto the streets. There had been no 
clashes, no casualties.
The authorities were well prepared should matters escalate. 
Under the overall authority of the Minister of the Interior, 
Alexander Protopopov, the city was divided into six police 
districts. Three lines of defence had been set up to deal with 
unrest: police, Cossacks, and the soldiers of the military 
garrison. The police were armed paramilitaries, most on foot, 
some mounted. The Cossacks – traditional Tsarist cavalry 
recruited from the minor gentry and rich peasants of the 
southern prairies – were armed with whips, sabres, pistols, 
and carbines. All told, there were 12,000 police and Cossacks. 
But if these failed, there were no less than 150,000 soldiers 
stationed in the city.7 
Neither the revolutionaries nor the authorities rated the 
events of 23 February much different from many others over 
the preceding six weeks. The former still issued no calls to 
action. The latter took only limited security measures. Extra 
flour was sent to some of the large bakeries. Troops were 
deployed to guard key points across the city. Whips were 
issued to the Cossacks. That was all. Most would probably 
have agreed with Zinaida Gippius, the avant-garde poet and 
hostess, who considered the day’s events just an ‘ordinary sort 
7. Chamberlin 1935/1965, 74.
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of hunger riot’.8 No-one had yet grasped the inner meaning of 
Women’s Day 1917.
The second day: 24 February
The following morning, central Petrograd was calm. The 
authorities relaxed. But too soon. Though the call had not 
come from their leaders, grassroots activists had been at work 
through the night, agitating for strike action and mass demon-
strations on the morrow. ‘We must go ahead and solve our 
problem by force’, one of them proclaimed at an early morning 
mass meeting of metal-workers at the Stetinin Factory. ‘Only 
in this way will we be able to get bread for ourselves … Arm 
yourselves with everything possible: bolts, screws, rocks. Start 
smashing the first shops you find!’
Before nine o’clock that morning, 40,000 Vyborg workers 
attempting to march into the city centre were confronting 500 
police and Cossacks at the Aleksandrovsky Bridge. Across four 
city districts, tens of thousands were on the move, bringing 
the total on strike to double the number of the first day. The 
Nevsky Prospect, the main downtown thoroughfare of elite 
Russia, was choked with demonstrators who had flooded in 
from the proletarian suburbs. As well as the slogan ‘Bread!’, 
others could now be heard: ‘Down with the autocracy!’, 
‘Down with the war!’ At the bridge, on the Nevsky, and at a 
dozen other places, there were clashes with the police. Again 
and again, the ‘Pharaohs’ – as they were known – launched 
ferocious charges to break up groups of workers. Sometimes 
the groups scattered and reformed elsewhere; sometimes they 
8. Lincoln 1986, 262–3, 322–3.
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held their ground with volleys of cobblestones and lumps 
of ice.
The police never go over to the crowd. They are recruited 
from the most backward section of the working class. Their 
role is to defend the property and power of the rich against 
threats from below. Their daily work is a matter of hostile 
collisions with activists, workers, and the poor. Their hatred 
of the oppressed is reinforced by what is nowadays called 
‘canteen culture’. So they become a hardened reactionary 
caste, immunised against any appeal for solidarity by a psychic 
armour of indifference and prejudice. In revolution, the police 
cannot be won over; they have to be physically confronted 
and routed.9
What, though, of the Cossacks? Though conservative 
property-owners, and often detailed to internal security, 
they were first and foremost soldiers. Their demeanour was 
different from usual – there was not the sneering, the pent-up 
aggression, the smouldering threat of violence. Sometimes 
there were even smiles and winks. More. A policeman struck 
a woman with a knout. A Cossack chased him off. Or so 
went the rumour passed along in the crowds. On the Alek-
sandrovsky Bridge, the Cossack line did not give way, but 
it proved permeable. Some crossed on the Neva ice; and 
were not stopped. Others darted beneath the Cossacks’ 
horses; and they were not stopped either. The workers at the 
Erikson factory held a meeting, voted to strike, and came out 
2,500-strong onto the Sampsonievsky Prospect. In a narrow 
place they met the Cossacks. But when ordered to charge, 
the Cossacks formed files behind their officers and passed 
peacefully through the crowd. The drama was enacted several 
9. Farrell 1992, passim, esp. 48–88, 165–8.
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times, always with the same outcome. ‘Of discipline,’ Trotsky 
later commented,
there remained but a thin transparent shell that threatened 
to break through any second. The officers hastened to 
separate their patrol from the workers, and, abandoning the 
idea of dispersing them, lined the Cossacks across the street 
as a barrier to prevent the demonstrators from getting to 
the centre. But even this did not help: standing stock-still in 
perfect discipline, the Cossacks did not hinder the workers 
from diving under their horses. The revolution does not 
choose its paths: it made its first steps toward victory under 
the belly of a Cossack’s horse.10
Uncertainty remained about what these two days of 
turmoil portended. ‘Nothing serious’ in the view of British 
Ambassador George Buchanan, reporting to the Foreign 
Minister in London.11 Though 28 policemen were reported 
beaten up (the workers injured went unrecorded), no firearms 
had been used and no-one had been killed.12 Perhaps matters 
would yet pass over without a major clash?
Nonetheless, General Sergei Khabalov, head of security in 
the capital, ordered further precautionary measures. Known 
revolutionaries were to be rounded up. The Guards Reserve 
Cavalry was summoned to the capital. More soldiers were 
to be deployed to back up the police and the Cossacks. But 
should firearms be used? A critical question that could not 
be answered. Would what Napoleon once called ‘a whiff of 
10. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 124–5.
11. Chamberlin 1935/1965, 76.
12. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 125–6.
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grapeshot’ clear the streets? Or would shooting detonate 
an explosion in the volatile mass of proletarian Petrograd? 
No-one could tell. Certainly not Interior Minister Protopopov, 
who, it is recorded, spent the evening trying to contact 
Rasputin’s ghost.13
The third day: 25 February
Early on the third day it was clear that the strike was spreading 
and becoming general. Many smaller factories were now 
closed. Shops were shuttered, trams at a standstill, newspapers 
no longer available. University and high-school students had 
joined the movement. The police estimated 240,000 on strike, 
a third more than on the previous day. The Putilov men – a 
40,000-strong proletarian phalanx – now joined the movement. 
Locked out of the factory in a labour dispute, they stormed the 
gates, held a mass meeting, and formed a ‘provisional revolu-
tionary committee’ to ‘lead the struggle against the police, to 
organise fighting detachments, and to establish revolution in 
the streets’.14
By midday, tens of thousands had gathered near the Kazan 
Cathedral on the Nevsky Prospect. The workers had padded 
their backs and shoulders with rags, towels, and bits of blanket 
as protection against whips. They carried knives, metal spikes, 
and broken bottles as weapons. Impromptu street meetings 
were taking place in different places. What followed was 
chaotic. According to Trotsky: 
13. Lincoln 1986, 325.
14.  Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 127; Chamberlin 1935/1965, 76; Lincoln 
1986, 326.
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The mounted police open fire. A speaker falls wounded. 
Shots from the crowd kill a police inspector and wound the 
chief of police and several other policemen. Bottles, petards, 
and hand-grenades are thrown at the gendarmes. The war 
has taught this art. The soldiers show indifference, at times 
hostility, to the police. It spread excitedly through the 
crowd that when the police opened fire by the Alexander 
III monument, the Cossacks let go a volley at the horse 
Pharaohs … and the latter had to gallop off.
Elsewhere, a group of strikers led by the worker-Bolshevik 
Kayurov took off their caps and approached a line of Cossacks, 
appealing for solidarity in the struggle against the Pharaohs for 
the right to eat.
‘The Cossacks glanced at each other in a special way,’ 
Kayurov continued, ‘and we were hardly out of the way 
before they rushed into the fight.’ And a few minutes later, 
near the station gate, the crowd were tossing in their arms 
a Cossack who before their eyes had slaughtered a police 
inspector with his sabre.15
Then the soldiers appeared, a line of grey greatcoats tramping 
forwards, faces glowering beneath fur hats, rifles levelled, 
bayonets fixed, a wall of state power. But the wall was 
crumbling. The workers approached them, getting close, 
posing questions. Why have you come? Who is your enemy? 
Which side are you on? Where do your interests lie?
15. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 127–8; Lincoln 1986, 325–6.
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The soldiers are sullen. A worm is gnawing them, and they 
cannot stand it when a question hits the very centre of 
the pain.
On one side were the sons of peasants in uniform; on the 
other, the sons of peasants in workers’ blouses. And not just 
men. There were many women in the crowds. Women who 
were mothers, sisters, wives, and girlfriends of the soldiers. Or 
perhaps just other women who reminded the soldiers of their 
families. To shoot Germans who were shooting back had been 
bad enough, for these had been men with whom they had no 
quarrel, conscripted to fight as they were, taking the same shit 
from officers. Now those same officers wanted them to shoot 
down starving women on the streets of Petrograd. These 
women were in front of them now, taking hold of their rifles, 
speaking eye-to-eye. ‘Put down your bayonets! Join us!’ they 
implored. 
The soldiers are excited, ashamed, exchange anxious 
glances, waver; someone makes up his mind first, and the 
bayonets rise guiltily above the shoulders of the advancing 
crowd. The barrier is opened, a joyous and grateful ‘Hurrah!’ 
shakes the air. The soldiers are surrounded. Everywhere, 
arguments, reproaches, appeals. The revolution makes 
another forward step.16 
On this day, the third of the uprising, the police had been 
defeated. The crowd had fought back against their violence, 
the Cossacks had attacked them, the soldiers failed to support 
them. In the Vyborg, the police stations had been wrecked, 
16. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 128–9.
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some officers lay dead, the rest had fled. But the matter 
remained in the balance. The Cossacks and the soldiers 
were wavering – allowing crowds to assemble and pass, even 
protecting them from the police – but not a single unit had yet 
gone over to the uprising. It was not yet a revolution. And, as 
Trotsky put it, ‘the fate of every revolution at a certain point 
is decided by a break in the disposition of the army. Against a 
numerous, disciplined, well-armed, and ably led military force, 
unarmed or almost unarmed masses of the people cannot 
possibly gain a victory.’17  
The core of the capitalist state is formed of bodies of armed 
men and women. You could strip away everything else except 
for soldiers, police, and prisons, and you would still have the 
state. Everything else is optional, but a minority ruling class 
cannot rule without armed force. They need this both to 
defend their property and profits from radical movements 
at home, and to defend their empires and ‘national interests’ 
abroad. The Tsarist state of February 1917 was no different in 
this respect than any of Europe’s other warring states. But its 
historical peculiarities – the fact that the Tsarist state was more 
autocratic and thuggish than, say, the British or the French; 
a fact rooted in the medieval backwardness of Old Russia – 
meant that it was now cracking apart. What gnawed most 
deeply in the mind of the soldiers was the crude brutality of the 
Tsar’s army, the bloody mash of a hopeless war, and the age-old 
agony of villages crippled by rent, debt, and land-hunger.
‘The psychological moment when the soldiers go over 
to the revolution is prepared by a long molecular process, 
which, like other processes of nature, has its point of climax’ 
(Trotsky). But at that point, the workers must push forwards 
17. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 139–40.
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with confidence to convince the soldiers that they can win. For 
a soldier to mutiny, especially in time of war, is more perilous 
than for a worker to strike. To disobey officers, to refuse to fire, 
to break ranks, to join the crowd: to do these awesome things 
– to suddenly and completely burst the iron bands of military 
discipline – the soldier must be certain that he will become 
part of a victorious mass able to protect him.18 The next two 
days would decide. 
The fourth day: 26 February
It was a Sunday, not a working day, so the people rose late. 
Petrograd was quiet that morning. ‘The city is calm’, the 
Tsarina cabled the Tsar. ‘Today, 26 February, the city is entirely 
peaceful’, reported General Khabalov.19
The city centre was under military occupation. Overnight, 
the Tsar had telegraphed new instructions to Khabalov:
I ORDER YOU TO BRING ALL OF THESE DISORDERS IN 
THE CAPITAL TO A HALT AS OF TOMORROW. THESE 
CANNOT BE PERMITTED IN THIS DIFFICULT TIME OF 
WAR WITH GERMANY AND AUSTRIA. NICHOLAS.
Khabalov had passed these orders to his subordinates, 
Petrograd’s district police and army chiefs, and they had 
made their dispositions. The downtown area had been turned 
into a military camp. Infantry detachments garrisoned key 
government buildings. Armoured cars were parked at strategic 
points. Machine-guns had been placed to sweep major inter-
18. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 139–42.
19. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 132; Lincoln 1986, 329.
THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION ◆  123 
sections. Cossack squadrons were held in readiness to clear the 
streets. ‘If the crowd is small,’ Khabalov had told his officers, ‘if 
it is not at all aggressive, and if it is not carrying [red] banners, 
then use your cavalry detachments to disperse it. But if the 
crowd is in any way threatening, and if it carries banners, then 
you are to act according to regulations. Give three warnings, 
and then open fire.’20 
The workers had been massing in the proletarian suburbs 
since dawn, but it was late morning before the first processions 
approached the lines of soldiers covering the roads and bridges 
into the city centre. Wherever marchers ignored orders to halt, 
officers gave the order to fire.
Shooting erupted in different parts of the city, and the 
workers scattered into doorways, courtyards, side-streets. 
Brown humps were left on the road, streaked with red. 
Machine-guns opened up. The Cossacks moved down the 
streets. 
The workers could not defend themselves: they had come 
to the demonstration unarmed. Shlyapnikov, one of only 
three members of the top Bolshevik leadership in the city, had 
firmly opposed the demand that the workers should arm. The 
workers could not defeat the soldiers with guns. They had 
to win with arguments. Only thus might the insurrection be 
victorious: ‘I decisively refused to search for arms at all and 
demanded that the soldiers should be drawn into the uprising, 
so as to get arms for all the workers. This was more difficult 
than to get a few dozen revolvers. But in this was the whole 
programme of action.’21 
20. Lincoln 1986, 327–9.
21. Chamberlin 1935/1965, 76.
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But now the soldiers were shooting, and, as one of them 
recalled, ‘the blood of workers stained the snow’.22 Shlyap-
nikov’s strategy appeared to some a failure. Revolution takes 
place in a fog of uncertainty. Each protagonist sees only a 
small part of the whole; each attempts to fill out the picture 
with impressions, rumours, fragments of reports, the random 
assessments and opinions of others. What few could see at 
first was that the killing – which was intended to render the 
embryonic revolution abortive – was in fact the psychic trauma 
that finally shattered the brittle allegiance of the soldiers.
The regime had chosen to militarise the crisis. It was 
attempting to restore order through terror: by turning Russian 
soldiers against Russian workers. But this was a gamble. The 
state is an apparatus of power based on social relationships. A 
combination of coercion and consent – force and fraud – it 
depends for its integrity, on the one hand, on the quiescence of 
the majority, and on the other, on the loyalty of the personnel 
of its repressive agencies. By 26 February 1917, the Tsarist state 
had lost the former: the proletarian crowds were now openly 
revolutionary, demanding an end to the war and the autocracy, 
and, even in the face of machine-guns, were standing their 
ground and spitting defiance. And the signs were there that the 
size, confidence, and appeals of those crowds were acting like 
an acid on the threads of discipline binding soldiers to officers 
in the grey lines opposite.
Many soldiers were firing high. Some were not firing at all. 
‘Each man must fire in turn so that I can watch him shoot’, 
yelled an enraged officer. ‘Aim at the heart!’23 In many parts 
of the city, the revolutionaries in the crowds, the rank-and-file 
22. Lincoln 1986, 329.
23. Lincoln 1986, 331.
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leaders, sensed the wavering in the ranks. Sometimes it was 
obvious to all. The Menshevik Nikolai Sukhanov witnessed an 
encounter on the Trinity Bridge. A cordon of Grenadiers was 
standing shoulder-to-shoulder barring the way. Activists were 
directing speeches at them. The soldiers were listening, some 
solemn and attentive, others chuckling. The workers were very 
close, and though the soldiers generally prevented anyone 
passing, a few filtered through and were not turned back.
There was no direct insubordination, but they were 
obviously unsuitable material for any active operations, and 
there was clearly nothing for the officers to do but turn a 
blind eye on this scene of ‘corruption’. For this detachment to 
take aim and open fire on the people it had been conversing 
with was unthinkable, and no-one in the crowd believed for 
a moment that it was possible.24 
This was confirmed by an unequivocal event that evening. 
Accounts of it vary, but what seems to have happened is this. 
Someone got news to the fourth company of the Pavlovsky 
Regiment – which had been confined to barracks without 
access to newspapers, telephones, or visitors – that its three 
sister companies were firing on the people. By six o’clock a 
decision had been made, and 150 men of the fourth company 
went onto the streets without orders, commanded by an NCO 
(his name lost to history). Their aim, it seems, was to recall their 
comrades. On the way, they encountered a police detachment. 
Either it was barring their way or it was shooting on unarmed 
demonstrators – or both – and the Pavlovsky men opened fire 
on the police, killing one, wounding another. Further details of 
24. Sukhanov 1955/1984, 26–7.
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their journey are obscure, but when they returned to barracks, 
they were surrounded by the Preobrazhensky Regiment, shots 
were exchanged, and the rebels were forced to surrender. 
Thirty-five were arrested and locked up. Another 22, however, 
had absconded – with their rifles.
Sukhanov heard an eyewitness account of these portentous 
events at the house of writer Maxim Gorky, a regular 
meeting-place of the city’s radical intelligentsia. ‘This’, 
reported Sukhanov,
was the first instance of a massive open clash between 
armed detachments … the importance of this affair … 
was enormous and quite unmistakable … to the Pavlovsky 
Regiment belongs the honour of having performed the first 
revolutionary act of the military against the armed forces of 
Tsarism … This was a terrible breach in the stronghold of 
Tsarism.25
The fifth day: 27 February
Much had happened in the night. Soldiers had discussed the 
day’s events in a hundred heated exchanges in the barracks. 
Many were sickened by what they had done, and embittered 
against the officers who had ordered it. Many had reached a 
firm decision: they would not fire on the crowds again.
The military mutiny began at seven o’clock. The previous 
day, the men of the Volynsky Regiment’s training squad had 
opened up with rifles and machine-guns in Znamenskaya 
Square, killing 40, wounding as many. The psychic injury 
was deep. Now there was atonement. ‘Fathers, mothers, 
25. Sukhanov 1955/1984, 28–9.
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sisters, brothers, even brides, are begging for bread’, Sergeant 
Kirpichnikov told his comrades. ‘Should we strike them down? 
Have you seen the blood running in the streets? I propose that 
we do not march against them tomorrow … Enough blood has 
been shed. Now it is time to die for freedom.’26
When Captain Lashkevitch arrived to lead out his 
detachment, he was met with cries of ‘We will not shoot’. 
The whole regiment refused to move. Their officers fled. 
Shots were fired at them from the windows as they went. The 
barracks had been taken for the revolution.
But could it be held? Soon the Volynsky were rushing to the 
neighbouring barracks – of the Litovsky, the Preobrazhensky, 
the Lithuanian Guards, the 6th Military Engineers – calling 
out their fellow soldiers just as the working women had called 
out their fellow workers on the first day.
Separate movements were under way in other parts of the 
city. Inner struggle convulsed the Moscow Regiment. Some 
officers and the training battalion tried to bar the way from 
Vyborg to the city centre, but other soldiers of the regiment 
joined the workers in a brief exchange of fire. Soon the whole 
regiment simply dissolved into the crowd, the soldiers helping 
to hunt down the police, break into the arsenals, and find arms 
for the workers.
By early afternoon, the insurgents had taken 40,000 rifles, 
30,000 revolvers, and 400 machine-guns. Armoured cars had 
appeared flying red flags. The fortresses had been opened and 
political prisoners released. Resistance at the barracks of the 
army bicyclists on the Sampsonievsky had been overwhelmed 
by the fire of armoured cars and machine-guns; a fence was 
broken down, buildings set on fire, the commanding officer 
26. Lincoln 1986, 331.
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killed, and other officers either captured or forced to flee 
through some vegetable gardens.
Late in the day came news that the Semenovsky Regiment 
– which had shot down the workers on Bloody Sunday in 
1905 – had joined the revolution. They in turn called out the 
Izmailovsky.27
Successive attempts throughout the day to form loyalist 
detachments with which to confront the mutineers and the 
workers failed. Khabalov had dispatched a regiment of a 
thousand men under a resolute officer with orders to suppress 
the uprising by whatever means were necessary. The regiment 
simply disappeared and was never heard from again. Entire 
military formations were dissolving. The once rock-solid 
human material of the Tsarist state had turned into a social 
fluid that seeped away in all directions. Thus, as Trotsky 
observed, ‘The Tsarist garrison of the capital, numbering 
150,000 soldiers, was dwindling, melting, disappearing. By 
night, it no longer existed.’ Khabalov cabled the Tsar at army 
headquarters:
I beg to inform His Imperial Highness that I am not able to 
carry out his instructions about the restoration of order in 
the capital. The majority of army units, one after the other, 
have betrayed their oaths, refusing to fire upon the rebels. 
Other units have joined the insurgents and have turned 
their weapons against the troops still remaining loyal to His 
Highness.28
27.  Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 143–4; Chamberlin 1935/1965, 78–80; 
Lincoln 1986, 331–2.
28. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 146–7; Lincoln 1986, 333.
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The triumph of the revolution in the Tsarist capital was 
complete by nightfall on 27 February. The strike was now 
general across the city and involved virtually the entire 
proletariat of 400,000 workers. The mutiny was equally 
general: it is estimated that somewhere between 15 and 45 per 
cent of the soldiers were on the streets with the workers, and 
virtually all the rest were in their barracks refusing orders to 
take repressive action.29
But Petrograd was a city of two million in a country of 150 
million. What of the rest of Russia?
There are circumstances in which a revolutionary city 
advances too far ahead of the country of which it is part and is 
then isolated and crushed. It happened with Paris in 1848 and 
1871. It would – as we shall see – be a danger narrowly averted 
in Petrograd itself in July 1917, and a danger terribly realised 
in Berlin in 1919. Progress in politics is impossible without a 
vanguard. But a vanguard must be one step ahead, not three.
Not that anyone would have been to blame had Petrograd 
moved too far ahead in February 1917. It was both the 
politico-military and the proletarian centre of Russia: at once 
the administrative core of the Tsarist state and the front line of 
the anti-Tsarist class struggle. Here, in the ancient capital, the 
contradictions of Old Russia attained their most concentrated 
form, accumulating a most powerful explosive charge. The 
danger of a premature detonation was there. But the elemental 
social forces unleashed in the February Days could not be held 
back. No-one summoned them. Many of the revolutionary 
leaders – Mensheviks, Social-Revolutionaries, and especially 
Bolsheviks – were abroad. Second-rank figures filled the 
gaps. But no call to the streets had come from any of them. 
29. Cliff 1976, 82.
130 ◆  A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
One rank-and-file Bolshevik reported: ‘Absolutely no guiding 
initiative from the party centres was felt … the Petrograd 
Committee had been arrested and the representative of the 
Central Committee, Comrade Shlyapnikov, was unable to give 
any directives for the coming day.’30 This is confirmed by the 
testimony of the Okhrana, the Tsarist secret police, whose files 
were seized after the revolution. An undercover agent inside 
the Bolshevik Party send this report to his superiors on 26 
February:
The movement which has started has flared up without any 
party preparing it and without any preliminary discussion 
of a plan of action. The revolutionary circles began to react 
only toward the end of the second day when the desire to 
develop the success of the movement to the widest limits 
possible became noticeable … The general attitude of the 
non-party masses is as follows: the movement started spon-
taneously, without any preparation, exclusively on the basis 
of the food crisis.31
This does not mean there was no leadership: it means 
that the leadership was from below. All mass action has to 
be organised. No meeting, march, or street battle lacks its 
leaders. Sometimes they had emerged from the ranks, thrown 
up by the February crisis. But more often it was veterans of 
the struggle, members of the revolutionary underground, who 
formed the organisational backbone of the uprising. Most were 
Bolsheviks. In answer to the question ‘Who led the February 
revolution?’, Trotsky gave an unequivocal answer: ‘Conscious 
30. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 163.
31. Cliff 1976, 84.
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and tempered workers educated for the most part by the party 
of Lenin.’32
The spark had caused a conflagration. But would Russia 
catch fire? The issue was only briefly in the balance. Strikes 
and demonstrations began in Moscow on 27 February. That 
very afternoon, detachments of soldiers arrived at the City 
Duma to enquire how they might join the revolution. Some 
sporadic shooting occurred over the succeeding few days, but 
it was nothing to compare with Petrograd’s heavy toll (1,443 
killed and wounded).
The revolution in the provincial cities was delayed a little 
more, beginning only on 1 March; but the story was everywhere 
the same. The workers left the factories, marched to the city 
centre, and gathered round the council chamber. The soldiers 
joined them there. The crowds waved red banners, hailed the 
revolution, and sang the Marseillaise. Petrograd answered for 
Russia. The vanguard was but one step ahead.33
What of ‘Bloody’ Nicholas? Having lost control of the 
garrison of the capital, the Tsar ordered fresh regiments to 
advance on Petrograd. The requirement was for ‘an absolutely 
loyal, though not necessarily large force’. The Cavaliers of St 
George – a battalion of decorated veterans – were detailed for 
the operation, along with four infantry regiments, four cavalry 
regiments, two machine-gun units, and four batteries of 
artillery. As the news from the capital worsened, further units 
were put on standby. But it proved a shadow army destined 
never to arrive. Far more dangerous than machine-guns was the 
moral contagion flowing in all directions from Red Petrograd. 
General Alexeyev resolved to keep his soldiers out of range. 
32. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 171.
33. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 156–60.
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The necessity now was for a political move, not a military one, 
lest the army as a whole be lost.
Of this, though, the imbecilic head of the dynasty was 
incapable. Instead, he abandoned his headquarters, his 
generals, and his front-line army, intent on returning to his 
family at Tsarskoe Selo Palace on the edge of Petrograd. He 
never reached it. The Tsar’s train was diverted by railway 
workers and, having shunted aimlessly across the countryside 
for two days, finally came to rest at Pskov.34 The Tsar of All 
Russia could no longer even accomplish a train journey. 
Thus was the 300-year-old Romanov dynasty terminated in a 
railway siding.35
34. Lincoln 1986, 334–7.
35.  The Tsar’s family was held captive by revolutionary forces and 
eventually executed at Yekaterinburg on 17 July 1918 to prevent their 




The July Days. Demonstrators scatter as right-wing gunmen 
open fire from upper-floor windows.
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The First Provisional Government
It had been one of the greatest popular revolts in history. The 
battle had been waged entirely through the mass action of the 
Narod, the common people of Russia. The bourgeoisie – the 
financial, commercial, and industrial capitalists – had played 
no part whatsoever. The middle class – the civil servants, the 
upper professionals, the intelligentsia – had watched events 
unfold from their balconies. The socialist leaders had either 
said nothing at all, or they had said nothing that made any 
difference. There was no leadership of any kind ‘from above’. 
The workers and peasant-soldiers of Petrograd had made the 
revolution all by themselves, as it were ‘from below’, and the 
rest of plebeian Russia had followed their lead.
Yet power now passed not to the workers, but to the 
liberal-bourgeois politicians of the Cadet Party, organised 
as a ‘Provisional Committee’ (soon to become ‘Provisional 
Government’) of the Tsarist Duma – a fake parliament of ‘lords 
and lackeys’ elected on a restricted franchise heavily weighted 
in favour of the rich. The new government was the work of 
Pavel Milyukov, a history professor and head of the Consti-
tutional Democrats (or Cadets), a liberal party of the middle 
class and intelligentsia favouring constitutional monarchy. The 
Cadets had formed a ‘Progressive Bloc’ with the Octobrists, 
a pro-Tsarist party of the nobility and the bourgeoisie whose 
leading figure was a rich Moscow finance-capitalist called 
Alexander Guchkov.
Behind the scenes, as the action unfolded on the streets, 
Milyukov had spent five sleepless days trying to construct a 
Progressive Bloc government – a new conservative regime to 
restore order, defend property, and continue the war. His first 
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effort was an abortive attempt to replace Tsar Nicholas (who 
was soon under house arrest) with his brother Mikhail – that 
is, to swap one autocrat for another. Mikhail, fearing for his 
own safety, refused to play his assigned role. It was then that 
Milyukov sat down and wrote out a list of ministers. It was 
a cabinet of Duma conservatives dominated by the Cadet 
Party. It included one token socialist: Alexander Kerensky.1 
This, then, was a government of landlords, industrialists, and 
right-wing professors. It seemed that the mountains in labour 
had given birth to a mouse. Trotsky called it ‘the paradox of the 
February Revolution’. What had happened?
Another power had in fact come into existence: the 
Soviet of Workers’ Deputies (soon to become the Soviet of 
Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies). The 1905 Revolution had 
taught this lesson: that the common people in action can 
best be organised by a pyramid of participatory democratic 
assemblies, the lowest bodies comprising mass meetings of 
everyone in a factory, barracks, battleship, or whatever, these 
electing delegates to the higher bodies.
But whereas the 1905 Soviet (the word simply means 
‘council’ or ‘assembly’) had originated as a strike committee 
– in other words, had emerged ‘from below’ out of the class 
struggle itself – the 1917 Soviet was an initiative of the radical 
intelligentsia. As the more moderate socialists emerged from 
semi-underground existence or were freed from prison by the 
crowds, they gathered in the grandeur of the Taurida Palace, 
the meeting place of the Duma, and formed a ‘Provisional 
Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies’. 
They called an immediate assembly and invited the workers 
to send delegates; but those who had taken the initiative had 
1. Lincoln 1986, 339–51 passim.
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earned much credit – and they were, after all, proven activists, 
many with records of prison and exile – so the instigators of 
the movement were confirmed as its leadership.2 These men 
held the real power in the capital after the February Days, 
for they enjoyed the confidence of the revolutionary crowds. 
But instead of wielding it, they stood aside and invited the 
Duma liberals to form a government. Was this not, after all, a 
‘bourgeois revolution’?
The Provisional Government immediately became the 
rallying point for right-wing forces. The President, Mikhail 
Rodzianko, was an ageing courtier, an ardent monarchist, 
and a mediocrity. The Prime Minister, Prince Lvov, was a rich 
but somewhat obscure right-wing liberal. The War Minister 
was Guchkov, who, as head of the Central Military-Industrial 
Committee, was effectively Russia’s war-profiteer-in-chief. 
But the real leadership was provided by Milyukov, the new 
Foreign Minister, described by the Menshevik chronicler of 
the revolution, Nikolai Sukhanov, as ‘the soul and brain of all 
bourgeois political circles’.3
Milyukov was an inveterate imperialist and warmonger – 
which, in the radically changed circumstances, required that he 
now become also a serial liar, issuing statements to the Russian 
people that were ‘only for domestic circulation’, while assuring 
the British, French, and Italian Ambassadors that ‘Russia would 
fight to the last drop of her blood’. The Russian bourgeoisie’s 
commitment to the war was absolute. It was dependent on 
the Entente for bank loans and arms shipments. The state had 
been bankrupted by the war, the economy reduced to a state 
of near-collapse, such that Milyukov and his colleagues could 
2. Sukhanov 1955/1984, 38–40.
3. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 198–209.
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not imagine continuing without foreign support. In any case, 
they wanted a seat at the victors’ banquet when the war ended; 
above all, they wanted Istanbul and the Bosphorus, as both an 
outer defence-work and a seaway to global markets. 
The war was the most pressing issue, but it was not the only 
one dividing the Provisional Government from Red Petrograd 
and the wider revolutionary mass movement. The workers 
wanted higher wages, an eight-hour day, an end to shortages, 
and, increasingly, control over production. The peasants 
wanted the land – the land of the gentry, and land free of debt 
and other burdens. And the minority peoples of the Tsarist 
Empire – 55 per cent of the population – wanted autonomy 
and an end to chauvinism, racism, and national oppression. 
The Provisional Government represented the opposite: war, 
empire, the restoration of order, and the defence of private 
property. Yet it lacked any power to impose them. War Minister 
Guchkov wrote to General Alexeyev less than a month after 
the overturn and confessed the true situation:
The Provisional Government possesses no real power and 
its orders are executed only in so far as this is permitted by 
the Soviet … It is possible to say directly that the Provisional 
Government exists only while this is permitted by the Soviet 
… Especially in the military department, it is possible now 
only to issue orders which do not basically conflict with the 
decisions of the … Soviet.4 
This reality had received dramatic confirmation as early as 1 
March, when a packed thousand-strong session of the Soviet, 
flooded with grey-clad soldier delegates, had passed Order No. 
4. Chamberlin 1935/1965, 101.
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1. This formalised the soldiers’ revolution. It called upon all 
military units to elect democratic committees, and declared 
that these would henceforward run the armed services. At a 
stroke, the rule of the Tsarist officer caste was terminated. The 
Order further stated that formal equality between officers and 
men now existed, that officers would no longer be allowed to 
impose disciplinary punishment, and that common soldiers 
would enjoy full rights as citizens. Above all, it abolished 
both corporal punishment and the death penalty, the ultimate 
barbarisms of a class-based military. Order No. 1 even outlawed 
abusive language: the routine use of terms like ‘mother-fucker’ 
were no longer to be tolerated when officers spoke to soldiers. 
The Russian soldier, denied dignity through the dark centuries 
of Tsarism, could finally stand upright.
The Right raged against Order No. 1. Alexeyev complained 
to Guchkov in mid April that 
Discipline in the Army is declining every day … The 
authority of officers has fallen, and there is no power to 
re-establish it. The spirit of the officers’ corps is falling more 
and more as a result … of their removal from actual power 
over their subordinates or the transfer of this authority to 
the soldiers’ committees … Pacifist sentiment develops in 
the armies.5 
The testimony of men like Alexeyev is clear: real power lay 
with the mass movement represented by the Soviets. Why, 
then, had the Soviet leaders allowed the Cadets to form the 
government? Why, moreover, had they done this in the 
face of many of their own supporters’ uncomprehending 
5. Chamberlin 1935/1965, 107.
DUAL POWER ◆  139 
indignation? The ‘socialist intelligentsia’ were soon receiving 
a stream of protests – like that from a former peasant called 
Zemskov, a Moscow worker and army deserter who had been 
hiding in the Kuban region for two years. Writing to Kerensky 
on 26 March, he denounced the empty claim that ‘freedom’ 
had been achieved:
After all, you’re oppressing the people, and they have long 
known that you are riding on their back: the noble and the 
merchant and the scholar and the poet and the journalist 
and the lawyer and the priest. You’re all nothing but greedy 
predators making off with the products of our labour. That 
is what the people are suffering from, and this is where the 
root of social evil lies. All the people need is for you parasites 
not to be riding on their back, and once that happens, freed 
from your yoke, they will govern themselves…6
The two dominant parties on the Executive Committee 
of the Petrograd Soviet were the Mensheviks and the 
Social-Revolutionaries. The former had lost their influence 
among the politicised workers, becoming a party dominated by 
students, teachers, lawyers, journalists, and the literati. Though 
still ‘Social Democrats’ with a theoretical commitment to 
socialist revolution at some indeterminate point in the future, 
the Mensheviks were what would now be called ‘reformists’. 
They believed that Russia’s revolution was inherently 
‘bourgeois’, that the Cadets were therefore the natural party of 
government, and that the role of socialists was to advance the 
cause of labour – to seek reforms – within a new democratic 
order.
6. Steinberg 2001, 85–91.
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The Social-Revolutionaries (SRs) were a party of radical 
intellectuals formed from a fusion of old Narodnik traditions. 
They had continued to focus on the peasantry and the land 
question, and the revolution now carried them high on a great 
tide of soldier and peasant votes. But they merely embodied 
in party form the conservatism of rich peasants, the wavering 
of middle peasants, and the passivity of poor peasants. 
This fractured and backward class base prevented the 
Social-Revolutionaries from giving decisive leadership. They 
would eventually split, the Right SRs backing the Provisional 
Government, the Left SRs becoming allies of the Bolsheviks.
What both parties shared was ‘petty-bourgeois’ 
(lower-middle-class) leadership. The Mensheviks and SRs 
were radical democrats and social reformers: they were 
not proletarian revolutionaries intent on the overthrow 
of the state and the wholesale dispossession of the rich. 
This political ‘Centre’ – in relation to the Cadets on the 
Right and the Bolsheviks on the Left – was variously 
described by contemporary critics as being composed 
of ‘moderates’, ‘compromisers’, ‘defencists’, ‘liquidators’, 
‘social-patriots/chauvinists’, and ‘petty-bourgeois democrats’. 
We shall use the term most familiar to modern readers and call 
the Mensheviks and SRs collectively ‘the Reformists’.
The Reformists conceded power to the Cadets because 
they feared the radicalism of the popular movement and were 
unwilling to assume power as the leaders of a revolution. 
The result was a ‘dual-power’ regime, in which authority 
was divided, since the Provisional Government exercised – 
or attempted to exercise – formal state power, but the great 
majority of the newly awakened masses of workers, soldiers, 
and peasants distrusted the Cadets and gave their allegiance to 
DUAL POWER ◆  141 
the Soviets, which they regarded as people’s parliaments, and 
to the Reformists, seen as the people’s true leaders. 
This ‘dual-power’ regime was highly unstable and could not 
endure. Politics has no real centre-point, least of all in time 
of revolution. Every great question demanded a yes or no 
answer. Would the war be ended? Would the eight-hour day be 
realised? Would the peasants get the land? Would the nation-
alities be granted autonomy? To each of these questions, the 
Provisional Government gave one answer and the masses 
another. But no final resolution was possible under a dual 
power with alternative and competing centres of political 
authority. Either the Provisional Government, in control of 
the old state apparatus and representing the propertied classes, 
would crush the Soviets and re-establish the uncontested rule 
of the rich, or the Soviets, democratic assemblies of the revolu-
tionary masses, would overthrow the Provisional Government 
and create a new social order.
Sooner or later, the matter would have to be resolved in one 
way or the other. In the meantime, in relation to this tension 
between conservative reaction and popular revolution, the 
Reformists formed an unstable centre – a role that involved 
them in performing an endless political pirouette on a 
shrinking social base, as they incrementally lost the support of 
the masses by their evasion, vacillation, and treachery on the 
central questions of the revolution.
The dual-power regime was bound to unravel. But it would 
take time – time for the masses to learn from experience that 
the Reformists did not represent their deepest aspirations. 
The advancing consciousness of the masses – moving from 
right to left during the eight months between February and 
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October – would henceforward constitute the principal motor 
of the revolutionary process.
Because it was fluid and fast-moving, the consciousness of 
the masses would repeatedly leap ahead of the representative 
bodies elected in an earlier phase of the revolution. This would 
give rise to a series of crises and clashes punctuating the history 
of 1917. From this we learn that the relationship between 
social classes, mass movements, democratic assemblies, and 
political parties is never straightforward. The interconnec-
tions form a working mechanism, in which nothing is fixed, 
everything is in motion. It cannot be assumed that a political 
party simply ‘represents’ a social class in any direct way, or that 
a democratic assembly merely ‘expresses’ the general will of a 
mass movement. Again and again, parties and assemblies lag 
behind the consciousness of active social forces. To understand 
the Russian Revolution is to grasp the inner dynamics of a 
complex political mechanism in a state of perpetual motion.
The April Days
When the Soviet Executive Committee decided to hand 
power to the bourgeoisie on 1 March, not a single one of its 
39 members had voted against, despite the fact that 11 were 
Bolsheviks or Bolshevik sympathisers. The following day, in 
a meeting of the full Soviet assembly, of some 400 deputies 
present, only 19 voted against, though some 40 were members 
of the Bolshevik faction. The lower ranking Bolsheviks – 
closer to the masses – tended to be more to the left, but the 
leadership simply tailed the Reformist-dominated Executive 
Committee. This tendency was reinforced by the return of 
two leading Bolsheviks, Lev Kamenev and Joseph Stalin, from 
DUAL POWER ◆  143 
exile in mid March. Taking over the party organ, Pravda, they 
moved the Bolsheviks further to the right. The Bolsheviks 
would support the Provisional Government ‘in so far as it 
struggles against reaction or counter-revolution’. And so long 
as German soldiers obeyed the Kaiser, the Russian soldier 
should ‘stand firmly at his post answering bullet with bullet 
and shell with shell’.7 Nothing of substance separated these 
Bolsheviks from the Reformists.
As soon as news reached him of the February Revolution, 
Lenin fretted to find a way back to Russia across war-torn 
Europe from his place of exile in Switzerland. He and his col-
laborators eventually secured the permission of the German 
authorities to pass through their territory in a ‘sealed train’. 
Like a dangerous bacillus, the Bolshevik cadre were to be 
injected into the Russian enemy, but prevented from contami-
nating any Germans along the way. Lenin arrived at Petrograd’s 
Finland Station on 3 April. The Bolsheviks had arranged a 
grand reception. There to meet him were an honour guard of 
Kronstadt sailors, a division of armoured cars, detachments of 
revolutionary soldiers, and a large crowd of factory workers. 
What he had to say thrilled the waiting rank and file and 
stunned their leaders. Standing on an armoured car, the 
headlamps casting long shafts of light down the darkened 
streets, the uplifted faces of thousands of soldiers, sailors, and 
workers illuminated in the glare, red-and-gold banners flying 
overhead, he denounced the Provisional Government, called 
for an immediate end to the imperialist war, and hailed the 
advent of ‘the worldwide socialist revolution’.8
7. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 300–1, 304–5.
8. Raskolnikov 1925/1982, 68–73.
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The very next day, he presented a short written summary 
of his perspective to a party conference in the Kshesinskaya 
Mansion, which the Bolsheviks had commandeered as their 
headquarters. Lenin’s April Theses, published in Pravda three 
days later, were effectively a manifesto for a second revolution. 
He denounced ‘revolutionary defencism’ – the idea that the war 
should now be supported as a defence of the revolution – on 
the basis that the Provisional Government was an imperialist 
government in alliance with other imperialist governments 
fighting an imperialist war. He rejected any support for the 
Provisional Government and called for its overthrow and 
replacement by ‘a republic of Soviets of Workers’, Agricultural 
Labourers’, and Peasants’ Deputies throughout the country, 
from top to bottom’. This would involve ‘abolition of the 
police, army, and bureaucracy’. All state officials would be 
elected, subject to immediate recall, and receive average 
wages. Russia, in other words, was to become a mass partici-
patory democracy. The landed estates were to be confiscated 
and turned into public property. A single national bank was 
to be set up. A new International was to be founded to spread 
revolution across the world.9
Earlier, in his Letters from Afar – the Bolshevik leader’s first 
response to news of the revolution – he had demanded that 
the working class be armed, creating a people’s militia that 
would maintain order, defend the revolution, advance the 
cause of ‘peace, bread, and freedom’, and ensure that ‘every 
worker improved his living conditions, that every family had 
bread, that no adult in a rich family should have a bottle of 
milk before the need of every child was satisfied, that rich 
9. Lenin 1917b, passim.
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apartments, abandoned by the Tsar and the aristocracy, should 
afford refuge to the poor and homeless’.10 
Lenin now embarked on a month-long struggle to turn his 
party round – a month of meetings, big and small, of speeches 
and articles, of urgent private huddles with leading Bolsheviks. 
Two days after his Theses, for example, came an article on dual 
power, clarifying the central question of the state:
In what does this dual power consist? In the fact that side by 
side with the Provisional Government, the government of 
the bourgeoisie, there has developed another government, 
weak and embryonic as yet, but undoubtedly an actually 
existing and growing government: the Soviets of Workers’ 
and Soldiers’ Deputies … It consists of the proletariat and 
the peasantry (clad in army uniform) … It is a revolutionary 
dictatorship, i.e. a power based on outright revolutionary 
seizure, on the direct initiative of the masses from below…11
To the Reformists, Lenin sounded out of touch, a wild 
extremist, a raving madman, according to some a ‘has-been’ 
peddling ‘superannuated truths of primitive anarchism’. The 
Bolshevik leaders squirmed: 13 out of 16 at first rejected the 
April Theses, and when they were published in Pravda there 
was an editorial disclaimer stating that they reflected Lenin’s 
‘personal opinion’, which was ‘unacceptable’.12 Elsewhere, 
his call for ‘worldwide socialist revolution’ was denounced 
as ‘Trotskyist’. ‘Lenin is wrong when he says the bourgeois 
revolution is finished’, claimed Kamenev. ‘The democratic 
10. Lenin 1917a, passim; Chamberlin 1935/1965, 132. 
11. Lenin 1917c, 27.
12. Lincoln 1986, 365.
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dictatorship is our foundation-stone’, explained Tomsky, 
another leading Bolshevik.13 But the argument was quickly 
won among the party rank and file, the worker-Bolsheviks 
rooted in the factories. By the time of the Party Congress, 
held from 24 to 29 April and attended by 149 delegates 
representing 79,000 members, Lenin’s ‘left’ Bolshevism was 
hegemonic across the party; Kamenev and Stalin, the chief 
culprits in the ‘reformist turn’, were not elected to the party’s 
new five-member steering group.14
Lenin’s victory at the conference was made easier by a 
decisive political test: the ‘April Days’ demonstrations on the 
20th and 21st of the month. They were triggered by the Cadet 
Foreign Minister Milyukov’s ‘Note’ setting out the Provisional 
Government’s attitude to the war. Addressed to Russia’s allies, 
it affirmed the nation’s resolve ‘to bring the world war to a 
decisive victory’, adding that ‘the leading democracies will 
find a way to establish those guarantees and sanctions which 
are required to prevent new bloody encounters in the future’. 
The message was clear: all-out imperialist war and a predatory 
victors’ peace. 
The Note ‘touched the match to the fuse’ (Trotsky).15 The 
battleships and the barracks exploded into action. The great 
naval base at Kronstadt was in the vanguard of Petrograd’s 
revolutionary movement. The crews of entire ships were 
applying to join the Bolshevik Party, and already there were 
3,000 full members and 35,000 registered sympathisers. Up 
to a thousand men worked on the great battleships of the 
age, and virtually every job required a high level of training 
13. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 332–3.
14. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 339–40.
15. Lincoln 1986, 361.
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and technical skill. Despite this, food was bad, living quarters 
cramped, regulations punitive, and officers frequently corrupt 
and brutal. Such was the class hatred festering in the ranks 
that some 36 ‘Dragons’ – as sailors called naval officers – had 
been killed in the February Revolution. Now Kronstadt was a 
ferment of revolutionary activity. At the naval base, reported 
the Bolshevik sailor Fyodor Raskolnikov,
Every ship, every regiment, every workshop sought to form 
a library of its own, however small this might be … and 
every political pamphlet was literally read to shreds. The 
February Revolution has aroused tremendous interest in 
politics and had thereby evoked an unprecedented demand 
for Bolshevik literature.16 
The movement had begun on the afternoon of 20 April. 
The Finnish Regiment appeared, fully armed, in front of the 
Marinsky Palace, where the Provisional Government met. It 
was soon joined by other military units, the crowd swelling to 
25,000 or more before the day was out. ‘Down with Milyukov!’ 
was the dominant slogan. 
News of the demonstration spread widely that evening – 
to other regiments, to Kronstadt, to the factories – and the 
following day saw vast columns of soldiers, sailors, and workers 
converging on the city centre, many bearing arms, many 
chanting ‘Down with the Provisional Government!’ and ‘Down 
with the war!’ There were clashes with counter-demonstrators, 
shots were exchanged, and, for the first time since February, 
blood flowed on the streets of the capital.
16. Raskolnikov 1925/1982, 64–7.
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Then, after just two days, the movement subsided. It had 
been a chaotic, spontaneous, improvised eruption from below. 
It had revealed the growing gulf between the Provisional 
Government and the masses: the growing polarisation of 
Russia into an imperialist Right and a revolutionary Left. 
Between the two, attempting to bridge the gulf, were the 
Reformist leaders of the Petrograd Soviet, who were, on the 
one hand, lobbying the government for a better form of words, 
while on the other, remonstrating with the crowds to end the 
protests. 
The April Days doomed the First Provisional Government. 
The Cadets and the Reformists, both desperate to restore 
public confidence, now favoured a coalition. The Cadets 
needed left cover for their conservative programme. The 
Reformists were under pressure to accept governmental 
authority. The main casualty was Milyukov, too tainted by his 
blatant imperialism to remain. The lynchpin of the Second 
Provisional Government would be Alexander Kerensky, now 
appointed War Minister, a Social-Revolutionary who had been 
the sole socialist to serve in the First Government.
Kerensky would dominate the next months of the revolution. 
A master of fiery, flowery, often hysterical rhetoric, he was a 
charismatic force at the tribunal. A man of tremendous energy 
but limited intellect, he seemed to float above the revolution, 
a bombastic voice shouting above its myriad conflicts, having 
no firm grounding in a social base, a party programme, a set 
of principles. It was this that fitted him for the role he was to 
play – neither Cadet nor Bolshevik, neither Right nor Left – as 
the living expression of the unresolved contradictions of the 
Russian Revolution in the middle months of 1917.17
17. Lincoln 1986, 367–71.
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The July Days 
The change of government meant a change of rhetoric: 
nothing more. Kerensky immediately embarked on a tour of 
the front, delivering tirades of histrionic patriotism to mass 
assemblies of soldiers. His mission, he had explained before 
setting out, was ‘to make it possible for everyone to look 
death in the face calmly and unflinchingly’. ‘Forward to the 
battle for freedom!’ he exhorted the soldiers. ‘I summon you 
not to a feast, but to death!’18 The social-chauvinist Kerensky 
thus gave to the imperialist war a democratic colouring. The 
excitable lawyer with a radical past made a more compelling 
messenger of death than a conservative history professor. But 
the agenda was the same: Russian peasant-conscripts were to 
die for Istanbul and the French banks.
Observers were impressed by the oratory and its momentary 
effect. But it was only momentary: the disintegration of the 
Russian army continued apace. Short of food, clothing, and 
equipment, lacking sufficient guns and munitions, knowing 
of the revolution, hoping that it portended a ‘Black Partition’ 
of the land, desperate to return to their villages to join in, 
the peasant-soldiers’ will to fight was gone. No-one listened 
anymore to priests and officers talking of Tsar, Faith, and 
Mother Russia. But the new slogans, too, were as echoes in 
the wilderness. What was ‘Prussian militarism’, ‘Austrian 
oppression’, and the ‘Turkish yoke’ as winter turned to summer 
and the village at home was making ready for the ploughing? 
And the supreme question: would they plough the same land 
this year as last; or would they take the lord’s land and plough 
that too? And would they themselves survive to see it? ‘What 
18. Lincoln 1986, 404–5.
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is the use of peasants getting the land if I’m killed and get no 
land?’ shouted one soldier at Kerensky.
Again and again, they returned to this, huddled in trenches, 
around their campfires, at meetings of the soldiers’ committees, 
listening to reports of delegates returning from Petrograd 
with news. Many had met the Germans and the Austrians. 
The soldiers opposite would call out, ‘Rus! Don’t shoot!’ 
The Russians would answer: ‘We won’t if you don’t!’ And 
sometimes they would meet to share food, to drink, to make 
merry: the storm of steel in no-man’s-land, the machinery of 
death, stilled by fraternisation. Maxim Gorky celebrated this 
in his newspaper:
It is apparent that the accursed war, begun by the greed of 
the classes in command, will be ended by the power of the 
commonsense of the soldiers. If this happens, it will … give 
man the right to be proud of himself. His will shall have 
conquered the most abominable and bloody monster, the 
monster of war.19 
Some were fraternising. Many more were refusing to fight. 
Most significant of all, thousands, then tens of thousands, and 
finally hundreds of thousands were leaving the trenches to 
begin the long trek home. Sukhanov, who worked with Gorky 
in the office of Novaya Zhizn (‘New Life’), saw ‘elemental 
forces’ at work in a movement so vast that it ‘recalled to mind 
a vast migration of peoples … a huge flood of soldiers took 
off for home without any sort of permission whatsoever. They 
clogged all the railroads, terrorised the authorities, threw 
19. Lincoln 1986, 397–403.
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passengers off the trains, threatened the entire transport 
system, and, in general, created a civic disaster.’20
On the home front, too, a great struggle against war erupted 
in the summer of 1917. The opening clash had been launched 
by the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers’ and 
Soldiers’ Deputies, in session for three weeks in June. Only 
105 out of 777 delegates were Bolsheviks. The Mensheviks 
and Social-Revolutionaries wanted a display of support for 
‘revolutionary defencism’ and ‘the unity of the revolution-
ary movement’. They had just strong-armed the Bolsheviks, 
increasingly dominant in Petrograd, into cancelling their own 
planned demonstration. Now they would cap this triumph 
with an alternative demonstration of their own.
The effort backfired. The protest on 18 June, 400,000 
strong, paraded under a great sea of Bolshevik banners. ‘Down 
with the Ten Capitalist Ministers!’, ‘Down with the Offensive!’, 
and ‘All Power to the Soviets!’ were the dominant slogans. 
Isolated handfuls carried Reformist banners. The crowd tore 
down those bearing the slogan ‘Confidence to the Provisional 
Government!’ ‘Here and there,’ reported Sukhanov, ‘the 
chain of Bolshevik banners and columns would be broken by 
specifically Social-Revolutionary or official Soviet slogans. 
But they were drowned in the mass.’ The smiles on the 
platform faded into stony glares as the leaders of the February 
Revolution were confronted with the unmistakable image of 
the October Revolution yet to come.21
But the war went on. The Right still hoped for victory 
and the spoils. The Centre dreamed of a democratic crusade 
that would unite the people behind the new Provisional 
20. Lincoln 1986, 405.
21. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 448–66 passim.
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Government. Only the Left, Lenin’s Bolsheviks, were 
unequivocal in opposing the war, and this intransigence was 
fast gaining them the allegiance of Petrograd. At the First 
Conference of Petrograd Factory Committees in late May/
early June, for example – an assembly of rank-and-file delegates 
representing 337,000 workers – the Bolshevik resolution was 
supported by 80 per cent of the 570 delegates. Around this 
time, too, the Bolsheviks secured a majority in the workers’ 
section of the Petrograd Soviet. The Social-Revolutionaries 
remained dominant among the soldiers, but even here there 
was a sharp contradiction between the formal support still 
given to the leaders of the old party of peasant revolt and 
the practical support given to the slogans and programme of 
Bolshevism: the political trajectory of the soldiers was obvious.
Further afield, though, the Bolsheviks were still well behind, 
as their showing in the elections to the All-Russian Congress 
of Soviets had revealed: only one in seven delegates.22 This 
imbalance – between Red Petrograd and the rest of Russia 
– exploded into a major political crisis when the Provisional 
Government attempted to move military units from the capital 
to the front to reinforce its planned summer offensive.
Lenin sensed the danger that Petrograd might become 
a second Paris Commune, and he argued relentlessly with 
his supporters to rein back the movement and discourage 
a premature attempt on power.23 In this he now found a 
powerful ally in Trotsky, just returned from exile (and shortly 
to join the Bolshevik Party, along with his 4,000 adherents, 
the Mezhrayontsy group, which until now had kept itself aloof 
22. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 432–3.
23. Cliff 1976, 260–1.
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from both major Social Democratic factions).24 But when the 
news arrived that two-thirds of the 1st Machine-Gun Regiment 
was to be sent to the front, the struggle against the Provisional 
Government escaped the control of the Bolshevik leadership. 
Like the sailors – essentially skilled workers in naval uniform 
– the machine-gunners were an elite of military specialists 
who had taken their place in the vanguard of the revolutionary 
movement. They now called on other regiments and the larger 
factories to join them on the streets, and in the early hours of 
3 July an angry and heavily armed demonstration converged 
on the Taurida Palace, 25,000 Putilov men with their families 
marching in from the Narva District to the south-west, 
30,000 workers and soldiers from the Vyborg in the north.25 
More were coming. The Kronstadt sailors shouted down the 
Bolsheviks they usually heeded and applauded Anarchist calls 
for solidarity. ‘Everyone burned with a desire to go and help as 
quickly as possible’, recalled Raskolnikov. 
Their aims were unclear. There was no precise notion of 
why the machine-gunners were demonstrating in Petrograd. 
It was enough that a demonstration was taking place. An 
active feeling of comradeship impelled the Kronstadt masses 
to take direct action, telling them that at such a moment 
they should be with their blood-brothers, the workers and 
soldiers of Petrograd. With such a unanimous collective 
feeling, it was very difficult to go against the stream.26 
24. Cliff 1989, 203–30 passim.
25. Lincoln 1986, 391–2.
26. Raskolnikov 1925/1982, 141–7.
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It was the same everywhere. Typical of the mood was the 
resolution passed at a mass meeting at the Schlusselburg 
Powder Works, where 5,000 men and women worked:
Enough hesitations! In the name of freedom, in the name of 
peace, in the name of the worldwide proletarian revolution, 
the All-Russian Executive Committee of the Soviet of 
Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Deputies must seize 
power! Executive power must rest in its hands, for it truly 
expresses the people’s will. There is no other way out of the 
impasse … The policy of compromise with the bourgeoisie 
has clearly revealed how utterly bankrupt and ruinous for 
the cause of freedom it is.27
The danger now was very real of an attempt on power in the 
capital. The Provisional Government and the Soviet Executive 
Committee had virtually no reliable military forces at their 
immediate disposal. But should they face a decisive threat, 
there was little doubt that sufficient loyalist units could be 
summoned from the provinces. And were this to happen, the 
forces of counter-revolution might be unleashed, and Red 
Petrograd, the vanguard of the popular revolution, would be 
drowned in blood. Raskolnikov was on the phone to Zinoviev 
at Bolshevik headquarters seeking advice. What to do? He 
could not stop Kronstadt marching on the following day. 
Zinoviev went away to consult. A few minutes later he came 
back with the answer: the party would lead ‘a peaceful and 
organised armed demonstration’. The Bolsheviks, having failed 
27. Steinberg 2001, 182–3.
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to restrain the movement, had resolved to place themselves at 
its head – the aim: to contain it.28
It was a vast display of Bolshevik power. Tens of thousands 
marched with guns – the 1st Machine-Gun Regiment, the 
Kronstadt sailors, Red Guards (armed workers’ militia) from 
the larger factories, and many others. Hundreds of thousands 
more marched with them. Perhaps as many as half a million 
were on the streets of the capital on 4 July 1917. The mood 
was tense as these vast plebeian crowds moved through the 
streets of the aristocratic and bourgeois city centre. Then shots 
were fired by snipers from the upper floors of buildings on the 
Liteiny Prospect and elsewhere, scattering the crowds, sending 
soldiers and sailors storming into houses to kill anyone they 
suspected. The bloody clashes would eventually claim 400 
victims. Little wonder that the mood of the crowd around 
the Taurida Palace was angry and edgy by the end of the day. 
Victor Chernov, Social-Revolutionary Minister of Agriculture, 
was seized by sailors when he attempted to give a speech and 
had to be rescued by Trotsky. ‘Take power, you son-of-a-bitch, 
when they give it to you!’ one worker snarled at Chernov.29 
But they would not. And the two-day siege of the Taurida 
Palace dissolved, the July movement petering out in backstreet 
skirmishes between middle-class patriots and revolution-
ary militants. Then, around midnight, the balance tipped 
decisively. Regiments that had remained neutral marched to 
defend the Soviet Executive Committee – the Izmailovsky, the 
Preobrazhensky, the Semenovsky.
There were many reasons. The scenes on the streets had 
been chaotic and bloody: many were unsettled and yearned 
28. Raskolnikov 1925/1982, 149.
29. Trotsky 1932–3/1997, 544–53 passim.
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for order. The movement had lacked purpose. The angry 
worker who had confronted Chernov had expressed it as 
clearly as anyone: the demonstrators were attempting to force 
those who refused power to take it. Only the Bolsheviks were 
for Soviet power, and they were not yet strong enough. And 
now, into the confusion, to further confound and disorient the 
retreating movement, was inserted a Great Lie. The regiments 
that had marched to the defence of Reformism had been told 
that Lenin was a paid agent of the German Kaiser.30 This 
calumny would provide the cover for a storm of reaction and 
repression designed to destroy the Bolshevik Party – a storm 
that would clear the ground for an attempted military coup to 
smash the entire revolutionary movement. 
30. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 558–61.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Counter-Revolution
The counter-revolution.  
Right-wing soldiers demonstrate in favour of war.
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The Kerensky Offensive
Between the February and July Days, the revolution was in 
the ascent. The February Days had brought down the Tsarist 
regime. The April Days had brought down the First Provisional 
Government of Cadets. The July Days would also work their 
effect: the Second Provisional Government, a coalition of 
Cadets and Reformists in which the former predominated, 
broke up, to be succeeded, after much shilly-shallying of party 
leaders, by a new coalition, now with Kerensky as Premier 
and a majority of Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries. 
Kerensky was the keystone of the shaky edifice of this Third 
Provisional Government. A liberal-imperialist in red feathers, 
he was the cuckoo in the Soviet, having been the only socialist 
in the First Provisional Government, the dominant figure in 
the Second, and now, as head of the Third, the indispensable 
point of intersection between the old state apparatus and the 
new revolutionary democracy. But these two forces – the 
opposing poles of the dual-power regime – were irreconcilable. 
Kerensky’s accommodation to the imperialist bourgeoisie – 
symbolised by his total commitment to the war – necessitated 
a full-scale attack on the revolutionary vanguard. The July 
Days retreat provided the opportunity.
The masses had been growing more organised and radical, 
better able to distinguish friend from enemy, truth from 
falsehood, more aware of where their interests lay, more 
willing to take action to push them forwards. Then came an 
abrupt check. The collapse of the July movement sent a wave 
of demoralisation across proletarian Petrograd. Heady hopes 
turned to bitter disappointment. Confidence was replaced by 
cynicism. Angry reproach fell upon those who had done most 
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to raise expectations: the Bolsheviks. The Great Lie – that 
German gold funded Lenin’s party – found a ready audience 
among a mass movement retreating in confusion.
The lie was fabricated from the most pitiful material. The 
unsubstantiated testimonies of a minor military agent and 
a shady businessman were fanned by the liberal-bourgeois 
media into a great storm of slander, abuse, and vilification.1 
As the lie percolated through the pores of Russian society, 
meetings of workers and soldiers shouted down Bolshevik 
speakers; in places, party members felt physically threatened 
and withdrew from the Soviets altogether. ‘The July events’, 
wrote Shlyapnikov,
and the whole accompanying campaign of violence and 
slander against our organisation interrupted that growth 
of our influence, which, by the beginning of July, had 
reached enormous proportions … The very party became 
semi-illegal, and had to wage a defensive struggle, relying in 
the main upon the trade unions and the shop and factory 
committees.2
Recruitment dried up. Some members abandoned the party. 
The rest kept their heads down. A few were gnawed by doubt. 
‘I will never forget’, wrote the Moscow worker Ratekhin,
one mortally hard moment. A plenary session was 
assembling [of the district Soviet] … I saw there were none 
too many of our Bolshevik comrades … Steklov, one of the 
energetic comrades, came right up close to me and, barely 
1. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 597–60.
2. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 758.
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enunciating the words, asked: ‘Is it true they brought Lenin 
and Zinoviev in a sealed train? Is it true they are working on 
German money?’3
The Reformist leaders suspected the allegations were false. 
But most said little or nothing, for the storm promised to 
sweep back their revolutionary rivals. Kerensky seized the 
moment to attempt a killer blow. Orders for the arrest of 
Lenin, Zinoviev, and other Bolshevik leaders were issued on 
19 July. ‘Now they will shoot us all’, Lenin had told Trotsky the 
day before. ‘For them it is the best moment.’ The Bolshevik 
leaders were forced into hiding, justifying their action on the 
grounds that ‘there are no guarantees of a fair trial in Russia at 
the present moment’, and that ‘all accusations against us are a 
simple episode of civil war’.4
This was the right decision. Lenin might well have been 
murdered, and anyway, in prison he would have been rendered 
powerless. But the decision was controversial. It seemed to 
imply guilt.5 Trotsky – who insisted that his name be added to 
the list of the accused – and other revolutionary leaders were 
in fact taken into custody.
The police, meantime, launched attacks on the wider mass 
movement. Some of the more revolutionary regiments were 
broken up or sent to the front. Arms searches were carried 
out in the factories and Red Guards disarmed. Bolshevik 
newspapers were suppressed; one news vendor was murdered 
in the street by government soldiers. Kerensky accused 
Kronstadt of harbouring ‘persons … who, influenced by 
3. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 760.
4. Chamberlin 1935/1965, 183.
5. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 760.
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German agents and provocateurs, have called for actions 
threatening the Revolution and the security of our country’. 
Under threat of blockade, Raskolnikov and other Bolshevik 
sailors surrendered themselves: to have called on their 
comrades for armed resistance would, in the circumstances, 
have been too risky.
Among the heaviest of the repressive blows was the 
restoration of the death penalty at the front.6 The soldiers 
were to be driven to fight by fear of the firing squad. The effect 
of the Great Lie was starkest in the trenches, where military 
imperatives imposed a politics of extremes. Bolsheviks 
were purged, army committees ignored, soldiers shot for 
fraternising. Deserters were herded back to the front following 
mass round-ups. Mutinous regiments were disarmed. Saluting, 
drilling, and the untrammelled rule of the officer caste were 
restored along much of the line. Elite shock battalions of 
loyalist soldiers were formed: the ‘Death Battalions’.7
The Great Lie cowed the revolutionary movement and 
allowed the counter-revolution to rear its head and rally its 
forces. Trotsky described it thus:
In the assault upon the Bolsheviks, all the ruling forces, the 
government, the courts, the intelligence service, the staffs, 
the officialdom, the municipalities, the parties of the soviet 
majority, their press, their orators, constituted one colossal 
unit … The slanders poured down like Niagara. If you take 
into consideration the setting – the war and the revolution 
– and the character of the accused – revolutionary leaders of 
6.  Raskolnikov 1925/1982, 193 and 187–209 passim; Chamberlin 
1935/1965, 184–5.
7. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 763–4.
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millions who were conducting their party to the sovereign 
power – you can say almost without exaggeration that 
July 1917 was the month of the most gigantic slander in 
world history.8
The Great Lie arose in the context of a great offensive. 
Kerensky’s tour of the army, his hysterical speeches to crowds 
of soldiers, the flood of official propaganda, the democratic 
phrases and red flags, the slandering and purging of the 
Bolsheviks, the suppression of mutinous units, the creation 
of Death Battalions, the partial restoration of the authority of 
officers: all this contributed to an upsurge of fighting along 
the Eastern Front in the summer of 1917. The weary, ragged, 
sullen Narod was being rallied, the country as a whole united, 
around the flag of ‘revolutionary defence’. Kerensky was 
recasting himself as the heroic champion of a fighting people.
The British and the French had underwritten the offensive 
by shipping vast quantities of rifles, machine-guns, cannon, 
and ammunition to Russia. The cannon stood 30 metres apart 
along 100 kilometres of front when the offensive opened. Never 
before had the Russians enjoyed a five-to-one advantage in 
firepower. This was enough to enable them to smash through 
two or three lines of Austro-Hungarian trenches and open a 
breach 30 kilometres deep in the enemy line.
Then the Germans rushed in reinforcements and coun-
terattacked. As they did so, Russian resistance collapsed. 
Everywhere, entire units – regiments, divisions, corps, armies – 
evacuated their positions, went into hiding, retreated headlong. 
Many did not even await the approach of the enemy; the mere 
rumour of their coming was sufficient to trigger abandonment 
8. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 622–3.
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of the line. Elsewhere, orders to march forwards or mount 
attacks were debated and rejected; and officers who attempted 
compulsion were sometimes killed.9 Brusilov, the Russian 
commander-in-chief, wailed in desperation: ‘It is necessary to 
restore iron discipline, in the fullest sense of the term … If we 
delay even a moment, the Army will perish, Russia will perish, 
we will sink into infamy.’ Kerensky contrasted ‘heroes who 
would selflessly die fulfilling their duty to the Motherland’ 
with those he called ‘cowards and traitors’; for the latter he 
demanded ‘the only penalty that could frighten them’.
But where were the loyal units to enforce ‘iron discipline’ 
and impose ‘the only penalty’ to be found? The whole army 
was infected with mutiny. ‘Can we really execute entire 
divisions?’ asked one general. If every insubordinate soldier 
was brought to trial, ‘half the army would end up in Siberia’. 
The army was being ‘destroyed’, thought another. There 
‘remained nothing but human dust’, opined a third.10 A great 
tide of men flowed away from the war during the summer and 
autumn of 1917. In its wake came the German juggernaut, 
rolling forwards, spearheaded by a new class of ‘storm-troops’, 
a relentless offensive that would eventually bring the Kaiser’s 
men into Riga on the Baltic on 21 August, a mere 300 miles 
from Petrograd.
Kerensky had failed. The Provisional Government had 
proved hollow. The revolution was destroying Russia. The 
country was being wrecked by a compound of military 
defeat, economic collapse, and social breakdown. The need 
was of a saviour, a strongman, a leader who would restore 
order, safeguard property, and repel the invader. So thought 
9. Stone 1969/1971, 2448–53.
10. Lincoln 1986, 356–7, 408–11.
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aristocratic and bourgeois Russia. And when Kerensky sacked 
Alexei Brusilov and replaced him as army commander-in-chief 
with Lavr Kornilov, a Siberian Cossack general with a 
bodyguard of machine-gun toting Turcoman warriors, it 
seemed to many that just such a man had emerged.
The Kornilov Coup
The saviour made a grand appearance in Moscow on 14 
August. The occasion was a session of the State Conference, 
an assembly of 2,414 delegates representing the former Tsarist 
Dumas, the co-operatives, the trade unions, the banks and 
big business, the municipalities, and the Soviets. Because it 
was Kerensky’s attempt to create a political base for the new 
Provisional Government, it was heavily skewed in favour 
of the Right and private property. The Conference was 
boycotted by the Bolsheviks as a gerrymandered assembly of 
counter-revolutionary forces. The Moscow workers greeted 
it with a 400,000-strong protest strike on the day of its 
opening.11 Held in the magnificent surroundings of a grand 
opera house and intended as a display of national unity, it 
was in fact a comic-opera prefiguring of the coming civil war. 
Figures of the Tsarist ancien regime formed the Right. The 
leaders of the Reformist parties formed ‘the Left’. The vast 
crowds of proletarian strikers outside on the first day – massed 
under banners bearing Bolshevik slogans – represented the 
revolutionary Narod. Agreement was impossible; for much of 
the time the Conference was consumed by stormy altercation. 
Kerensky was revealed as the indispensable pivot connecting 
the two sides. All politics must be personified. The politics 
11. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 658–9.
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of impasse – of irreconcilable class contradictions – may find 
expression in a buffoon. Such was Kerensky: vain, pompous, 
self-important, his histrionic rhetoric cover for lack of real 
substance and the hopelessness of the political situation. The 
impasse became obvious with the arrival of Kornilov.
At the first sitting of the Conference, Kerensky had been 
given a standing ovation by the Lefts, while the Rights had 
remained seated. At the second sitting, Kornilov received a 
standing ovation from the Rights, and the Lefts remained 
seated.12 Kornilov had arrived in Moscow to cheering crowds. 
Richly dressed women had strewn his path with flowers. ‘You 
are the symbol of our unity’, proclaimed one Cadet politician. 
‘Save Russia and a grateful people will crown you.’ Ascending 
the podium, Kornilov told the State Conference that
the Army must be restored at all costs, for without a recon-
structed Army, there can be no free Russia and no salvation 
of our homeland … Only an Army welded together by iron 
discipline, only an Army led by the unified will of its leaders 
can achieve victory … We cannot afford to waste time. Not 
even a single minute can be wasted.13
The ‘restoration’ of the army was already under way. After 
his appointment, Kornilov had begun issuing demands of 
the government: that politicians should not interfere with 
his military arrangements; that the death penalty should 
be reintroduced in the rear as well as at the front; that the 
railways and war industries should be militarised. At the same 
time, counter-revolutionary forces began to gravitate upon 
12. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 672–3.
13. Lincoln 1986, 416–17.
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Kornilov’s headquarters: the Death Battalions (including 
women’s battalions); the Cavaliers of St George (decorated 
veterans); the League of Officers; the Junkers (as officer cadets 
were known); and the Council of the Union of Cossacks. The 
commander-in-chief also summoned the 3rd Cavalry Corps, 
which included the notorious ‘Savage Division’ of Caucasian 
horsemen – not to the front, but to the rear, directing it 
towards Petrograd. ‘Kornilov became a banner’, reported 
General Denikin. ‘For some of counter-revolution, for others 
of the salvation of the Motherland.’14
Kerensky was party to the conspiracy. In this he mixed 
counter-revolutionary malice with political stupidity. He 
expected to implement Kornilov’s programme himself, but 
was aware that it could not be done without the destruction 
of the revolutionary movement in the capital. Accordingly, 
his intention was to provoke the Bolsheviks into calling the 
workers onto the streets, and to be ready to smash them with 
loyalist troops. For this purpose, he asked Kornilov to send a 
cavalry corps to the capital. As the agent detailed to convey 
this request later explained, the mission was ‘To get from 
General Kornilov a cavalry corps for the actual inauguration of 
martial law in Petrograd and for the defence of the Provisional 
Government against any attempt whatever, in particular an 
attempt of the Bolsheviks.’15
Kerensky was a Kornilovist; but, as the Menshevik 
Sukhanov put it, ‘only on the condition that he himself should 
stand at the head of the Kornilovists’. The plot in which he was 
engaged was, as Trotsky explained, Byzantine in its duplicity:
14. Chamberlin 1935/1965, 194–9.
15. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 704–6.
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the Minister-President, without the knowledge of a part of 
his own Government, behind the back of the Soviets that 
had given him power, in secrecy from the party of which he 
was a member, had entered into agreement with the highest 
generals of the Army for a radical change in the state regime 
with the help of the armed forces.16
But this plan for a military coup – a plan to destroy Red 
Petrograd with grenades, shootings, and the gallows – was, on 
Kerensky’s part, the act of a political imbecile. Once unleashed, 
the counter-revolution would be sure to destroy not only 
the Bolsheviks, but also the Soviets (which the Bolsheviks 
increasingly dominated), thus collapsing the entire dual-power 
regime that was the basis of Kerensky’s premiership. Not until 
the very last moment did the truth dawn on the middle-class 
lawyer whom history had elevated to such heady heights. 
Last-minute negotiations between Kerensky and Kornilov 
yielded a peremptory demand from the Tsarist general for a 
declaration of martial law in Petrograd, the surrendering of 
all power in the capital to the military, and the resignation en 
masse of the Provisional Government. The Prime Minister was 
invited to come to the Stavka (military headquarters) for his 
own safety. It was suggested he might be Minister of Justice in 
a new government.17
The conspiracy fell apart. Kornilov had revealed himself 
as a rival for supreme power. Kerensky promptly cabled 
the commander-in-chief ordering him to surrender his 
office, then a further instruction ordering a halt to all troop 
movements towards Petrograd. Kornilov ignored both. He was 
16. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 706–7.
17. Chamberlin 1935/1965, 209–11.
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henceforward engaged in an open military coup against the 
Provisional Government. The revolution faced its most clear 
and present danger since the February Days. In the judgement 
of Prince Trubetskoy, head of the Stavka diplomatic corps, 
‘The whole commanding staff, the overwhelming majority 
of the officers, and the best fighting units of the Army are 
for Kornilov. On his side in the rear are all the Cossacks, the 
majority of the military training-schools, and also the best 
fighting units.’18
The Provisional Government had already ceased to 
function. The Cadet ministers had resigned their offices 
and disappeared from view: the counter-revolution was now 
represented by a Cossack general, so there was nothing for 
the frock-coats to do but await the outcome. The Reformist 
ministers remained, but it hardly mattered: they commanded 
no forces, so were powerless. News of the coup became 
widely known in Petrograd on the night of 27/28 August. The 
Russian Stock Exchange greeted the approach of Kornilov’s 
Cossack and Caucasian cavalry with a surge in share values.19 
The propertied classes were banking on a prompt termination 
of the revolution.
The Soviets, on the other hand, even under Reformist 
leadership, had suddenly awakened to the fact that their 
very existence was in mortal danger. On the evening of 27 
August, a joint session of both Executive Committees – 
that of the workers and soldiers, and that of the peasants 
– had agreed to create a new body, a Committee for Struggle 
with Counter-Revolution, formed of three representatives 
of each of the main Soviet parties, the Mensheviks, the 
18. Chamberlin 1935/1965, 212–13.
19. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 722–3.
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Social-Revolutionaries, and the Bolsheviks. This body issued 
an immediate call for all-out armed resistance to Kornilov.20
Why had the Bolsheviks joined the Committee for Struggle 
with Counter-Revolution? The Provisional Government, 
which included both Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries, 
had hounded the Bolshevik Party into semi-underground 
existence, imprisoning or forcing into hiding its leaders, 
shutting down its newspapers, smearing its members as 
accomplices of the Kaiser. Kerensky was a reactionary 
masquerading as a democrat. The Winter Palace and the 
Stavka were twin centres of counter-revolution. What was 
it that Lenin had said after the July Days? That Kerensky’s 
cabinet was ‘Bonapartist’ in character and dependent for its 
existence upon ‘a military clique’.21 The term ‘Bonapartist’ 
implied an authoritarian government elevated above society 
and balanced between two opposing social forces. Lenin’s 
argument was that Kerensky was an embryonic Bonapartist, in 
that he straddled the division between bourgeoisie and Soviet, 
but, lacking an army of his own, was compelled to seek an 
alliance with the generals.
The breach between Kerensky and Kornilov transformed 
the situation. It was a ‘sharp turn’ that demanded ‘revision 
and change of tactics’. The main enemy was now Kornilov, 
because he represented the mailed fist: the crisis had become 
an open struggle between the army and the Soviets, between 
armed counter-revolution and the Petrograd proletariat.22 
The argument was carefully nuanced. When Kronstadt sailors 
asked Trotsky, ‘Isn’t it time to arrest the Government?’, he 
20. Chamberlin 1935/1965, 217.
21. Cliff 1976, 287.
22. Cliff 1976, 298–301.
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answered, ‘No, not yet. Use Kerensky as a gun-rest to shoot 
Kornilov. Afterwards we will settle with Kerensky.’23 This was 
the tactic of the united front in action: unity of the working 
class – Mensheviks, Social-Revolutionaries, and Bolsheviks 
– to defend the revolution against the immediate and most 
dangerous enemy. But this, for Lenin, did not mean an 
alliance with Kerensky: ‘We will fight, we are fighting against 
Kornilov, but we are not supporting Kerensky, but exposing 
his weakness … In fighting Kornilov, the proletariat will fight 
not for the dictatorship of Kerensky, but for all the conquests 
of the Revolution.’24 
In truth, as in all the great days of the revolution, as in 
February, April, and July, no call from above was required: 
tens of thousands of activists embedded in Petrograd’s revolu-
tionary mass movement were already in action. The Soviets, in 
decay for two months under their insipid leadership, suddenly 
burst back into life, nourished by an upsurge of activity 
from below, as the workers and soldiers flowed into packed 
meetings. The Red Guards, suppressed after the July Days, 
were reborn, with queues of young workers forming to sign 
up and collect rifles; the proletarian militia was soon 40,000 
strong. The giant Putilov works became the centre of resistance 
in the Peterhof District: the Factory Committee remained in 
permanent session, new fighting detachments were formed, 
and workers toiled 16 hours a day to manufacture 100 cannon 
for the defence of the revolutionary capital. The rail workers – 
threatened by Kornilov with martial law – tore up track, built 
barricades, refused to move troop trains, shunted others into 
sidings. The postal and telegraph clerks refused to transmit 
23. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 738–9.
24. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 821.
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military messages. ‘The generals’, commented Trotsky, ‘had 
been accustomed during the years of war to think of transport 
and communications as technical questions. They found 
out now that these were political questions.’ Other unions 
provided funds, offices, transport, and printing-presses to aid 
the defence.25
In the end, it was almost bloodless. The counter-revo-
lutionary forces in the rear were easily cowed. A military 
commandant in communication with Kornilov was shot by the 
Kronstadt sailors. Four officers of the Baltic Fleet who refused 
to swear allegiance to the revolution were also executed. Most 
of the rest, the secret Kornilovists in Petrograd and elsewhere, 
went to ground, awaiting the arrival of the Cossacks and 
Caucasians. But they never came. Trotsky recalled how the 
army of counter-revolution was immobilised or diverted to the 
back of beyond by the rail workers: 
In a mysterious way, echelons would find themselves 
moving on the wrong roads. Regiments would arrive in the 
wrong direction, artillery would be sent up a blind alley, 
staffs would get out of communication with their units. All 
the big stations had their own soviets, their railway workers, 
and their military committees. The telegraphers kept them 
informed of all events, all movements, all changes … Parts of 
the army of Krymov [Kornilov’s field commander] were in 
this way scattered about in the stations, sidings, and branch 
lines of eight different railways. If you follow on the map the 
fate of the Kornilov echelons, you get the impression that 
25. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 734–7.
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the conspirators were playing at blind-man’s-buff on the 
railway lines.26
At the same time, the rank-and-file soldiers were swamped 
by revolutionary crowds, fraternising, leafleting, arguing, 
attempting to dissolve a mortal physical threat with the acid 
of a moral power. The Cossacks were surrounded by 20,000 
armed soldiers at Luga. They were given leaflets informing 
them that Kornilov was an outlaw. The Cossacks held their 
own meetings. Had they been deceived? Had their officers 
lied? A delegation of Muslim revolutionaries went to meet 
their co-religionists of the Savage Division. It included the 
grandson of a famous hero who had defended the mountains 
against Tsarism. What was the result? The Caucasians stuck a 
red flag inscribed ‘Land and Freedom’ on their commander’s 
staff car.27 
Thus did the Kornilov Coup boil up, surge forwards, and 
then melt away into the ground, its high command unable to 
direct it, its troop trains shunted into nowhere, its soldiery 
sucked into a revolutionary mass that rose up all around it.
Not only that. The August Days had exposed the violence 
of the propertied classes, their irreconcilable hatred of the 
revolution, the impossibility of compromise. They also laid 
bare the powerlessness of the Provisional Government and 
the treachery of Kerensky and the Reformist leaders. Not 
least, they revealed the Bolsheviks to be the most resolute 
champions of the revolution and of the common people’s 
demands for peace, land, and freedom.
26. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 744–5.
27. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 741–3.
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As the counter-revolution’s attempt to solve the national 
crisis with a Cossack army crumbled to pieces, the mood 
of Russia’s dark masses, shifting only slowly since the July 
debacle, swung suddenly and sharply to the left. A revolution, 
Marx once said, needs from time to time the whip of 
counter-revolution. So it was on this occasion: Kornilov 
had roused the masses from their slumber, and now – more 
experienced, more serious, more committed to the party that 
was truly their own – they were set to rise in unvanquishable 




The October Days. A still from Soviet filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein’s 
depiction of the storming of the Winter Palace.
THE OCTOBER DAYS ◆  175 
Revolution from below
The events in Petrograd during 1917 were underpinned by an 
escalating land-war in the Russian countryside. The peasants 
outnumbered the workers more than five to one. Peasant 
conscripts had shot down striking workers and crushed the 
urban revolutionary movement in 1905. They would have 
done so again had the revolution not spread to the countryside 
in 1917.
The Provisional Government tried to prevent this happening 
by opposing all direct action by peasants; the official line was 
that the villages should wait for the Constituent Assembly to 
decide the land question. All major parties were committed to 
an elected Constituent Assembly which would frame a new 
constitution for Russia. What is quite clear is that had the 
peasants waited, they would never have got the land. The banks 
had lent the landlords four billion roubles.1 This commercial 
alliance between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy could 
not be broken without revolutionary action from below. The 
Reformists (who would dominate the Constituent Assembly 
when it finally met in January 1918) certainly had no intention 
of challenging the rights of property from above. On 21 
September, for example, Kerensky issued an order forbidding 
the peasants from taking land, cattle, machinery, or firewood 
belonging to the big estate-owners; dire penalties were 
threatened.
But this had no more effect than countless similar injunctions. 
The repressive apparatus to enforce such government diktats 
no longer existed. The peasant movement grew and grew: 34 
counties had been effected in March, 174 in April, 236 in May, 
1. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 872.
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280 in June, and 325 in July.2 If the movement faltered a little 
in some areas during the summer, it was only for the action to 
spread to previously passive regions, and then for the entire 
land-war to flare up across the whole country in the autumn, 
with 30 per cent more recorded incidents in September than 
August, and 43 per cent more in October than September.3
At the same time, the struggle became more radical, with the 
most destitute peasants moving into the front rank, alongside 
growing numbers of ‘self-demobilised’ soldiers returning from 
the front. They were encouraged by the urban workers, many 
of whom retained strong links with the villages from which 
they had migrated, often expressed through membership of 
‘back-home’ clubs. The soldiers knew how to fight and were 
habituated to violence. Again and again, they led the people 
of their villages into action. ‘More and more soldiers came 
to us from the towns and from the trenches, some of them 
wounded, some of them demobilised’, recalled one peasant 
villager. ‘They brought more news and stirred up the revolu-
tionary sentiment of the peasantry.’4
The peasants rolled into action in the manner of all the great 
land-wars of the past. Manor houses were looted and burned. 
Grain was seized and livestock driven off. Farm machines and 
tools were carried away. Whatever could not be taken was 
smashed. The struggle for the forests was especially bitter – 
timber for building and firewood for heating were basic needs 
in the villages – and so was the struggle for grain, especially 
among the poorest, feeling the pinch of hunger as winter 
approached in crisis-wracked Russia. The landlords and their 
2. Chamberlin 1935/1965, 251.
3. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 862–3.
4. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 873–4; Chamberlin 1935/1965, 250–3.
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agents fled, the authorities lacked the means to restore order, 
and the villages set about the ‘Black Partition’ of which they 
had dreamed for centuries. Land committees were the primary 
organs of the peasant revolution, but when the militancy of 
the masses outran what their Social-Revolutionary leaders 
were prepared to sanction, even the land committees might 
be superseded by the primitive peasant democracy and direct 
action of the mir, the village commune. The revolution in the 
countryside – like the revolution in the cities and at the front – 
found the channels it needed; the flood could not be stemmed.
The general result was a great levelling of land ownership. 
Poor and landless peasants received sizeable allotments. The 
middle peasants usually gained something. The rich peasants 
were often pulled down a peg. The noble estate ceased to 
exist.5 Thus was the peasant revolution accomplished from 
below before it could be authorised from above. Thus, too, 
was the ground beneath the feet of the counter-revolution 
turned to quicksand. Trotsky was unequivocal about the 
world-historic significance of the land-war in the Russian 
countryside in 1917:
As air currents carry seeds, the whirlwinds of the revolution 
scattered the ideas of Lenin … The peasantry pushed the 
Bolsheviks toward power with their revolt. But only after 
conquering power could the Bolsheviks win over the 
peasantry, converting their agrarian revolution into the 
laws of a workers’ state … In order that the peasant might 
clear and fence the land, the worker had to stand at the head 
5. Chamberlin 1935/1965, 256.
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of the state: that is the simplest formula for the October 
Revolution.6
In many places, the war against the landlord fused with a 
war against the national oppressor. Only 70 million of the 
Tsarist Empire’s inhabitants were ‘Great’ Russians (as opposed 
to ‘Little’ Russians or Ukrainians); the remaining 90 million 
belonged to a national minority. The latter included western 
peoples like the Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, 
and Ukrainians, and eastern peoples like the Muslim Turks 
of Central Asia. The politics of class and nation were woven 
into a sociological tapestry of exceptional complexity; but 
often enough the lines of class antagonism were also those 
of national resistance, most obviously where native peasants 
lived under alien landlords. The Bolshevik policy was simple: 
with the exploited against the exploiter, with the oppressed 
against the oppressor; above all, opposition to the dominant 
Great Russian chauvinism of the Tsarist state. In consequence, 
many national minorities rallied to Lenin’s party, often moving 
into the front line. The crack regiments of Lettish sharpshoot-
ers are a notable example. Recruited from Lettish peasants 
and labourers in the Baltic states, they hated their ancestral 
Germanic landlords and their Great Russian officers in 
roughly equal measure. They would play a leading role in the 
October Insurrection.7
The national question preoccupied half the Tsar’s soldiers, 
the land question virtually all of them. Then there was the 
unrelenting misery of the trenches. The war had taken half the 
younger able-bodied males from the villages: a vast cull of the 
6. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 877–88 passim.
7. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, passim.
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Russian peasantry in the service of empire. Millions were dead 
or maimed. Millions were still rotting at the front in patched 
coats and leaking boots – sullen, inert, mutinous. Millions 
more were hiding in the woods or trekking home. In the wake 
of the Kornilov Coup, the influence of the Bolshevik Military 
Organisation among the soldiers soared. Even in July, it had 
boasted 26,000 members organised in 60 branches. Its advance 
thereafter was unstoppable. One astute observer delivered this 
gloomy report on the effects of the Kornilov adventure:
The authority of the commanders was destroyed once and 
for all. The masses of the soldiers, seeing how a general, a 
commander-in-chief, had gone against the Revolution, felt 
themselves surrounded by treason on all sides and saw in 
every man who wore epaulettes a traitor. And whoever tried 
to argue against this feeling also seemed a traitor.8
Trenches were decorated with white flags to show that no 
aggressive action would be taken. Officers who attempted 
to enforce discipline were ignored and sometimes killed. 
There was an epidemic of ‘fragging’ – throwing grenades into 
officer’s quarters to take out unpopular occupants. Only the 
elected soldiers’ committees were obeyed. Entire regiments 
worked out plans for mass departure from the front. Vehicles 
and trains were commandeered as transport.
The radicalisation was uneven. The troops on the 
south-western front were far behind those stationed near 
Petrograd. The Black Sea Fleet was behind the Baltic Fleet. 
Infantry tended to be ahead of artillerymen, cavalrymen, 
and the technical branches. The men in the trenches would 
8. Chamberlin 1935/1965, 236–7.
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sometimes find it necessary to threaten to bayonet the gunners 
if they opened fire (and thus provoked enemy retaliation), 
or they would deliberately cut telephone wires to prevent 
spotters communicating with their batteries.9 But if the 
soldiers were moving at different speeds, they were moving 
in the same direction: towards an abandonment of the war at 
the front in favour of the revolution at home. Quite simply, if 
Russia in 1917 was experiencing the biggest peasant land-war 
in history – a mass movement of 100 million villagers – it was 
also experiencing the biggest military mutiny in history – a 
movement of 10 million soldiers.
The swing to the Bolsheviks among the soldiers was 
especially sharp in the capital after the Kornilov Coup, when 
the government again threatened to move garrison units 
to the front. The strength of this swing was the reason that 
a Menshevik decision to set up a ‘Committee of Defence’ 
backfired. Formed initially of representatives of each of the 
three main Soviet parties – and shortly renamed the ‘Military 
Revolutionary Committee’ (MRC) – it became an expression 
of the growing radicalism of the soldiers and was destined to 
operate as the high command of the coming October Insur-
rection.10 The Soldiers’ Section of the Petrograd Soviet voted 
on 13 October, by a majority of 283 to 1, to obey only orders 
endorsed by the MRC. The meaning was clear: control of the 
Petrograd garrison had passed from the generals to the people. 
Other signals of the mood in the barracks were equally clear.
Across Russia, power was devolving from higher democratic 
bodies to lower ones, closer to the people, more directly rep-
resentative, better able to give immediate expression to the 
9. Chamberlin 1935/1965, 224–35 passim.
10. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 941–2.
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evolving popular will. Among the workers, power was shifting 
from the Soviets to factory committees; among the peasants, 
from the land committees to village communes; and among 
the soldiers, from the Soviets to regimental committees. The 
regimental committees in the capital now came together 
as the Garrison Conference, meeting for the first time on 
18 October. The overwhelming majority of regiments now 
favoured a ‘coming-out’: an armed urban insurrection, a second 
revolution, to terminate the threat of counter-revolution and 
place power in the hands of the people. The roll-call of those 
who declared themselves ready to go onto the streets at a call 
from the Petrograd Soviet constituted a majority; most of the 
rest were neutral; the hostile were so few they were denied 
the floor.11
Even so, it was the workers who were decisive. The peasants 
could burn the local manor house and divide up the land, 
but that was only a village revolution. The soldiers could 
shoot their officer and ‘self-demobilise’, but even the garrison 
regiments in the capital were only temporary sojourners – 
peasants in uniform, weary of war and sick for home. The 
soldiers did not constitute an urban vanguard. Few had any 
appetite for fighting, whether at the front or in the streets. Most 
now followed the Soviets, sympathised with the Bolsheviks, 
and favoured a coming-out; but equally, they expected others 
to decide and to act. ‘The political condition of the garrison’, 
explained Trotsky, the main organiser and leader of the 
October Insurrection, ‘was thus exceptionally favourable for 
an insurrection. But its fighting weight was not large…’.12
11. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 947–55.
12. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 1032–3.
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It was otherwise with the sailors of the Kronstadt naval 
base and the Baltic Fleet more generally: as a species of 
skilled worker in uniform, concentrated in large workplaces, 
they combined ‘proletarian resolution with strict military 
training’.13 But they were too few in number to take power 
in a major modern city. The workers, on the other hand, 
combined revolutionary determination with vast numbers. 
Their military arm – the Red Guards, organised in factory 
contingents, perhaps 25,000 in all – would provide the bulk of 
the fighting forces of the October Insurrection. 
Right-wing historians often describe October as a Bolshevik 
‘coup’ made possible by the ‘anarchy’ into which Russia had 
fallen by autumn 1917. The misunderstanding is profound. 
Their basic error is to view history from above, not below. 
What looks to them like ‘anarchy’ was, in fact, the leaching 
away of state authority and the rise of new organs of popular 
power. What they describe as a ‘coup’ was, in fact, an expression 
of the democratic will of millions of workers, soldiers, sailors, 
and peasants. The Tsarist monarchy had commanded an army 
of millions. Yet it was overthrown in the February Revolution. 
The Provisional Government had inherited that army of 
millions. Yet it was swept away by the October Insurrection. 
Historical events of this magnitude are not brought about by 
mere ‘coups’. The very success of the October Insurrection 
hides its true character. The revolution was so ripe – the social 
crisis so deep, the authority of the government so hollowed 
out, the masses so willing to support decisive action – that, in 
the event, a few tens of thousands were sufficient to execute 
the popular will.
13. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 1070.
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The Petrograd workers had reached this point as early as 
July. Held back by a party that feared a re-run of 1905, their 
confidence had been shaken and they had retreated a distance. 
But Kornilov had roused them again, and this time, with the 
rest of Russia fast catching up, there was to be no relapse. At an 
early morning session of the Petrograd Soviet on 1 September, 
the Reformists were overturned and the Bolshevik resolution 
for a government of workers and peasants was passed two to 
one. The following day, the Finland Soviets voted the same 
way (700 for, 13 against). Three days later, Moscow (355 
to 254). Three days after that, Kiev (130 to 66). And so it 
continued: September was the month that the Soviets went 
Bolshevik across Russia.14
It amounted to a national referendum on the form of 
government – whether it should be Provisional or Soviet, 
parliamentary or popular – and that meant a referendum on 
which class should rule, the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. But 
this was not like other referenda – manipulation of a passive 
electorate by a political elite and its media echo-chambers. 
This was opinion created from below, by the masses in action, 
through the living experience of the class struggle, and then 
formalised in the decisions of countless participatory popular 
assemblies.
The factory-committee movement in Petrograd was one 
measure of the depth of the social earthquake reflected in the 
Bolshevik advance. Because the higher Soviet bodies lagged 
behind the popular mood, because the Reformist leaderships 
became a barrier to revolutionary advance, the workers 
increasingly put their trust in their own factory committees, 
which were directly and immediately accountable to the 
14. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 805–6.
184 ◆  A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
shop-floor. These had emerged in the wake of the February 
Days to challenge the tyranny of the bosses in the factories. 
They had launched the fight for the eight-hour day in March. 
They had held their First Conference in the capital at the end of 
May, with 570 delegates representing 236 factories employing 
337,000 workers; and the Conference had voted overwhelm-
ingly for a Bolshevik resolution demanding workers’ control 
of industry. The Second Conference of Factory Committees 
of Petrograd and its Environs in August elaborated on this aim:
It was the duty of the factory committee to … work out 
the rules of internal order – the organisation of working 
time, wages, the hiring and firing and leave of workers and 
employees, etc. … [They should have] control over the 
composition of the administration, and over the dismissal 
of the members of the administration who cannot guarantee 
normal relations with the workers, or who are incompetent 
for other reasons … All members of the factory adminis-
tration can enter into service only with the consent of the 
factory committee.15 
Top-down management, in short, was to be abolished. 
Henceforward, there would be white-collar administrators and 
specialists accountable to the workplace collective, not to the 
bosses. The drive for control was both defensive – a response 
to lockouts and sabotage of production by management in 
the service of the counter-revolution – and offensive – a 
pushing back of ‘the frontier of control’ by an increasingly 
well-organised and class-conscious working class reaching 
towards people power. Factory committees and workers’ 
15. Cliff 1976, 227–32.
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control were the proletarian revolution turned into a practical 
programme for every factory.16
The factory committees became a national movement. 
An All-Russian Conference of Factory Committees met 
in Petrograd from 17 to 22 October. A majority of the 167 
delegates were Bolsheviks. Trotsky regarded the Conference 
as ‘the most direct and indubitable representation of the 
proletariat in the whole country’. His speech to the factory 
delegates was an unequivocal call to insurrection:
The proletariat must seize power. The army, the peasantry, 
and the navy all look to it with hope. And your organisation, 
the factory committees, must become the champions of this 
idea. At the forthcoming Congress of Soviets the questions 
of power, of peace, of land – all will be put point-blank. And 
when the Soviet gives the word, you in the localities must 
reply, ‘We are here!’ Your reply must be a united ‘All power 
to the Soviets!’17
The crisis of Bolshevism
The Bolshevik Party had grown exponentially. Membership at 
the beginning of 1917 had been around 24,000. This grew to 
80,000 at the end of April, and then 240,000 at the end of July. 
The respective figures for Petrograd were 2,000, 16,000, and 
36,000. The party’s members were overwhelmingly working 
class. The Reval district, for example, reported 3,182 members 
in August, of whom 2,926 were workers, 209 soldiers or sailors, 
and just 47 ‘intellectuals’. The members were also very young. 
16. Smith 1983, passim.
17. Cliff 1976, 244–5.
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At the Party Congress in July/August 1917, the youngest 
delegate was 18, the oldest 47, and the average age was 29. Lenin 
was delighted: ‘The young are the only people worth working 
on’, he had written to Inessa Armand, the French-Russian rev-
olutionary socialist and feminist, in February.18 The influx of 
new members pushed the party to the left. Young workers, 
radicalised by the crisis and the revolution, burning with 
indignation, idealism, and passion for change, were intolerant 
of party veterans whose long years in the underground had 
taught lessons in caution. Just as the masses were to the left of 
the party, so the new members were to the left of the old, and 
the rank and file to the left of the leaders; and at the highest 
level, at the furthest remove from the struggle, that is, on the 
Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, the conservatism 
of the Old Guard found its most concentrated expression.
In the middle of September, the Central Committee 
received a letter from the Bolshevik leader, still in hiding 
since the July Days. (Lenin’s leadership was informal. He 
had no special position. He was simply one member of the 
Central Committee. His authority was based on political 
pre-eminence.) The Bolshevik majority in both the Petrograd 
and Moscow Soviets proved that ‘Our day is come’, he wrote. 
A second revolution, an armed insurrection to overthrow the 
Provisional Government and seize state power, was the order 
of the day. ‘In this matter it is now impossible to be premature.’ 
The recipients were stunned. The old man had gone mad. 
He was completely out of touch. Not a single member of the 
Central Committee supported him. Instead they decided to 
burn the letter.19
18. Cliff 1976, 150–1, 159–62.
19. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 978–84.
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Lenin’s perspective reflected the situation not only in 
Russia, but worldwide. He saw the workers and peasants of 
Russia as the vanguard of a conflagration set to sweep across 
war-ravaged Europe and beyond. ‘We stand in the vestibule of 
the world-wide proletarian revolution’, he told his comrades. 
He knew that timing, in revolution as in war, was decisive. He 
knew that at the climax of revolution, the masses reach a pitch 
of hope and expectation, but that this mood is momentary, 
that it is a feverous state of tension that quickly exhausts itself, 
and that the masses then drop back into weary resignation, 
laced with cynicism about all things political, leaving the 
stage of history clear once again for society’s traditional rulers. 
The willingness of the masses to carry out an insurrection 
was decisive.
Lenin was never the advocate of a coup. He had opposed an 
insurrection in the July Days. He had spent time since writing 
a pamphlet, State and Revolution, in which he had revived the 
Marxist theory of the state in the context of revolution. The 
existing state, he argued, was a top-down repressive apparatus 
run by members of the ruling class in the interests of the ruling 
class. It was bourgeois through and through, and could not be 
taken over by the workers and used to implement socialism: it 
had to be smashed and replaced with a new kind of bottom-up 
democratic state. This had been the key lesson of the Paris 
Commune of 1871:
The Commune … appears to have replaced the smashed 
state machine ‘only’ by fuller democracy: abolition of the 
standing army; all officials to be elected and subject to 
recall. But as a matter of fact this ‘only’ signifies a gigantic 
replacement of certain institutions by other institutions of 
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a fundamentally different type … the abolition of all rep-
resentation allowances, and of all monetary privileges to 
officials, the reduction of the remuneration of all servants of 
the state to the level of workman’s wages.20
The Soviets and other democratic assemblies like the factory 
committees, regimental committees, and village communes 
were, in combination, the embryo of such a bottom-up 
state. And the moment had arrived when the masses, having 
placed all their hopes for a better life in these assemblies of 
their own making, were prepared to support a decisive blow 
to invest them with supreme power. But revolution is the 
most concentrated of collective acts. It requires a brain and 
a central nervous system to direct and co-ordinate the mass 
collective action of millions of people organised in thousands 
of assemblies. Now, at the critical moment, at one of history’s 
greatest turning points, the brain had a seizure.
Lenin was desperate. At the end of September, he broke with 
his own Central Committee, appealing over their heads to the 
wider party by sending a public document, The Crisis is Ripe, 
to the Petrograd and Moscow Committees and to the Soviets, 
now with Bolshevik majorities, in both cities. The Central 
Committee was openly charged with opposing an immediate 
seizure of power. ‘That tendency’, he continued,
must be overcome. Otherwise, the Bolsheviks will cover 
themselves with eternal shame and destroy themselves as a 
party. For to miss such a moment and ‘wait’ for the Congress 
of Soviets would be utter idiocy, or sheer treachery … for it 
20. Cliff 1976, 315–22.
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would mean losing weeks at a time when weeks and even 
days may decide everything.21
The Bolshevik leader was tireless, sending out a stream of 
articles, motions, and letters, attempting to stir up the party 
rank and file against ‘the upper circles of the party’, where ‘a 
wavering is to be observed, a sort of dread of the struggle for 
power, an inclination to replace this struggle with resolutions, 
protests, and conferences’. This was effective. The Kiev 
Bolsheviks voted by an overwhelming majority against 
their own ‘anti-Leninist’ committee. Moscow issued a bitter 
denunciation of the Central Committee and demanded that 
it ‘take a clear and definite course toward insurrection’. Finally, 
on 10 October 1917, the Central Committee assembled for 
its most momentous meeting. Lenin arrived in disguise, in 
wig and spectacles, and without beard. They met in secret, 
in the apartment of leading Menshevik Sukhanov, whose 
Bolshevik wife had made sure her husband would be away 
that evening. Twelve of the 21 Central Committee members 
were present. The session lasted ten hours – deep into the 
night – the Bolshevik leaders sustained by tea with bread and 
sausage. The resolution committing the Bolshevik Party to 
the October Insurrection was scribbled hastily by Lenin with 
the chewed end of a pencil on a sheet of paper taken from a 
child’s notebook: 
The Central Committee recognises that both the inter-
national situation of the Russian Revolution … and the 
military situation … all this in connection with the peasant 
insurrection and the swing of popular confidence to our 
21. Cliff 1976, 344–5.
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party … and finally the obvious preparation for a second 
Kornilov attack … all this places armed insurrection on 
the order of the day. Thus recognising that the armed 
insurrection is inevitable and fully ripe, the Central 
Committee recommends to all organisations of the party 
that they be guided by this, and from this point of view 
consider and decide all practical questions.22
The vote, when it came, was ten to two. A decisive majority? 
Not at all: the majority had been pressured from within the 
party and then browbeaten by Lenin during an all-night session. 
So even now, two weeks before the October Insurrection, the 
inner-party struggle continued. The opposition rallied around 
the two CC dissidents, Grigori Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, 
who had immediately issued a party statement arguing that ‘to 
proclaim an armed insurrection now is to put at stake not only 
the fate of our party but also the fate of the Russian and inter-
national revolution’. Their campaign fed the nervousness and 
hesitation of leading party bodies as they stood on the brink of 
the ultimate step.
A reconvened Central Committee meeting on 16 October, 
attended this time by a dozen other leading Bolsheviks, 
debated at length a proposal that the previous resolution 
should be taken as a matter of ‘general orientation’ only, not 
as an injunction to prepare for immediate armed insurrection. 
Zinoviev’s ‘vacillation’ motion secured six votes against 15 
with three abstentions.
Then, two days later, a bombshell: Zinoviev and Kamenev 
published an article in Maxim Gorky’s Menshevik newspaper 
Novaya Zhizn attacking the whole idea of insurrection. Lenin 
22. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 996–1000.
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exploded, denouncing them as ‘strike-breakers’ and ‘blacklegs’ 
and demanding their expulsion from the party. But the two 
dissidents acted with strong, albeit discreet, support at the 
highest levels of the party. Joseph Stalin, one of the two editors 
of Pravda, was among the closet oppositionists, responsible 
for a statement in the party newspaper criticising Lenin’s 
‘sharp tone’ and expressing agreement ‘in fundamentals’ with 
Zinoviev and Kamenev.23
By now, though, the die was cast. The Bolshevik rank and file, 
embedded in a vast network of popular assemblies, heading up 
a mass movement throbbing with revolutionary energy, were 
in motion. And another body – not the wobbling Bolshevik 
Central Committee – would provide the essential command 
and control: the Military Revolutionary Committee chaired 
by Leon Trotsky.
A final comment is in order. The Bolshevik Party – a 
nationwide network of revolutionary militants rooted in the 
class struggle of the workers, soldiers, and sailors – was essential 
to the success of the revolution. This network was the primary 
transmitter of revolutionary ideas, the primary crucible for 
the forging of mass leaders, and the primary mechanism for 
organising united mass action at every level. But it was not the 
‘democratic-centralist’ monolith of sectarian myth; it was not 
a hierarchy in which instructions were handed down from 
on high to be carried out with military-style discipline by the 
lower echelons. This is how Trotsky described it:
Between the saints as the Church paints them and the devils 
as the candidates for sainthood portray them, there are to 
be found living people. And it is they who make history. 
23. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 1001–14.
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The high temper of the Bolshevik Party expressed itself 
not in the absence of disagreements, waverings, and even 
quakings, but in the fact that in the most difficult circum-
stances it gathered itself in good season by means of inner 
crises, and made good its opportunity to interfere decisively 
in the course of events. That means that the party as a whole 
was a quite adequate instrument of revolution.24
The October Days
Lenin was right about the timing of insurrection, but wrong 
about its form. He thought the party might call it in its own 
name; he was persuaded by Trotsky and others that the 
Soviets, not the Bolsheviks, should issue the summons to the 
masses to rise against the Provisional Government.
Lenin was the political genius who built and led the 
Bolshevik Party. Trotsky was the genius who led the Petrograd 
Soviet at its decisive hour and who organised the October 
Insurrection. The Bolshevik Revolution was the achievement 
of these two political leaders in equal measure. Let the 
Menshevik Sukhanov stand testimony. In the two weeks 
after that momentous secret meeting in his own apartment, 
Sukhanov recalled, Trotsky was a continuous flurry of activity:
He flew from the Obukhov Works to the Fuse Factory, from 
the Putilov to the Baltic Mills, from the Riding School to the 
barracks, and it seemed he spoke in all places at the same 
time. Every Petrograd worker and soldier knew who he was 
and had heard him speak. His influence – among the masses 
and at headquarters – was overpowering. During these days, 
24. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 1015–16.
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he was the central figure and the real hero of this remarkable 
page in history.25
Lenin, of course, was in hiding all this while, only to emerge on 
the morrow of victory.
The October Insurrection was a masterpiece in the art of 
revolution. Delegates to the Second All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets were arriving in the capital. It was expected to have 
a Bolshevik and Left Social-Revolutionary majority. But as 
a large, new, somewhat chaotic mass assembly – finding its 
way, sorting out procedures, electing administrative bodies, 
pushing forwards through a thicket of resolutions and speeches 
– making the decision to launch an armed insurrection, and 
organising such an enterprise, might have been problematic. 
The Military Revolutionary Committee, in carrying out the 
insurrection in the name of the Soviets, was anticipating the 
will of the Congress. It was acting on the principle that first is 
the deed. You have to act, because by acting you change reality; 
and when reality changes, in so far as people welcome the 
change, they will endorse the decision that brought it about.
Though the 25th of October has been sanctified as the day 
of the insurrection, it was not in fact the work of a single day. 
The insurrection began on the 20th and was not completed 
until the 26th: so it was as much a process as the February 
Revolution had been. Much of the illusion that it was some 
sort of coup depends upon this false compression. Trotsky, 
already Chair of the Petrograd Soviet, became Chair also of 
the newly formed Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) 
on the 20th. Trotsky was unequivocal about the need for this 
highly centralised directory:
25. Lincoln 1986, 433.
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People do not make revolution eagerly any more than they 
do war. A revolution takes place when there is no other way 
out. And the insurrection, which rises above a revolution 
like a peak in the mountain chain of events, can no more 
be evoked at will than revolution as a whole … Just as a 
blacksmith cannot seize the red-hot iron in his naked hand, 
so the proletariat cannot directly seize power.26
His point was that the power of the popular movement had 
to be concentrated into a single point, like the tip of a spear; 
only thus could the masses achieve what they desired – peace, 
bread, and land through the seizure of power by democratic 
mass assemblies which were the embodiment of true people 
power. And from this moment – irrespective of residual 
vacillation by the Bolshevik leadership – the insurrection 
had begun. The MRC – which had been boycotted by 
the Reformists – was an exclusively Bolshevik and Left 
Social-Revolutionary body, committed from the outset to 
organising an armed insurrection. MRC ‘commissars’ were 
immediately appointed to all combatant units to ensure full 
intelligence, co-ordination, and the carrying out of Soviet 
orders. The MRC also established control over the arsenals 
and the printing presses. In this, though, and in all matters, it 
was assisted by action from below, as, for example, when the 
print workers’ union informed the MRC of an increase in 
Black Hundred leaflets and pamphlets, prompting immediate 
action to suppress it.27
The following day, 21 October, came the crucial decision of 
the Garrison Conference – the great assembly of regimental 
26. Lincoln 1986, 437.
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committees in the capital – to break with military headquarters 
and support the armed insurrection. Trotsky proposed three 
short resolutions: that all steps taken by the MRC be given 
full support; that there should be ‘a peaceful review of forces’ 
the following day; and that ‘the All-Russia Congress of Soviets 
must take power in its hands and guarantee to the people 
peace, bread, and land’. Hundreds voted in favour, 50 or so 
abstained, none voted against. ‘The noose around the neck of 
the February regime was being drawn in a reliable knot.’
The ‘peaceful review of forces’ had been called for 22 
October in response to a counter-revolutionary provocation: a 
proposed Cossack ‘religious procession’. The latter was called 
off – crowded out by the revolutionary upsurge – but the 
Soviet demonstration went ahead. It took the form of packed 
mass meetings in every possible auditorium, great and small, 
across Red Petrograd. The leader of the October Insurrection 
described it thus:
The people of the slums, of the attics and basements, stood 
still by the hour in threadbare coat or grey uniform, with 
caps or heavy shawls on their heads, the mud of the streets 
soaked through their shoes, an autumn cough catching at 
their throats. They stood there packed shoulder-to-shoulder, 
and crowding even closer to make room for more, to make 
room for all, listening tirelessly, hungrily, passionately, 
demandingly, fearing lest they miss a word of what it is so 
necessary to understand, to assimilate, and to do … The 
experience of the revolution, the war, the heavy struggle of 
a whole bitter lifetime, rose from the deeps of memory in 
each of these poverty-driven men and women, expressing 
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itself in simple and imperious thoughts: this way we can go 
no further; we must break a road into the future.28 
No further. A new road. The American journalist and 
radical John Reed, newly arrived in Petrograd, was witness to 
this. The city was always bleak in autumn, a place of grey skies, 
frequent rain, chill winds, long nights, mud everywhere; but to 
this was added the shortages, the food becoming ever scarcer, 
the queues longer, the wait for bread, milk, sugar, tobacco 
sometimes taking hours. The contrast with the rich on the 
Nevsky Prospect and other fashionable streets was sharper 
than ever:
Young ladies from the provinces came up to the capital to 
learn French and cultivate their voices, and the gay, young, 
beautiful officers wore their gold-trimmed crimson bashliki 
and their elaborate Caucasian swords around the hotel 
lobbies. The ladies of the minor bureaucratic set took tea 
with each other in the afternoon, carrying each her little 
gold or silver or jewelled sugar-box, and half a loaf of bread 
in her muff, and wished the Tsar were back, or that the 
Germans would come, or anything that would solve the 
servant problem.29
But Reed saw much more than the polar opposites of class 
society. He saw the great popular rising from the depths, 
visible in countless tiny incidents and comments:
28. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 966–8.
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We came down to the front of the 12th Army, back of Riga, 
where gaunt and bootless men sickened in the mud of 
desperate trenches; and when they saw us they started up, 
with their pinched faces and the flesh showing blue through 
their torn clothing, demanding eagerly, ‘Did you bring 
anything to read?’30
Despite the privation, the desperate struggle for daily 
survival, there was an explosion of reading, listening, talking, 
meeting, debating:
Lectures, debates, speeches – in theatres, circuses, 
school-houses, clubs, soviet meeting-rooms, union 
headquarters, barracks … Meetings in the trenches at the 
front, in village squares, in factories … What a marvellous 
sight to see … the Putilov factory pour out its 40,000 to 
listen to Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries, 
Anarchists, anybody, whatever they had to say, as long 
as they would talk. For months in Petrograd, and all over 
Russia, every street-corner was a public tribune. In railway 
trains, street-cars, always the spurting up of impromptu 
debate, everywhere…31 
Reed spoke at one of these endless meetings in a giant 
Petrograd munitions plant:
The meeting took place between the gaunt brick walls of 
a huge unfinished building, 10,000 black-clothed men and 
women packed around a scaffolding draped in red, people 
30. Reed 1926/1977, 40.
31. Reed 1926/1977, 40.
198 ◆  A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
heaped up on piles of lumber and bricks, perched high up 
on shadowy girders, intent and thunder-voiced. Through 
the dull, heavy sky now and again burst the sun, flooding 
reddish light through the skeleton windows upon the mass 
of simple faces upturned to us.32
The day of the ‘peaceful review of forces’ – a day of mass 
meetings unprecedented in the history of the world – was 
the day when these vast masses were ‘welded in one gigantic 
cauldron’ (Trotsky’s phrase) around the simple, practical, 
obvious, inescapable Bolshevik programme for the resolution 
of the social crisis:
All power to the Soviets – both in the capital and in the 
provinces.
Immediate truce on all fronts. An honest peace between 
peoples.
Landlord estates – without compensation – to the peasants.
Workers’ control over industrial production.
A faithfully and honestly elected Constituent Assembly.33 
This massive demonstration of Soviet power crowded out 
the Provisional Government by revealing its isolation and 
impotence. An MRC resolution the following day sealed the 
matter, declaring that its commissars were inviolable repre-
sentatives of the Soviet, and that opposition to them therefore 
amounted to defiance of Soviet authority. Thus was the rule 
of the Provisional Government terminated two days before 
32. Reed 1926/1977, 52.
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THE OCTOBER DAYS ◆  199 
its physical liquidation.34 This, of course, was merely formal 
sanction from on high for actual practice on the ground. 
Everywhere – quietly, easily, without fanfare or drama – power 
was passing from one class to another, as officers, managers, 
landlords, and policemen ceased to give orders, and as what 
Reed called ‘the Dark People’ of the Soviets assumed control. 
So it continued for three days more. Sukhanov, hostile but 
honest, found the whole process fascinating. He thought that 
the military operations ‘seemed more like a changing of the 
guard’.35 John Reed, the drama-hungry journalist, was equally 
bemused. He witnessed the chaotic bustle, the endless coming 
and going, at the Smolny Institute, the headquarters of the 
insurrection, which he saw ‘thronged with hurrying shapes of 
soldiers and workmen, some bent under the weight of huge 
bundles of newspapers, proclamations, printed propaganda 
of all sorts’. He forced his way along the corridors, where 
every room had become the office of a faction, a committee, a 
bureau, or something to do with the multifarious business of 
the Soviet. In the downstairs refectory, ‘The benches along the 
wooden tables were packed with hungry proletarians, wolfing 
their food, plotting, shouting rough jokes across the room.’36 
But in the streets, though he encountered checkpoints with 
their huddles of soldiers and red militia, he could not find the 
historic panorama with a cast of thousands that the occasion 
seemed to require. 
On every corner, immense crowds were massed around a 
core of hot discussion. Pickets of a dozen soldiers with fixed 
34. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 969–71.
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bayonets lounged at the street crossings, red-faced old men 
in rich fur coats shook their fists at them, smartly-dressed 
women screamed epithets; the soldiers argued feebly, with 
embarrassed grins.37
There were last-minute hitches. The allegiance of the 
garrison of the Peter and Paul Fortress was uncertain. It stood 
threateningly on the opposite bank of the Neva from the 
Winter Palace. It required a personal visit by Trotsky to win the 
soldiers over. This had the added bonus of the 100,000 rifles 
held in the fortress’s Kronverksky Arsenal. The Peter and Paul 
Fortress, in the event, became the arsenal of the insurrection: 
there were soon trucks pulling up from all over Petrograd 
to secure a stack of rifles. Similar concerns centred on the 
armoured car division and, finally, on a bicycle battalion. 
In each case, however, the soldiers were won over without 
violence.38 The insurrection found its way by moral power – 
by the overwhelming pressure of the great mass of democratic 
opinion organised in the Soviet movement – and has thereby 
deceived generations of historians into mistaking the greatest 
popular revolution in history for a military coup. ‘It was not 
necessary to employ force,’ explained Trotsky, ‘for there was no 
resistance. The insurrectionary masses lifted their elbows and 
pushed out the lords of yesterday.’39
The way was eased by a pitiful effort at pre-emptive 
action by the Provisional Government on 24 October. It 
marshalled its forces: the Junkers, the officer-cadets of the 
military schools; a Women’s Shock Battalion; some Cossacks; 
37. Reed 1926/1977, 95.
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an artillery unit; a ragbag of officers who happened to be 
in the capital. This was supplemented with an appeal to 
headquarters to send reliable units (as if these existed). 
There were threats to suppress newspapers, cut telephone 
lines, remove commissars, and prosecute the Military Revo-
lutionary Committee. None were effective. The Provisional 
Government was an intelligence without muscles or motor 
function. But these puny spasms were just enough to convict 
the government of counter-revolutionary intent and validate 
the defensive disguise which the insurrection continued to 
wear. ‘The enemy of the people took the offensive during the 
night’, announced the Soviet communiqué. ‘The Military Rev-
olutionary Committee is leading the resistance to the assault 
of the conspirators.’40
Smolny was converted into a combined fortress and military 
headquarters. ‘The massive façade of Smolny blazed with 
lights as we drove up,’ recalled Reed,
and from every street converged upon it streams of hurrying 
shapes dim in the gloom. Automobiles and motor-cycles 
came and went; an enormous, elephant-coloured armoured 
automobile, with two red flags flying from the turret, 
lumbered out with screaming siren … The canvas covers 
had been taken off the four rapid-fire guns on each side of 
the doorway, and the ammunition-belts hung snake-like 
from their breeches. A dun herd of armoured cars stood 
under the trees in the courtyard, engines going. The long, 
bare, dimly illuminated halls roared with the thunder of feet, 
calling, shouting…41
40. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 1055.
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The MRC commissars completed the takeover of the 
capital the following day, 25 October, seizing the Electric 
Power Station, the Main Post Office, the Nikolaevsky Bridge, 
the State Bank, and the Warsaw Station: all these fell to the 
insurrectionaries between midnight and dawn. So complete 
was the victory – so silent and unspectacular – that Kerensky 
was almost too late to make his escape. He was finally carried 
from the city huddled in the back of an American Embassy 
car around noon.42 By then, the ring of Red Guards and rev-
olutionary soldiers and sailors was drawing tight around the 
Winter Palace.
On this day, the whole energy of Russia’s mighty conflagra-
tion had became concentrated in the hands of perhaps 25,000 
armed men – workers, soldiers, and sailors. There was little 
for anyone else to do. Most workers remained at home, most 
soldiers in their barracks. They had debated, voted, and given 
their activist vanguard a mandate. Now it was simply a matter 
of executing the formal transfer of power from one class to 
another. There was no looting or rioting. Theatres, cinemas, 
and shops remained open. Normal life continued on the 
Nevsky, within sight and sound of the desultory siege under 
way at the Winter Palace. 
The climax was anti-climax. The Winter Palace, the seat of 
government, was held by a motley collection of Tsarist officers, 
Cossacks, Junkers, war veterans, and the Women’s Battalion. 
This was the sum total of social forces prepared to fight for 
Kerensky (who, in any case, had fled). Threatened from the 
River Neva by the guns of the battleship Aurora, and unable to 
prevent armed workers and sailors infiltrating the palace’s vast 
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labyrinth of entrances and passageways, the defence crumbled 
amid frantic scuffles. It would all look far more impressive in 
Eisenstein’s 1928 movie. Trotsky had already reported to the 
Petrograd Soviet that ‘the Provisional Government has ceased 
to exist’. He was a little premature: the guns were still firing. It 
was almost two o’clock on the morning of 26 October when 
Vladimir Antonov-Ovseyenko, a young intellectual with long 
hair, clipped beard and moustache, wire-rimmed spectacles, 
and filthy clothes, led his armed detachments into the meeting 
room of the Provisional Government. ‘In the name of the 
Military Revolutionary Committee,’ Antonov-Ovseyenko 
announced, ‘I declare that you – all of you – members of the 
Provisional Government are under arrest.’43
The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets was in session 
that morning. Lenin had emerged from hiding to address it. 
He told the assembled delegates that ‘We shall now proceed 
to construct the socialist order.’ The Congress then passed 
an appeal addressed to ‘the workers, soldiers, and peasants’ 
drafted by the Bolshevik leader. It stated:
The Soviet government will propose an immediate 
democratic peace to all peoples and an immediate armistice 
on all fronts. It will secure the transfer of the estates of the 
landlords … to the control of the peasants’ committees, 
without compensation. It will protect the rights of the 
soldiers by introducing complete democracy in the army. 
It will establish workers’ control over production. It will 
see to it that the Constituent Assembly is convened at its 
appointed time. It will see to it that bread is supplied to the 
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cities and articles of prime necessity to the villages. It will 
guarantee all nations inhabiting Russia the genuine right of 
self-determination.
The Congress decrees: all power in the localities shall 
pass to the Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ 
Deputies…44






Spreading the revolution. German revolutionaries  
man the barricades in Berlin in January 1919.
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A carnival of the oppressed
The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets which assembled 
on 25 October was the ‘parliament’ of the new revolutionary 
regime. Because delegates continued to arrive from remote 
regions, and because party allegiances were sometimes 
uncertain, we do not have precise figures for the balance of 
forces. What is clear, however, is that the Bolsheviks were the 
largest party, with about 60 per cent of the seats, and their Left 
Social-Revolutionary allies accounted for another 15 per cent 
or so, giving the Left a thumping majority. The Mensheviks 
and Right SRs immediately walked out, refusing to recognise 
the insurrection, leaving only some smaller left groups 
alongside the Bolsheviks and Left SRs.
The Congress set up a new government, the Council of 
People’s Commissars (the Sovnarkom). This body, which 
initially numbered 15, was the ‘cabinet’ of the new regime. The 
most important members were Lenin, who was Chairman, 
and Trotsky, who was first Commissar of Foreign Affairs and 
later Commissar of Army and Navy Affairs.1
History records only a few such instances of genuine people 
power. The new ‘ministers’ had to hand-write their own decrees 
for lack of clerical assistants. The new ‘cabinet secretary’ had 
to bang out the minutes on a commandeered typewriter with 
two fingers because there was no typist. The new ‘Finance 
Minister’ owed his appointment to the fact that he had once 
worked as a clerk in a French bank. When the ‘War Minister’ 
tried to flag down a car in the street to take him to the front, he 
was told it belonged to the First Machine-Gun Regiment and 
he could not have it.2
1. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 1148; Cliff 1978, 2–5.
2. Cliff 1978, 6–7, 22.
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The new ‘parliament’ of the revolution seemed equally 
incongruous when set against the bourgeois assemblies with 
which it was inevitably compared. The American journalist 
John Reed was an eyewitness at the Second Soviet Congress. 
Here, for him, during these ‘ten days that shook the world’, was 
the living embodiment of a world turned upside down:
I stood there watching the new delegates come in – 
burly, bearded soldiers, workmen in black blouses, a few 
long-haired peasants. The girl in charge … smiled contemp-
tuously … ‘See how rough and ignorant they look! The 
Dark People…’ It was true: the depths of Russia had been 
stirred, and it was the bottom which came uppermost now.3
The enemies of the new regime – Monarchists, Liberals, 
Reformists – were convinced it could not last. On the very 
day of the insurrection, one conservative daily, looking at the 
social character of the revolutionary movement through a lens 
of bourgeois privilege, was sneering about the prospects:
Let us suppose for a moment that the Bolsheviks do gain the 
upper hand. Who will govern us then? The cooks perhaps, 
those connoisseurs of cutlets and beefsteaks? Or maybe the 
firemen? The stableboys, the chauffeurs? Or perhaps the 
nursemaids will rush off to meetings of the Council of State 
between the diaper-washing sessions. Who then? Where are 
the statesmen? Perhaps the mechanics will run the theatres, 
the plumbers foreign affairs, the carpenters the post office. 
Who will it be?4
3. Cliff 1978, 3.
4. Cliff 1978, 1–2.
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History would soon reveal whether ‘statesmen’ were 
essential or disposable. Everything depended on the initiative 
and creativity of the masses. To encourage this, the Sovnarkom 
issued a string of decrees in rapid succession:
• A decree on peace (26 October) calling upon ‘all the 
belligerent peoples and their governments to start 
immediate negotiations for a just, democratic peace’.
• A decree on land (26 October) stating that ‘private 
ownership of land shall be abolished forever’ and that all 
land shall ‘become the property of the whole people and 
pass into the use of all those who cultivate it’.
• A decree on the national question (2 November) 
proclaiming full equality and the right of all peoples to 
‘free self-determination, up to secession and formation 
of an independent state’.
• A decree on workers’ control (14 November) stipulating 
that workplaces were to be run by ‘all the workers of the 
given enterprise through their elected bodies’ in the 
context of ‘planned regulation of the national economy’.
• A decree on participatory democracy (22 November) 
arguing that ‘the electors’ right to recall those elected’ 
was ‘the fundamental principle of true democracy … 
[in] … all representative assemblies without exception’.
• Two decrees on the emancipation of women (16 and 18 
December) declaring full equality of men and women, 
making divorce automatic upon request by either 
spouse, and legitimising children born out of wedlock.
And there were many more over the next three years: a 
decree abolishing the old judiciary and setting up people’s 
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courts; a decree guaranteeing complete religious freedom, 
but forbidding religious indoctrination in schools; a decree 
legalising abortion on demand (the first in the world); a decree 
legalising homosexuality (another first).
But these were not laws to be imposed by police and judges. 
They were calls to action. ‘Decrees are instructions which call 
for practical work on a mass scale’, Lenin told the Eighth Party 
Congress in March 1919. Like the leaflets of the underground 
years, the decrees of the revolutionary epoch were agitational. 
‘The purpose of a decree is to teach practical steps to the 
hundreds, thousands, and millions of people who heed the 
voice of the Soviet government’, Lenin insisted. ‘This is a trial 
in practical action…’.5
The British journalist Arthur Ransome (later famous 
as author of Swallows and Amazons) knew Russia well. 
Visiting again in early 1919, he reported on the explosion 
of creative activity unleashed by the October Revolution. 
Take education. Where there had been six universities, there 
were now 16. Attendance was open to all and free. Since the 
decree abolishing entry qualifications, enrolments at Moscow 
University had doubled. State funds had been supplied to 
provide free school meals, and, for children who needed 
them, free clothes and footwear. Colleges were set up for 
workers. ‘The workmen crowd to these courses’, reported 
Ransome. ‘One course, for example, is attended by a thousand 
men, in spite of the appalling cold of the lecture rooms.’ The 
Commissariat of Public Education was also responsible for 
libraries. The number of these had doubled in Petrograd and 
tripled in Moscow since the revolution. In one country district, 
there were now 73 village libraries, 35 larger libraries, and 500 
5. Cliff 1978, 5–11.
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hut libraries or reading-rooms. Russia was flooded with printed 
matter – newspapers, pamphlets, political tracts by Marx, 
Lenin, and Trotsky, cheap editions of Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and 
Turgenev, and much more. Post offices became distribution 
centres, and bookselling kiosks enjoyed a boom in sales.6 
The workers’ state provided the framework for all this activity; 
but the initiative came from below. A small incident at the 
beginning of a countrywide literacy programme illustrates 
this perfectly. Two nurses wrote to Commissar of Public 
Education, Anatoly Lunacharsky, as follows: ‘We know that 
across the vast expanse of the Russian land there are corners 
where people have not yet heard the voice of a person who can 
read and write. That’s where we want to go.’7
But the odds against the fledging regime were daunting. 
The cities were gripped by shortages of food and fuel. The 
collapse in the production of civilian goods during the war 
and the revolution meant that peasants had nothing to buy and 
therefore no incentive to sell their foodstuffs. The proletariat 
and the industrial sector were dwarfed by the vast agrarian 
hinterland. The revolution faced a ‘scissors crisis’: unable to 
supply the industrial centres, it could not produce the goods 
needed in the countryside, and this led to yet further falls in 
output – a widening of the gap between town and country, 
proletarian and peasant. The size of the industrial workforce 
is one measure of the crisis. It numbered 3.6 million in 1917, 
2.5 million in 1918, 1.5 million in 1920, and 1.1 million 
in 1922. Petrograd in the winter of 1918 was, according to 
novelist Alexei Tolstoy (a remote relative of Leo), ‘starving 
… bitten through by polar winds, a town without coal and 
6. Ransome 1919/1992, 149–53.
7. Haynes 2002, 39.
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bread, its factory chimneys extinguished, a town like a raw 
human nerve’.8 The Bolshevik feminist Alexandra Kollontai, 
speaking to American journalist Louise Bryant, joked, ‘Surely 
you must understand that there is a great deal of moral 
satisfaction in deciding whether you want thick cabbage soup 
or thin cabbage soup.’9
Radical idealism and popular enthusiasm could sustain the 
revolution for a time. But they could not overcome hunger, 
cold, and disease. Eventually, if the economic crisis was not 
resolved, if the socialist experiment was not underpinned by 
material security, the revolution would be consumed by the 
primeval backwardness of Old Russia. To survive for long, the 
workers’ state needs to break its isolation and gain access to 
Europe’s reserves of industrial power. If, on the other hand, it 
remained isolated and unaided, it would eventually succumb. 
Only world revolution could rescue the Bolshevik regime. 
A tidal wave of revolution
Capitalism is a world system. For Marx, ‘the establishment 
of modern industry and the world market’ went hand in 
hand. Because industrialisation confers huge commercial 
advantages, and because goods and services are traded inter-
nationally, capitalism imposes itself on a global scale through 
the imperatives of economic and military competition. The 
cotton goods of a Manchester textile mill were cheaper than 
the homespun of an Indian villager even when traded half way 
round the world. The machine-guns and artillery of European 
8. Haynes 2002, 50–1.
9. Haynes 2002, 39.
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soldiers were capable of destroying armies of native spearmen 
and musketeers. 
If capitalism is a world system, it follows that the working 
class is an international class. Workers are divided by nation, 
but nationalism does not reflect their true interest. To take on 
the bosses, who operate globally, workers have to unite across 
national boundaries. To achieve emancipation, they have to 
destroy the bourgeois nation-state and create an alternative 
workers’ state based on direct democracy. To build a socialist 
economy, they have to take collective control of the workplaces, 
the transport system, and the global trade networks. To defend 
their gains and complete their revolution, they have to spread 
the struggle across the world. 
There is no such thing, therefore, as ‘socialism in one 
country’. Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, and many other 
leading Marxist thinkers have all stressed that proletarian 
revolution has to be worldwide or it will fail. A socialist ‘siege 
economy’ can only ever be temporary. Eventually, either 
poverty and insecurity will force the revolution to turn in on 
itself and create new forms of exploitation in order to survive. 
Or the workers’ state will succumb to hostile pressure – some 
combination of economic boycott, internal civil war, and 
foreign military aggression.
This knowledge was fundamental to the thinking of the 
Bolshevik leaders after the October Insurrection. It was the 
reason they prioritised the creation of the Communist Inter-
national (aka the Comintern or Third International) in 1919. 
The Bolsheviks wanted to create a revolutionary international 
to replace the Second International of Social Democratic 
parties which had broken up as its respective constituents voted 
to back their own governments at the outbreak of the First 
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World War. The new Comintern was to be the high command 
of world revolution. The first four congresses were genuinely 
revolutionary assemblies of growing size and importance. The 
First Congress (March 1919) comprised 51 delegates from 
33 countries, the Fourth (November‒December 1922) 408 
delegates from 61 countries.10
How realistic was the Comintern’s attempt to foster world 
revolution in the years after 1917?
Revolution had broken out in Russia first because it was the 
weakest of the great powers. But it soon spread. By the third 
winter of the war, the experience of modern industrialised 
warfare was imposing massive strain on the whole of European 
society. With millions dead, millions maimed, millions 
starving, and millions homeless, a wave of desertion, mutiny, 
strikes, and demonstrations swept across Europe. Two-thirds 
of the French army on the Western Front mutinied and refused 
to mount further attacks. The Italian army fled the battlefield 
at Caporetto, and tens of thousands threw away their rifles and 
headed for home singing the Internationale and shouting ‘Viva 
Russia!’ From late 1918 onwards, the revolutionary contagion 
spread through the former Central Powers – through Germany, 
Austria, Hungary, and Turkey. German sailors mutinied when 
ordered out to sea and triggered a revolution which ended 
the war and brought down the Kaiser within a fortnight. By 
the end of 1918, red flags flew over Berlin, Munich, Vienna, 
and Budapest. Everywhere, in the forefront of the popular 
revolt, were soldiers and sailors. Quite literally, millions of 
men across Europe broke discipline to join mass revolution-
10. Faulkner 2013, 209–10.
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ary movements of workers and peasants directed against their 
own political and military elite.11
Germany, the super-state and industrial colossus at the 
heart of Europe, was the decisive battleground of the world 
revolution. Germany had lost 1.8 million soldiers in the First 
World War, while a further 750,000 civilians had died of 
starvation at home. By the second half of the war, the diet of 
the average German worker averaged only two-thirds of the 
calories needed for long-term survival. On 9 November 1918, 
a revolution started by mutinous sailors in Kiel reached Berlin. 
Two days before the Armistice on the Western Front, hundreds 
of thousands were on the streets. The city was awash with red 
flags and socialist banners. The anti-war revolutionary socialist 
Karl Liebknecht addressed the crowds from the balcony of the 
imperial palace and proclaimed a ‘socialist republic’ and ‘world 
revolution’. The First World War – the bloodiest carnage in 
human history up to that time – had been ended by the rev-
olutionary action of millions of workers, soldiers, sailors, and 
peasants across Europe, first on the Eastern Front, now on 
the Western.
A proletarian insurrection in Germany would have brought 
the richest industrial economy and the largest working class 
in Europe over to the side of socialist revolution, bringing 
immediate succour to the Bolshevik regime in Russia, 
establishing workers’ power from the North Sea to the Pacific, 
and, in all probability, ensuring that the revolution would 
go global. Germany’s ‘November Days’ revolution had seen 
mass demonstrations, mass strikes and mutinies, and the 
rapid formation of a network of workers’, soldiers’, and sailors’ 
councils. The Russian Revolution had shown that such a 
11. Faulkner 2013, 202–5.
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network represented a potential alternative state structure 
based on direct democracy. But the German councils chose to 
hand power to a traditional parliamentary-type government. 
A new administration formed of reformist ministers was 
endorsed by an assembly of 1,500 workers’ and soldiers’ 
delegates. This event revealed both the strength of the councils 
– their backing was needed – and the weakness of their politics 
– they put their trust in professional career politicians. This 
was a re-run of Russia’s February Days translated into German 
– the creation of a dual-power regime.
On 4 January 1919, the Reformist government sacked 
Berlin’s radical chief of police for refusing to take action 
against working-class protests. Hundreds of thousands of 
workers poured onto the streets, many of them armed. An 
‘Interim Revolutionary Committee’ was installed at police 
headquarters. But the leadership was uncertain, local troops 
remained hostile, and support for the action outside Berlin 
was minimal. The Berlin activists had been goaded into action 
before the revolution had ripened. The revolutionary capital 
was isolated. Not only the Freikorps – fascist-type paramili-
taries – but many soldiers from outside Berlin were willing to 
participate in what turned out to be the bloody suppression 
of the ‘Spartakus Rising’. Karl Liebknecht was knocked 
unconscious and shot. Rosa Luxemburg’s skull was smashed 
with a rifle butt, she was then shot, and her body was thrown 
into a canal. The German Revolution had been decapitated. 
In the July Days of 1917, the Bolsheviks had reined back 
the Petrograd proletariat to prevent a premature seizure of 
power in the capital. In January 1919, the Spartakus League, an 
embryonic Communist Party, failed to do the same in Berlin – 
and paid a terrible price. 
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The setback was not necessarily fatal. The crisis continued 
to mature across Germany. Support flowed from the moderate 
SPD to the more radical USP and the revolutionary KPD (the 
German Communist Party). The Freikorps faced increasingly 
effective resistance from armed workers and revolutionary 
soldiers. By March 1920, an estimated 20,000 had been killed in 
a series of regional civil wars. At this point, the German ruling 
class launched a ‘law and order’ coup, sending troops into 
Berlin, overthrowing the SPD government, and appointing a 
conservative bureaucrat called Kapp in its place.
For Kapp, read Kornilov. And just as in Russia in August 
1917, the Right had misjudged the political situation. The 
head of the main union confederation called a general 
strike. Millions of workers responded. They also formed 
new councils and took up arms. The ‘Ruhr Red Army’ freed 
Germany’s greatest industrial region of all right-wing troops. 
The ‘Kapp Putsch’ collapsed in a few days, and the SPD 
ministers returned to office. The attempted coup had exposed 
the true nature of the ruling class and the great strength of the 
working class. The confidence of German workers soared and 
they moved sharply to the left. 
But the potential was not realised. The KPD drew back 
from proletarian insurrection. The Kapp Putsch did not, like 
the Kornilov Coup of August 1917, pave the way for socialist 
revolution. Too bold in January 1919, the KPD leaders had 
learnt their lesson too well, and now, in wholly different cir-
cumstances, proved too timid. 
Timing is all in the art of revolution. The summer of 1920 
was perhaps a moment when revolutionaries could have led 
the working class to victory in the heart of Europe. Italy, like 
Germany, was then on the brink of revolution. The imperialist 
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war had levered open deep fractures in an unstable social 
order. The country had lost half a million dead in the First 
World War. The misery of the trenches was matched by bread 
shortages and hunger on the home front. The ancient poverty 
of the villages, the new forms of exploitation in the factories of 
the north, and the carnage and privation of the war combined 
to produce the Biennio Rosso – Italy’s ‘Two Red Years’ of 1919 
and 1920.
Summer 1919 saw a three-day general strike in solidarity with 
the Russian Revolution. Spring 1920 saw Turin metal-workers 
on strike demanding recognition for their camere del lavoro 
– the ‘factory councils’ which leading revolutionary Antonio 
Gramsci saw as the Italian equivalent of Russia’s Soviets. The 
movement peaked in August 1920. Engineering workers in 
Milan occupied their factories in response to a lockout by 
the employers. An occupation movement then swept the 
‘industrial triangle’ of north-western Italy. Some 400,000 
metal-workers and 100,000 others took part. The occupied 
factories were treated like military bases. They were defended 
against the police, and arms were stockpiled inside them. 
The Italian working class had had enough: the mood among 
workers was insurrectionary.
The government was paralysed. The Prime Minister 
admitted to the Senate that he lacked the forces to suppress 
the movement. So he made some concessions and cut a deal 
with the union leaders. The Socialist Party was not prepared to 
challenge this decision. Reformists dominated the apparatus 
of both unions and party. 
Had a large, well-rooted revolutionary party led an 
insurrection in August 1920, it is likely that the Italian working 
class could have taken state power and pulled the mass of 
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peasants and the rural and urban poor into action behind it. 
The primary reason this did not happen was lack of revolu-
tionary leadership, organisation, and will. The price paid was 
very high. The retreating proletarian movement was soon 
to be overwhelmed by an advancing fascist one: Mussolini’s 
Blackshirts took power in October 1922. 
The convulsions were not restricted to Germany and Italy. 
They were felt across the whole of Europe and beyond. At the 
end of 1918, the liberal-nationalist government in Hungary 
collapsed and was replaced by a radical ‘Soviet’ government of 
Communists and Social Democrats led by Bela Kun. In April 
1919, a ‘Soviet Republic’ was also established in Bavaria, and in 
that same month revolutionaries attempted to seize power in 
Vienna. A fleeting glimpse was offered of a possible alternative 
future: Budapest, Bavaria, and Vienna might have formed a 
revolutionary bloc in the heart of Europe. 
It was not to be. In each case, the revolutionaries were 
not strong enough to prevent reformists from derailing the 
revolution. One of the Bavarian revolutionary leaders, facing 
execution after the Soviet Republic’s overthrow, summed 
up the experience of working with Social Democrat and 
Independent Socialist ‘allies’: ‘The Social-Democrats start, 
then run away and betray us. The Independents fall for the 
bait, join us, and then let us down. And we Communists are 
stood up against the wall. We Communists are all dead men 
on leave.’
The contagion spread further: to Spain, which experienced 
its Trienio Bolchevista (‘Three Bolshevik Years’) in 1918–20; 
to France, where the Socialist Party of 150,000 members 
voted to transform itself into a Communist Party affiliated 
to the Third International; and in Britain, where engineering 
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workers fought pitched battles with police and soldiers on the 
streets of Glasgow in 1919, and the mining, transport, and rail 
unions formed a ‘triple alliance’ which terrified the Liberal 
government in 1920.
The revolutionary mood also infected distant continents: 
Australia, Canada, and the US experienced mass strikes as 
workers fought to build unions, raise wages, and improve 
conditions. It also passed from the major metropolitan 
countries to the colonial periphery. Irish Republicans waged 
guerrilla war to win independence in 1919–21. Huge Egyptian 
crowds demanded an end to British rule in 1919. Large parts 
of Iraq were in armed revolt against colonial occupation in 
1920. Strikes, demonstrations, and riots swept British India 
in the post-war years. And Chinese students triggered a mass 
movement against foreign domination that would culminate 
in proletarian insurrection in 1927.
With hindsight we can see that 1921 was the turning point. 
The greatest popular revolt against war and poverty in the 
history of the world crashed against the defences of corporate 
capital and the imperialist states in a rising tide from 1917 to 
1921. The system was shaken to its foundations and survived 
by a narrow margin. The revolutionary wave then ebbed 
back. Accidents of timing, failures of leadership, weakness 
of organisation, lack of unity, confusion of purpose: all 
contributed to the eventual defeat. The weave of interrelated 
narratives is too complex to be analysed here: it would be 
the subject of another book. But one thing is clear: at every 
turn, in every place, reformism, with its contradictory mix of 
social-democratic rhetoric and national-capitalist practice, 
acted to bamboozle and block the revolutionary movement of 
the working class; not once, not occasionally, but again and 
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again whenever a decisive breakthrough seemed possible. This 
guaranteed the failure of the world revolution in 1917–21. 
And this doomed the Russian Revolution to isolation, and 
therefore to disintegration and defeat. This is the story that 
must now be told.
CHAPTER TEN
The Revolution Besieged
Defending the revolution. A Red Army recruitment 
poster from the Civil War.
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The Civil War
The Russian counter-revolution’s first attempt to destroy the 
new Bolshevik regime had been easily and quickly suppressed. 
Strikes by public officials, sabotage by industrialists, and a 
sullen mood of non-cooperation among supporters of the old 
order failed to halt what Lenin called ‘the triumphal march 
of soviet power’.1 An attempted military coup by Kerensky 
and General Krasnov’s Cossacks was defeated at the Battle of 
the Pulkovo Heights, a few miles south of Petrograd, on 30 
October. Red artillery inflicted heavy losses (up to 500 dead), 
and the Cossacks, stunned by the resistance and demoralised 
by revolutionary agitation, retreated.2
The Constituent Assembly, which met on 5 January 1918, 
turned out to have an anti-Soviet majority. It comprised 370 
Right SRs, 175 Bolsheviks, 86 Nationalists, 40 Left SRs, 17 
Cadets, and 16 Mensheviks. This meant that the revolution-
aries – the Bolsheviks and Left SRs – held only 30 per cent 
of the seats. A decision was taken to disperse the Constituent 
Assembly by force, eliminating a political centre that might 
otherwise have become a focus for counter-revolution. This 
was little more than a police action by the Soviet authorities 
in the capital: there were even fewer defenders of the 
Constituent Assembly than there had been of the Provisional 
Government.3 But the political significance of the act was 
huge, and the controversy about it has raged for a century.
Since the earliest days of Russian socialism, all factions had 
called for such a body to lay the groundwork for a modern par-
1. Haynes 2002, 33.
2. Serge 1930/1972, 87–9.
3. Cliff 1978, 29–38.
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liamentary democracy. The abrupt closure of the Constituent 
Assembly has been portrayed as a gross violation of democracy 
and a betrayal of past commitments. More than that: as a 
measure of the inherent authoritarianism of Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks. These arguments are flawed because they are 
abstract; only context can determine whether any particular 
act is progressive or reactionary. Up until February 1917, the 
call for a Constituent Assembly had been a revolutionary 
demand. Between February and October, it remained a slogan 
of radical forces seeking to push the revolution forwards to full 
democracy.
But the October Insurrection, the meeting of the Second 
Congress of Soviets, and the formation of the Council of 
People’s Commissars had broken through the limits of formal 
representative democracy based on a parliament and created 
a mass participatory democracy based on Soviets. Formal 
democracy lags behind participatory democracy in giving 
expression to the will of the masses. Leaders elected in one 
phase of the revolution lag behind the radicalism of the masses 
in the next. Assemblies of the electoral majority lag behind 
the actions of the fighting vanguard. Revolution is above all a 
process of rapid change, in which nothing has time to coagulate, 
ossify, become fixed in form; its colossal transformative power 
repeatedly runs ahead of the consciousness of its protagonists. 
Men and women in revolutionary action frequently astonish 
themselves with their own audacity. Even Lenin, on the day 
of the insurrection, turned to Trotsky and said: ‘You know, 
from persecution and life underground, to come so suddenly 
to power, it makes one giddy.’ The Constituent Assembly was 
a relic from the past before it even met. ‘This chief democratic 
slogan,’ Trotsky explained,
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which had for a decade and a half tinged with its colour the 
heroic struggle of the masses, had grown pale and faded out, 
had somehow been ground between millstones, had become 
an empty shell, a form naked of content, a tradition and not 
a prospect. There was nothing mysterious in this process. 
The development of the revolution had reached the point 
of a direct battle for power between the two basic classes of 
society, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. A Constituent 
Assembly could give nothing to either one or the other.4
Even so, despite the resilience of the Soviet regime, and 
the democracy and creativity that fizzed within it, backward, 
peasant-dominated, war-shattered, economically prostrate 
Russia was on borrowed time. Lenin was under no illusions. 
‘The final victory of socialism in a single country is … 
impossible’, he told the Third Soviet Congress in January 1918. 
‘Our contingent of workers and peasants which is upholding 
Soviet power is one of the contingents of the great world army.’ 
Two months later he put the matter yet more starkly: ‘It is 
the absolute truth that without a German revolution, we are 
doomed.’5
In the event, the German Revolution was first delayed by a 
year, then knocked back by a premature uprising, and finally 
aborted in a missed opportunity. In the meantime, with large 
parts of Soviet territory already under German occupation, 
and with Russian forces in no condition to resist a further 
advance, the Bolsheviks needed peace as a drowning man 
needs air. But the German generals were waging an imperialist 
war against a beaten enemy, and they refused to stop unless the 
4. Trotsky 1932–3/1977, 937–8.
5. Faulkner 2013, 202.
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Bolsheviks ceded Poland, Finland, the Baltic states, and large 
parts of the grain- and oil-rich Ukraine.
The German ultimatum split the Bolshevik leadership. Some 
argued for ‘revolutionary war’ in defence of Russian territory. 
Lenin argued for acceptance of the ultimatum, since the 
Bolsheviks had no forces with which to fight. Trotsky argued 
for neither revolutionary war nor acceptance of the ultimatum, 
trusting instead to the imminent outbreak of revolution in 
Germany. Trotsky’s compromise position – neither war nor 
peace – was carried. But the German army on the Eastern 
Front simply rolled into the Ukraine, meeting virtually no 
resistance. Lenin then won the argument, and the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk was signed on 3 March 1918. The Soviet state 
was plundered of land, people, and resources – one-quarter 
of its territory, 45 per cent of its population, one-third of its 
agrarian output, 75 per cent of its coal and iron production, 
and almost 30 per cent of its revenues. That there was no 
alternative did not alter the bitterness of the recrimination nor 
the dire economic consequences. The daily bread ration in 
Petrograd had already fallen from 300gm in October 1917 to 
half that the following January, and to just 50gm in February – 
a tenth of a loaf. Now it got worse – and the revolution began 
to die slowly of starvation.6
Then civil war erupted in full fury. Instead of the comic-opera 
coup of a Kornilov or a Krasnov, this time it was a heavily 
armed, multi-front, years-long onslaught on the beleaguered 
enclave of workers’ power around Petrograd and Moscow. The 
Whites – as the counter-revolutionaries were known – were 
mobilised on four main fronts under the command of former 
Tsarist generals: an eastern front under Kolchak in Siberia; a 
6. Cliff 1978, 38–54, esp. 50; Faulkner 2013, 202.
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southern front under Kaledin, Denikin, and Wrangel in the 
Ukraine, the Don Basin, and the Caucasus; a western front 
under Yudenich in the Baltic region; and a distant northern 
front sustained by British, French, and US expeditionary 
forces based at Murmansk and Arkhangelsk.
Russia’s great distances and primitive communica-
tions afforded the Whites ample opportunity to raise 
counter-revolutionary armies in distant quarters. Guns, 
funds, and additional fighting forces were provided by the 
foreign powers. Britain alone supplied nearly a million rifles. 
Some 14 foreign expeditionary forces invaded Russia in 
support of the Whites. Among the more significant inter-
ventions were a British operation around oil-rich Baku on 
the Caspian, a Japanese lodgement at Vladivostock on the 
Pacific, and the campaign of a Czech Legion recruited from 
former prisoners-of-war on the Trans-Siberian Railway. In 
the course of 1919, the workers’ state was reduced to a central 
Russian zone of about 60 million people, largely cut off from 
its traditional sources of food, fuel, and raw materials.7 The 
Russian Revolution, for a time, hung by a thread.
Yet by early 1920, most of the White armies had been 
defeated, and by the end of that year, the Civil War was 
effectively over. How was this possible? Because they were 
operating on exterior lines and widely separated fronts, the 
Whites were unable to co-ordinate their military operations. 
The Reds, on interior lines, were able to move forces quickly 
by rail to deal with successive emergencies in different sectors. 
Trotsky, despite his total lack of previous military experience, 
proved a brilliant leader of the Red Army, creating it from 
scratch from voluntary enlistment and then conscription. His 
7. Haynes 2002, 48; Faulkner 2013, 202.
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method was to build it around a core of former Tsarist officers, 
Bolshevik commissars, and revolutionary workers and soldiers. 
This mix of professionalism and political commitment created 
a central military cadre able to organise and inspire the mass 
of mainly peasant recruits. By the end of 1918, there were 
500,000 Red Army soldiers; by July 1919, the number was 2.3 
million; and towards the end of the Civil War in July 1920, no 
less than 4 million.
The Red Army was far from perfect. It was sometimes poorly 
equipped, ill-disciplined, and badly led; it sometimes lacked 
the will to fight and failed in battle. It was, of necessity, held 
together by a ruthless military discipline; and often, to survive, 
like all armies in all ages, it was driven to forced requisition-
ing from civilians. Erich Wollenberg, a German Communist 
who fought with the Red Army in the Civil War, confessed the 
brutal reality:
As Trotsky most aptly remarked, the Bolsheviks were 
compelled to ‘plunder all Russia’ in order to satisfy 
the army’s most basic needs. Trotsky certainly did not 
exaggerate, for in 1920 the army consumed 25% of the entire 
wheat production, 50% of other grain products, 60% of the 
fish and meat supplies, and 90% of all the men’s boot and 
shoe wares … The Bolsheviks were forced to commandeer 
all the peasants’ surplus grain in order to ensure the supplies 
needed to feed the army and the industrial proletariat. The 
so-called ‘requisition squads’ and the system of forced 
quotas which extracted the peasants’ last grain stores from 
their hiding-places and throttled all petty commerce were 
frequent causes of the peasantry’s vacillation to the side of 
the Whites.8
8. Wollenberg 1938/1978, 110–11.
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Here was the contradiction destined to destroy the 
revolution. The ‘plundering’ enabled the Red Army to win 
the Civil War; but what remained of the Soviet state would be 
a shell. In the short term, the alternative seemed worse. The 
Whites represented the rule of the generals and the landlords; 
and the peasants knew that if they won, they would take 
back the land. And because they embodied the tyranny of 
the few over the many, the Whites were corrupt, brutal, and 
murderous. Captured commissars were routinely shot. Red 
soldiers perished in their thousands in White prisoner-of-war 
camps. Peasant villages were stripped of food and resources. 
Anti-Semitic pogroms killed up to 100,000 Jews. Even foreign 
officers sent to their aid were disgusted by the Whites. One 
American general reported that ‘The Kolchak government 
has failed to command the confidence of anybody in Siberia 
except a small discredited group of reactionaries, monarchists, 
and former military officials.’9 The Red Army, whatever its 
faults and failings, was a democratic army, a people’s army, 
a would-be army of liberation. The White armies were the 
gangrenous limbs of a dying social order. That, in the end, 
ensured their defeat.
But the victory of the workers’ state in the Russian Civil War 
was Pyrrhic. The effort had accelerated the economic collapse 
and drained the country of person-power, material resources, 
and revolutionary energy. The Tsarist counter-revolution had 
been defeated. But the revolution had been hollowed out. 
And, in one of history’s most bitter twists, another species of 
counter-revolution – one without historic precedent – was 
already growing, a malignant embryo, inside the revolutionary 
regime itself. 
9. Cliff 1990, 58–87 passim; Haynes 2002, 49.
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From War Communism to New Economic Policy
The Civil War accelerated the economic collapse and social 
transformation that were destroying the material and human 
foundations of the revolution. The towns were depopulated 
by lack of food and fuel, by unemployment as factories closed 
for lack of raw materials, and by mass recruitment of workers 
into the administration and the army. Grain requisitioning 
was introduced in the summer of 1918, to both feed the towns 
and supply the army, but this poisoned relations between 
the regime and the peasants. Centralised state control over 
the economy was imposed, but this was a desperate attempt 
to manage scarcity, and the black market boomed. By 1920, 
workers were receiving four-fifths of their wages in kind, 
and the value of these had fallen to one-tenth of their 1913 
level. No-one could survive on this, so urban incomes were 
supplement by craft production, petty trade, and stealing; 
when this failed, people returned to the countryside, where 
most still had ties. Malnourished, often cold, dressed in filthy 
rags, the population was decimated by epidemic disease – 
typhus, typhoid, cholera, tuberculosis, and malaria. Russia 
probably suffered around 1.5 million excess civilian deaths 
between 1914 and 1917, but no less than 12 million between 
1918 and 1922.
When the writer Ilya Ehrenburg arrived in Moscow, his 
trousers had disintegrated at the knees. With a new job, he 
was entitled to a clothing coupon. Getting to the front of the 
queue at a clothing depot, he was offered a choice: a winter 
coat or a suit. ‘The choice was very hard. Frozen as I felt, I was 
ready to ask for a winter coat, but suddenly I remembered the 
humiliations of the past months and shouted, “Trousers! A 
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suit.”’ This rough-and-ready egalitarianism – an equalisation 
at the lowest level of existence – was called ‘War Communism’. 
Some eternal optimists proclaimed it as the advent of socialism. 
Most understood it as desperation. ‘What do you think?’ asked 
one Bolshevik official. ‘The People’s Commissariat of Food 
does this for its own satisfaction? No. We do it because there is 
not enough food.’10
The Civil War and War Communism consumed the rev-
olutionary cadre of 1917. The network of rank-and-file 
activists, eventually hundreds of thousands strong, that had 
led the masses during the October Insurrection was afterwards 
sucked into a huge apparatus of political administration 
and military defence. There was no choice. The landlords, 
capitalists, and bureaucrats of the old regime had fled. The 
estates, the factories, and the government departments were 
under new authority. An alternative workers’ state had to be 
constructed to run the economy, manage society, and fight the 
counter-revolution, both in the rear and at the fronts.
Much of the work was repressive action, not just in battle 
against White armies, but in the towns and villages controlled 
by the Reds. Here was a bitter truth. Where there is abundance, 
there is enough for all. Where there is scarcity, there is a queue. 
Where there is a queue, you need a policeman. Just as you 
cannot build socialism in one country, nor can you build it on a 
foundation of poverty. Millstones of material deprivation were 
grinding into atoms the great mass forces mobilised in 1917, 
turning them to human dust, reducing the Russian Narod to a 
pitiful scrabble in the gutter for a crust of bread. 
One measure of the shattered solidarity was the rise of 
the Cheka and the Red Terror. The Cheka was an internal 
10. Haynes 2002, 51–4.
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security police which grew to number 50,000 operatives 
during the Civil War. Its attempts to maintain order, suppress 
opposition, and root out counter-revolution seem to have 
claimed about 50,000 victims. Nor did its work end when the 
White armies were defeated. Red Russia was prostrate and 
riven with discontent. There were peasant revolts in Tambov 
province, strikes in Petrograd, and, most tragic of all, an armed 
insurrection at the naval base of Kronstadt, the great bastion of 
Bolshevism in 1917.11
The sailors raised no banner of counter-revolution; their 
slogan was ‘Soviets without Communists’. The blame for 
everything – the ravages of the Civil War, the effects of Allied 
intervention and blockade, the privations of War Communism, 
the hunger, the cold, the disease, everything – was laid at 
the door of the embattled regime. It was a blind eruption 
of discontent lacking clear political purpose. But the rebels 
were adamant, and negotiations to find a peaceful settlement 
proved fruitless. Even Victor Serge, a deeply sensitive 
commentator, acutely aware of the germs of decay eating away 
at the revolution from within, believed the Bolsheviks had no 
choice but to crush the Kronstadt Rebellion of March 1921: 
‘They wanted to release a pacifying tempest, but all they could 
actually have done was open the way to counter-revolution 
… Insurgent Kronstadt was not counter-revolution, but its 
victory would have led – without any shadow of a doubt – to 
the counter-revolution.’ But he added something more: in the 
fighting at Kronstadt could be heard ‘the crack of the timbers 
in the whole building’. Lenin thought so too. ‘The Kronstadt 
11. Haynes 2002, 55–7.
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events’, he declared, ‘were like a flash of lightning which threw 
more glare upon reality than anything else.’12
The great retreat now began. The Russian economy at the 
end of the Civil War in 1921 was only one fifth the size it 
had been in 1913. This was the economic cost of eight years 
of world war, revolution, and civil war in a vast country of 
primitive agriculture; not until 1928 would the 1913 level 
be regained. The world revolution that might have brought 
the wealth of German industry to the rescue of the besieged 
Soviet regime had stalled. The ‘flash of lightning’ at Kronstadt 
– like the thunderbolt of an angry Zeus – was clear warning 
that Russia’s Bolsheviks had defeated the White armies only to 
find themselves confronting material barriers they could not 
surmount.
There were three insuperable problems: the social weight of 
the peasantry; the economic collapse due to war; and the dis-
integration of the working class. The alliance between workers 
and peasants had made the revolution possible. The peasants 
outnumbered the workers ten to one. If the workers had not 
won over the peasants, they would have been shot down by 
peasant-soldiers loyal to the Tsar. Instead, the Bolsheviks 
had promised ‘bread, peace, and land’, and the peasants had 
supported the October Insurrection; after that, even the 
plundering of the Red Army during the Civil War had not 
broken their deep-rooted class antagonism to the Whites. 
But the interests of workers and peasants then diverged. The 
working class is a collective because its labour is collective. 
You cannot divide up a coal mine, an engineering plant, or a 
railway network into separate enterprises. When workers take 
power, they have to run the economy as an integrated whole. 
12. Cliff 1990, 184–6.
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The peasantry, on the other hand, is a class of individualists, 
because every peasant’s aspiration is to be an independent 
farmer. The peasants will support urban revolutionaries who 
allow them to seize the land. But further co-operation then 
depends on the ability of the towns to produce goods they can 
trade with the villages. If they fail in this, the peasants will not 
trade, and the towns will starve.
The Bolsheviks understood this. Their problem was that 
production had collapsed, the towns had emptied, and the 
working class had shrunk to a fraction of its former size, 
diminished by war, disease, retreat to the countryside, and 
absorption into the administration and army. In plain fact, the 
exploiting classes had been vanquished, the peasants controlled 
the land, the democratic mass movement in the cities had 
dissolved, and the only organised social force operating at 
a national level was the new bureaucratic apparatus of party 
and state.
Such was the economic and social malaise that had full 
Soviet democracy been restored in the early 1920s, the country 
would have been torn apart by the contradiction between the 
interests of the international working class and the interests 
of the Russian peasantry. The Bolsheviks were left holding 
onto power in the hope that they would eventually be rescued 
by world revolution. For a while, the socialist tradition itself 
could act as an historical force, even if embodied in a state 
apparatus rather than a revolutionary class. But the Bolsheviks 
could not defy gravity. Sooner or later, they would succumb 
to the hostile social forces all around them. Lenin could see 
it. ‘Ours is not actually a workers’ state’, he said as early as 
1920, ‘but a workers’ and peasants’ state … But that is not 
all. Our party programme shows that ours is a workers’ state 
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with bureaucratic distortions.’ Later, alarmed at the influence 
of former Tsarist officials and newly recruited careerists in the 
government apparatus, he posed the question: ‘This mass of 
bureaucrats – who is leading whom?’13
At the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921, War 
Communism was abandoned in favour of the New Economic 
Policy (NEP); it would remain the policy of the Soviet state 
until 1928. The NEP was an attempt to resolve the ‘scissors 
crisis’ between town and country, and thus to win an 
economic breathing-space before the next global revolution-
ary upsurge. It allowed private production and a free market to 
develop alongside state enterprise. The effect was to foster the 
development of a class of entrepreneurs (the ‘NEP men’) and 
a class of rich peasants (the kulaks). At the same time, the ‘red 
industrialists’ who ran state enterprises behaved increasingly 
like conventional capitalists. The imperatives of survival for 
an embattled state in control of an underdeveloped economy 
dominated by peasant farms were transforming the character 
of the regime.14
In 1928, Lenin’s question – ‘who is leading whom?’ – 
would receive its definitive answer. Crushing both the Right 
(representing the NEP men and the kulaks) and the Left 
(representing the old revolutionary tradition), Stalin’s Centre 
would emerge from the backrooms of the Bolshevik Party as 
the political expression of a new bureaucratic ruling class. The 
way in which that class was formed and took power, and the 
nature of the totalitarian regime and state-capitalist economy 
it created, is the subject of our final chapter.
13. Faulkner 2013, 218–19.
14. Haynes 2002, 57–9; Faulkner 2013, 219.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
Stalinism
Crushing the revolution. Grigori Zinoviev, Lenin’s 
right-hand man, as photographed after his arrest by 
Stalin’s police in 1936 – one of millions of victims of the 
counter-revolutionary terror.
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The rise of the bureaucracy
By late 1921, almost everywhere in the world, the great rev-
olutionary wave stirred into motion by the First World War 
was ebbing away. By late 1923, this was clear to all but the 
most die-hard optimists. Most critically, having faced down 
challenges from both Communist revolutionaries and Nazi 
counter-revolutionaries, Germany’s Weimar Republic – a 
liberal parliamentary regime – had achieved a measure of 
stability. The October Insurrection of 1917 had not ignited 
the world socialist revolution that the Bolsheviks had worked 
for. Lenin himself became a poignant symbol of the decay 
of revolutionary hope: increasingly incapacitated by a series 
of strokes, he died in 1924. The Russian Revolution was left 
isolated, surrounded by enemies, devastated by war, and 
impoverished by economic collapse. Struggling to survive in 
desperate conditions, the Bolshevik regime turned in on itself 
and, in time, morphed into a hideous mockery of its former 
socialist ideals.
The crisis of 1918–21 – the period of the Civil War and War 
Communism – transformed the character of the Bolshevik 
Party, the Soviets, and the Russian working class. The close 
political relationship between revolutionary party, democratic 
assembly, and industrial proletariat had made possible the 
October Insurrection. Trotsky used the metaphor of a steam 
engine: the party was the piston, in which the energy of the 
revolution was transmitted; the democratic assemblies were 
the piston box, organising and concentrating the energy; and 
the industrial proletariat – along with the wider Narod, the 
soldiers and peasants, who followed its lead – were the steam, 
the mass collective action which powered all the great events 
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of 1917. This relationship broke down completely in the 
subsequent four years with the disintegration of Russia’s small 
industrial proletariat. ‘The industrial proletariat is déclassé’, 
Lenin declared in October 1921. ‘It has ceased to exist as a 
proletariat. Since the great capitalist industry is ruined and 
the factories immobilised, the proletariat has disappeared.’1 In 
the early 1920s, two main class forces dominated Russian life: 
the peasantry, now in control of the land, and the party-state 
bureaucracy, still infused with much revolutionary spirit, but 
increasingly preoccupied with the imperatives of restoring 
the basics of everyday life in a backward, war-ravaged, 
poverty-ridden economy.
The Bolshevik Party itself was transformed. Its membership 
swelled. The revolutionary veterans were soon swamped by 
post-October recruits, many joining because it was the only 
way to get a job and earn a living. By 1922, for example, only 
15 per cent of Bolshevik Party members in Petrograd had been 
members in 1917; the proportion of ‘Old Bolsheviks’ – those 
who had been members before 1917 – was only a tiny fraction 
of the total.2 The latter – now usually in leading positions – 
enjoyed great prestige. But this did little to foster inner-party 
democracy. Many of the new recruits were fair-weather friends 
of the regime, careerists rather than idealists, happy to go with 
the flow, unwilling to challenge the leadership. Nonetheless, 
the danger was that the political pressure of this mass of new 
party officials, the civil servants of the Soviet regime, would 
undermine the revolutionary traditions of the party. The 
adoption of the New Economic Policy and the rise of the NEP 
men and the kulaks increased this danger. The conservatism of 
1. Haynes 2002, 64.
2. Haynes 2002, 53–5.
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the new party bureaucracy might be reinforced by the social 
influence of this growing petty-bourgeois mass. They might 
also become transmitters into the party of the imperatives 
of world market competition, for the small Soviet economy, 
compelled to trade in order to survive, was being shaped by 
the international capitalist order. The Soviet state, Trotsky 
explained in 1927, was developing
directly or indirectly, under the relative control of the world 
market. Herein lies the root of the question. The rate of 
development is not an arbitrary one – it is determined by 
the whole of world development, because in the last analysis 
world industry controls every one of its parts, even if that 
part is under the proletarian dictatorship and is building up 
socialist industry.3
Lenin spelt out the implications: ‘The proletarian policy of 
the party is not determined by the character of the membership,’ 
Lenin observed, ‘but by the undivided prestige enjoyed by the 
small group that might be called the Old Guard of the party.’ 
But in the growing social vacuum in which it operated, that 
‘Old Guard’ felt compelled to shore up its defences: the Tenth 
Party Congress of March 1921 voted to ban internal factions – 
a major restriction on inner-party debate and democracy. This 
was one measure of the desperation with which the Bolshevik 
leadership acted to preserve the revolutionary tradition and 
maintain the Soviet regime as an outpost of socialist revolution 
pending the next global upsurge. But they were fighting a 
tragic battle against history. Beneath their feet was shifting 
sand. ‘Permit me to congratulate you on being the vanguard 
3. Haynes 2002, 60.
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of a non-existent class’ was the bitter reproach addressed to 
Lenin by one revolutionary veteran.4
At the end of his life, increasingly incapacitated by strokes, 
Lenin became preoccupied with the problem of bureaucratic 
degeneration. Sensing that his life’s work was slipping away, 
he waged his ‘last struggle’ – against Joseph Stalin and the 
emerging party-state bureaucracy. In a secret ‘Testament’ 
written shortly before his death, he warned leading party 
comrades that the Secretary-General of the Party had 
‘unlimited authority concentrated in his hands’, that he was 
‘too rude’, and that they should therefore
think about a way of removing Stalin from that post and 
appointing another man in his stead who in all other respects 
differs from Comrade Stalin in having only one advantage, 
namely, that of being more tolerant, more loyal, more polite, 
and more considerate to comrades, less capricious, etc.5 
It was not to be. The party leadership felt too embattled on 
too many fronts to risk a split at the top. Lenin’s prescription 
was, in any case, no remedy for the disease. Seeing no other 
way out, he had been reduced to proposing that the Bolshevik 
Revolution be rescued by a mere shuffling of its high command. 
The fundamental problem was not that Stalin was a boorish 
bureaucrat. It was that the political leadership of the emerging 
party-state apparatus required a boorish bureaucrat. The man 
whom Sukhanov remembered as ‘a grey blur’ in the great 
events of 1917 – a backroom operator, a party hack, not a mass 
leader, not an orator, writer, or theoretician – had now come 
4. Haynes 2002, 64–5.
5. Cliff 1979, 201–16.
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into his own. And as Secretary-General of the Party, in the new 
world coming into being – a bureaucratic dystopia more in 
keeping with a Kafka novel than a Marxist tract – he held the 
prime position, in control of appointments to every section 
of the party-state apparatus. Within a year of his taking up 
post, and even before Lenin’s death, 10,000 new assignments 
had been made. The burgeoning bureaucracy – increasingly 
formed of men and women who owed their position to Stalin’s 
faction – now dominated party congresses. More than half the 
delegates at the Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923 were 
party officials. A year later, at the Thirteenth Party Congress in 
May 1924, it was two-thirds. This was a critical turning point.
Not a single member of the internal party opposition was 
elected as a voting delegate to the Thirteenth Congress. 
Delegates were now chosen by processes of co-option and 
selection from above. Dissent and debate were minimal. 
Party democracy had been hollowed out. Nikolai Bukharin 
described how it worked in the Moscow party in late 1924:
the secretaries of the party cells are usually appointed by the 
district committee … Normally the putting of the question 
to a vote takes place in a set pattern. They come and ask the 
meeting ‘Who is against?’, and since people more or less fear 
to speak out against, the individual in question finds himself 
elected secretary of the bureau of the cell … The same thing 
can be observed in a somewhat modified form in all other 
stages of the party hierarchy as well.6 
The takeover by the party bureaucracy was given clear 
political expression by the adoption, at the Fourteenth Party 
6. Haynes 2002, 67–8. 
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Congress in December 1925, of the doctrine of ‘socialism in 
one country’. This amounted to the evisceration of the entire 
Marxist tradition – which can be defined as the theory and 
practice of international proletarian revolution – and of the 
Bolshevik tradition, which, true to Marxism, had insisted time 
and again that Russia was merely a link in a global chain, the 
1917 revolution but a stage in a process, the Soviet regime 
dependent for its long-term survival on a new upsurge of revo-
lutionary struggle on a worldwide scale.
But this perspective did not reflect the interests of the 
party-state bureaucracy. They were administrators involved 
in economic modernisation and social reconstruction; 
essentially, they were technocrats with a practical job of 
work to do. Increasingly, they were conscious of themselves 
as a group with common interests and shared goals; a group, 
indeed, that now formed the leadership of Soviet Russia. 
They were, according to Stalin, ‘an order of Teutonic knights 
at the centre of the Soviet state’. More than that: as Christian 
Rakovsky and a group of Russian oppositionists observed in 
1930, they were an embryonic ruling class:
Before our very eyes, there has been and is being formed 
a large class of rulers with their own subdivisions, growing 
through controlled co-option … What unites this peculiar 
sort of class is the peculiar sort of property, namely, state 
power … [The bureaucracy] is the nucleus of a class … Its 
appearance will mean that the working class will become 
another oppressed class. The bureaucracy is the nucleus 
of some kind of capitalist class, controlling the state and 
collectively owning the means of production.7 
7. Haynes 2002, 68–9.
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‘Socialism in one country’ (or ‘national socialism’) is a con-
tradiction in terms. There is worldwide socialist revolution and 
there is the international capitalist system; there is no ‘middle 
way’, merely moments in a process of transition towards one 
or the other. Soviet Russia was metamorphosing into a form 
of what is best described as ‘state-capitalism’. It was – as some 
oppositionists expressed it at the time of the Fourteenth 
Congress – becoming a ‘radish’: red on the outside, white on 
the inside. Between 1923/4 and 1928/9 – that is, between 
Lenin’s death and the termination of the New Economic Policy 
– that process of transformation accelerated dramatically. The 
party expanded from half a million members to a million and 
a half. By the end of the decade, two-thirds of members had 
joined during the NEP years, most of them after Lenin’s death. 
Lenin became a cult figure, his body mummified and put on 
display, his ideas turned into a catechism to be learned like 
religious dogma, with Stalin’s dismal Foundations of Leninism 
as its missal.8
The destruction of opposition currents inside the party 
was easily accomplished. Though the highest levels of the 
state were convulsed by arguments around four critical issues 
– the growth of bureaucracy, the relations between town and 
country, the speed of economic development, and ‘socialism in 
one country’ versus international revolution – Stalin’s Centre 
faction, resting on the support of the party-state apparatus 
it had itself created, remained predominant throughout. 
Successive oppositions were disoriented by an historical 
process they did not fully understand; but more importantly, 
they were disabled by their isolation inside the party machine, 
8. Haynes 2002, 67–72.
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while being unable – and to some degree unwilling – to build 
a political base outside it.
At first, Zinoviev and Kamenev formed a ‘Troika’ with 
Stalin against Trotsky’s ‘Left Opposition’ (1922–5). Then, 
awakening to the danger represented by Stalin, they broke with 
him to form a ‘United Opposition’ in alliance with Trotsky 
(1925–7). Finally, with the United Opposition defeated, the 
alliance between Bukharin and Stalin disintegrated (1927–8), 
bringing the process of bureaucratic degeneration to its 
second great turning point – the moment when a new ruling 
class emerged fully fledged and took wing. ‘Socialism in one 
country’ now culminated in an all-out attempt to build a new 
state-capitalist economy based on the forced collectivisation of 
agriculture, intensified exploitation and capital accumulation, 
and state-driven investment in heavy industry and arms 
production. This, however, required the final destruction of 
what remained of Lenin’s Bolshevik Party and the Russian rev-
olutionary tradition.
The party-state bureaucracy that had emerged in Russia 
under Stalin’s leadership was, by 1928, strong enough to 
complete what was, in effect, a counter-revolution. It had 
been accumulating power for a decade, and when it moved 
decisively at the end of the 1920s, it was able to destroy all 
remaining vestiges of working-class democracy. Meetings 
were packed, speakers shouted down, oppositionists purged 
and deported by an apparatus now dominated by officials who 
had joined it since the revolution.
During the 1930s, the bureaucracy consolidated its grip 
by liquidating virtually the whole of the old Bolshevik Party. 
Veterans of the October Insurrection were arrested, tortured, 
paraded in show trials, denounced as ‘saboteurs’ and ‘wreckers’, 
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and then executed by Stalin’s secret police. Against Trotsky 
and the tiny numbers of brave men and women who stood 
with him to the end was the power of inertia in an exhausted, 
impoverished, peasant country. Without world revolution 
to reinforce them, backward war-torn Russia had simply 
consumed its native revolutionaries – until they were so few 
that they could be swept into the oblivion of the Gulags.
Even so, the idealism and experience of the revolutionary 
years survived in popular memory and served to indict all 
that followed. For this reason, the remaining revolutionaries 
were hounded to their deaths during the 1930s. Only one in 
14 of the Bolshevik Party’s 1917 members still belonged to 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1939; virtually 
all of the rest were dead. Of the nine members of Lenin’s last 
Politburo (in 1923), only two were still alive at the end of 1940 
(Stalin and Molotov). Of the others, one died of natural causes 
(Lenin), one committed suicide in fear of arrest (Tomsky), 
and the remaining five were murdered (Kamenev, Zinoviev, 
Bukharin, Rykov, and Trotsky).
State-capitalism in Russia
The bureaucracy acted in 1928 because it had the power to 
do so and because it faced a crisis. The peasants were refusing 
to supply enough grain to the cities, and foreign governments 
were cutting off diplomatic relations and banning trade links. 
There was growing fear of war. The Russian state was no longer 
the centre of world revolution it had been in 1921. It was again, 
as it had been under the Tsars, one of Europe’s great powers. 
Its defence was no longer seen to be a matter of proclamations 
and proletarian solidarity, but of tanks and heavy artillery. The 
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leadership’s response to the crisis of 1928/9 was to seize the 
grain, drive down wages, and impose rapid industrialisation. 
The Russian dictator explained the logic: ‘To slacken the pace 
of industrialisation would mean to lag behind, and those who 
lag behind are beaten … We are 50 to 100 years behind the 
advanced countries. We must make good this lag in ten years 
or they will crush us.’9
Russia had survived civil war and foreign invasion: the 
new regime had not been destroyed by military force. But 
the defeat of the world revolution had left Russia isolated and 
impoverished in a global economy dominated by capitalism. 
So the counter-revolution was achieved not by violent 
overthrow, but by the relentless external pressure of economic 
and military competition. Russia needed to export grain to pay 
for machine tools. It needed machine tools to build modern 
industries. It needed these to produce the guns, tanks, and 
planes with which to defend itself in a predatory global system 
of competing nation-states. Private capital accumulation was 
too slow. What Bukharin in the 1920s had called ‘socialism at 
a snail’s pace’ would have left Russia trailing behind and ever 
vulnerable to dismemberment by hostile powers. Only the 
state had the power to concentrate resources, impose a plan, 
override opposition, and drive through rapid forced industri-
alisation. The aim was mass production to build state power. 
Russia’s rulers thus became personifications of state-capitalist 
accumulation. But they also used their power to reward 
themselves richly, even as they plundered the peasantry, cut 
wages, increased work pressure, and filled the Gulags with 
slave-labourers.
9. Faulkner 2013, 231.
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By 1937, plant directors were paid 2,000 roubles a month, 
skilled workers 200–300 roubles, and workers on the minimum 
wage 110–115 roubles. Pay differentials in the army were 
even more extreme: during the Second World War, colonels 
were paid 2,400 roubles a month, private soldiers 10. The pay 
of plant directors and army colonels was modest, however, 
compared with that of top members of the state bourgeoisie 
earning up to 25,000 roubles a month – more than 200 
times the minimum wage. So the bureaucracy had become a 
privileged class with a clear material interest in remaining loyal 
to Stalin and the state-capitalist system. It therefore proved 
utterly ruthless in imposing forced industrialisation on society 
at a colossal cost in human suffering.
Consumption was sacrificed to investment in heavy 
industry. The proportion of investment devoted to plant, 
machinery, and raw materials – as opposed to consumer goods 
– rose from 33 per cent in 1927/8 to 53 per cent by 1932 and 
69 per cent by 1950. The result was shortages and queues – 
though less than there might have been, because wages were 
cut at the same time, by an estimated 50 per cent over six 
years. Grain was seized from the peasantry to feed the growing 
urban population and to pay for imports of foreign machinery. 
Because of this, when the price collapsed on world markets 
in 1929, at least three million peasants starved to death. It 
was not enough. The state decreed ‘the collectivisation of 
agriculture’ (state control). Millions of peasants – denounced 
as kulaks (rich peasants producing for the market) – were 
dispossessed and transported. Many died. Others ended up 
as slave-labourers in the Gulags, which expanded into a vast 
Siberian slave empire run by Stalin’s security apparatus. The 
30,000 prisoners of 1928 had become two million by 1931, five 
million by 1935, and probably more than ten million by the 
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end of the decade. Millions of others were simply murdered 
by the police, the annual cull rising from 20,000 in 1930 to 
350,000 in 1937. State terror on this scale reflected Russian 
backwardness, the pace of state-capitalist accumulation, and 
the levels of exploitation necessary to achieve it. The working 
class, the peasantry, and the national minorities had to be 
pulverised into submission.10
The damage was not confined to Russia. The revolutionary 
content of Marxism was abandoned but its verbal formulas 
were retained and redeployed to justify the policies of the 
Russian bureaucracy. The Comintern – the Communist Inter-
national – became a vehicle for imposing the ideology and 
policies of the Russian state on foreign Communist parties. 
In 1927, having abandoned world revolution in favour of 
‘socialism in one country’, Stalin tried to break out of Russia’s 
isolation by seeking respectable allies abroad. So the Chinese 
Communist Party was ordered to kow-tow to Chiang Kai-shek 
and disarm the Shanghai working class. The result was a terrible 
counter-revolutionary massacre. The following year, the policy 
suddenly switched to sectarianism and adventurism. In the 
Comintern’s disastrous ‘Third Period’, Stalin proclaimed a new 
revolutionary advance, such that Communists were to break 
all ties with Social Democrats and prepare for an imminent 
seizure of power.
This mirrored (and helped justify) the policy inside Russia. 
The attack on the kulaks was presented as an attack on private 
capitalism (which was true) and as a major advance towards 
‘socialism’ (which was not). The ultra-left turn of the Third 
Period provided a smokescreen for bureaucratic power and 
10.  Faulkner 2013, 229–32; the classic study of this process is Tony Cliff ’s 
State Capitalism in Russia, one of the seminal works of modern 
Marxist analysis. 
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forced industrialisation. The sectarianism of the Third Period 
created a fatal division inside the German labour movement 
and allowed Hitler to take power in 1933.
But the Nazis threatened a resurgence of aggressive German 
imperialism, and Stalin began casting around for European 
allies. The Comintern therefore lurched from ultra-left 
madness to ‘Popular Frontism’: Communists were now to 
form alliances with the liberal bourgeoisie, reining back the 
working class to placate potential allies of the Russian state.
Thus, instead of promoting world revolution, the 
Stalinist Comintern had, by the mid 1930s, become actively 
counter-revolutionary. This was to produce, in 1937, another 
catastrophic disaster to place alongside those of 1927 and 
1933, when the Spanish Communist Party, under orders from 
Moscow, spearheaded the suppression of the working-class 
revolt in Catalonia, decapitating the entire revolutionary 
movement inside the Spanish Republic and derailing the 
struggle against Franco’s fascists. The Spanish workers would 
pay a terrible price: 40 years of right-wing dictatorship.
With the triumph of Stalin in Russia in 1928 and of Hitler 
in Germany in 1933 a terrible darkness descended on Europe. 
The continent became a place of dictatorship, persecution, 
and militarism. Later it would explode into war – the most 
terrible war in history, one in which 60 million would die, most 
of them in mass campaigns of genocide and ethnic-cleansing. 
The horrors of Stalingrad, Auschwitz, and the Gulags were 
the bitter fruit of revolutionary defeat, counter-revolutionary 
triumph, and a world gone mad. They were the historic 
confirmation of the chilling prediction made long before 
by the German-Polish revolutionary Rosa Luxemburg that 
humanity faced a choice between socialism and barbarism. 
We face it still. 
EPILOGUE 
A Century of War  
and Revolution
The century since 1917 has been a century of war and revolu-
tion. The political crisis unleashed by the Russian Revolution 
was global and protracted. Even after the main storm had 
passed, Germany was again on the brink of revolution in 1923, 
Britain experienced the General Strike in 1926, and China was 
convulsed by revolution and counter-revolution in 1927. 
After the Wall Street Crash of 1929, unemployment and 
poverty skyrocketed, and politics polarised across Europe. 
The Nazis took power in Germany in 1933, but the workers 
of Vienna, Paris, and Barcelona waged mighty struggles to halt 
the fascist advance between 1934 and 1938. 
The Second World War conjured insurrectionary 
movements in Yugoslavia, Warsaw, Greece, Italy, and many 
other places. Under the shadow of the Bomb, the Cold War era 
saw nationalist movements in China, Cuba, Algeria, Vietnam, 
and a dozen other countries wage guerrilla insurgencies to 
overthrow colonial rule. In 1956, Arab nationalists faced 
down European imperialism in the Suez crisis, and Hungarian 
workers fought Russian tanks on the streets of Budapest.
Between 1968 and 1975, the world was again convulsed 
by upheavals on a scale reminiscent of the great revolution-
ary wave of 1917 to 1923. In May‒June 1968, French students 
252 ◆  A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
fought pitched battles with riot police in Paris, while millions 
of workers went on strike and occupied their factories. Across 
the world, millions were mobilised in mass struggles against 
war, racism, exploitation, and police violence. In 1974, military 
dictatorships were overthrown in Greece and Portugal. 
We live still in an epoch of war and revolution. Mass urban 
insurrection brought down a US-backed dictator in Iran in 
1979. A revolutionary trade-union movement paralysed Poland 
in 1981. The Stalinist regimes of Russia and Eastern Europe 
were swept away by a chain-reaction of popular uprisings in 
1989. Middle Eastern dictators were toppled or destabilised 
in the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2010–12. In the last few years, we have 
been witness to a string of popular uprisings that have turned 
some of the urban heartlands of world capitalism – Athens, 
Madrid, Istanbul, Rio, and many more – into battlegrounds. 
These waves of popular resistance have crashed against 
bastions of corporate and state power and each time receded. 
What they confirm is that the rich and the warlords – the 
corporate and politico-military elites who control our lives – 
live at permanent risk of revolt from below. And they know 
– because, as the English revolutionary poet Percy Bysshe 
Shelley put it, ‘they are few and we are many’ – that such revolt 
could, at some point, acquire the mass, energy, and direction 
to sweep them and their rotten system away.
That this happens – that we make a worldwide anti-capitalist 
revolution – has now become an existential imperative. 
The global economy is trapped in a long-term crisis of 
stagnation-slump, hooked on debt, speculation, and bubbles 
of electronic money. Whole societies have imploded into 
sectarian warfare and mass displacement. Other societies are 
being torn apart by soaring inequality and deprivation. The 
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greed of the rich, the profiteering of the corporations, the 
violence of imperial states, the carbon pollution of the global 
growth-machine, the privatisation of public services, the 
grinding down of the poor, the militarisation of the refugee 
crisis, the shoot-to-kill racism of police, the bigotry and hate 
pumped out by right-wing politicians and broadcast by the 
mass media, all this and much more reveals a deeply dysfunc-
tional, pathological, redundant social order. 
As I wrote at the end of the Marxist History of the World:
A different world has become an absolute historical 
necessity. Another world is possible. The revolution is, in 
this sense, an ‘actuality’. But it is not a certainty. It has to be 
fought for. Its achievement depends on what we all do. The 
historical stakes have never been higher.
The Russian Revolution of 1917 is rich in lessons for today’s 
crisis-ridden world of exploitation, oppression, and violence. 
The Bolsheviks have much to teach us. 
Timeline
Date Events in Russian history Events in the wider world
1462–1505 Reign of Tsar Ivan the Great
1533–1584 Reign of Tsar Ivan the Terrible
1570 Destruction of Novgorod
1598–1613 ‘Time of Troubles’
1613 Accession of Tsar Michael 
Romanov
1670–1671 Rural revolt of Razin
1682–1725 Reign of Tsar Peter the Great
1700–1721 Great Northern War
1707–1708 Rural revolt of Bulavin
1762–1796 Reign of Tsarina Catherine the 
Great
1773–1775 Rural revolt of Pugachev
1792–1815 French Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars




Decembrist Revolt in St 
Petersburg
1848 Year of Revolutions/
‘Springtime of Peoples’
1853–1856 Crimean War
1857 First publication of radical journal 
The Bell (by Herzen, in London)
1861 Abolition of serfdom
1863 Publication of Chernyshevsky’s 
What is to be Done?
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Date Events in Russian history Events in the wider world
1869 Publication of Tolstoy’s War and 
Peace
1874–1875 Narodniks ‘go to the people’
1876
6 December





Assassination of Tsar Alexander II 
by Narodnya Volya revolutionaries
1883 Plekhanov founds Emancipation 
of Labour Group
1891–1903 Government dominated by 
reforming minister Sergei Witte
1894 Accession of Tsar Nicholas II
1894–1895 First Sino-Japanese War
1895 Lenin and others found St 
Petersburg League of Struggle for 
Emancipation of the Working 
Class





First publication of revolutionary 
newspaper Iskra (by Lenin, in 
Leipzig)








9 January ‘Bloody Sunday’: 1905 Revolution 
begins
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Date Events in Russian history Events in the wider world
April–May Third (‘Bolshevik’) Congress of 
RSDLP in London













Armed insurrection in Moscow
1906
April–May Fourth (‘Unity’) Congress of 
RSDLP in Stockholm
April–July First Tsarist Duma
1906–1911 Government dominated by 












January Sixth (‘Bolshevik’) Congress of 
RSDLP in Prague
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28 June Assassination of 
Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand in Sarajevo
July Three-week general strike by 
300,000 St Petersburg workers
28 July 100,000 German 
workers demonstrate 
against war in Berlin
4 August German SPD votes to 
support war in 
Reichstag
August Battle of Tannenburg: Russian 
defeat
September Battle of the Masurian Lakes: 
Russian defeat
November Arrest of Bolshevik Duma fraction
1915




Strike wave involves 400,000 
workers
May–June Battle of Gorlice-Tarnow: Russian 
defeat
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Date Events in Russian history Events in the wider world
1916
January–June Lenin writes Imperialism: The 
Highest Stage of Capitalism
June–
September
Brusilov Offensive: Russian 





9 January 150,000 workers demonstrate in 
Petrograd on anniversary of 
Bloody Sunday
23 February 90,000 workers strike in 
Petrograd: the beginning of 
‘February Days’ revolution
24 February 180,000 workers strike in 
Petrograd and clash with police
25 February 240,000 workers strike in 
Petrograd and defeat police
26 February Soldiers deployed against workers 
in Petrograd
27 February Petrograd military garrison 
mutinies and joins revolution – 
400,000 workers on strike, 
150,000 soldiers in mutiny;
strikes and demonstrations begin 
in Moscow
1 March Executive Committee of Petrograd 
Soviet concedes power to First 
Provisional Government; 
Petrograd Soviet passes Order  
No 1
3 April Lenin arrives from exile at 
Petrograd’s Finland Station
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4 April Lenin issues April Theses calling for 
overthrow of Provisional 
Government
20–21 April Mass anti-war demonstrations in 
Petrograd: ‘April Days’
22 April Second Provisional (Coalition) 
Government formed
24–29 April Seventh (‘Bolshevik’) Congress of 
the RSDLP in Petrograd 
May‒June First Conference of Petrograd 
Factory Committees (Bolshevik 
dominated)
French Army mutinies 
on Western Front
June First All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets in Petrograd
18 June 400,000 join Bolshevik-dominated 
Soviet demonstration in Petrograd
1–19 July Kerensky Offensive: Russian 
defeat
3–4 July 500,000 join armed, semi-
insurrectionary, Bolshevik-
dominated demonstrations in 
Petrograd: ‘July Days’ 
19 July Bolshevik leaders arrested or 
forced into hiding
24 July Third Provisional (Coalition) 
Government formed
7–12 August Second Conference of Petrograd 
Factory Committees
12 August State Conference opens in 
Moscow; 400,000 workers mount 
protest strike
14 August Kornilov addresses State 
Conference
21 August Fall of Riga to Germans
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1 September Petrograd Soviet votes for 
government of workers and 
peasants
10 October Bolshevik Central Committee 
(meeting in secret) votes for 
armed insurrection
13 October Soldiers’ Section of Petrograd 




All-Russian Conference of Factory 
Committees in Petrograd
18 October Petrograd Garrison Conference 
votes for armed insurrection 
20 October Trotsky elected Chair of the 
Military Revolutionary Committee
21 October Petrograd Garrison Conference 
votes to obey only Military 
Revolutionary Committee orders
22 October ‘Peaceful review of forces’ in 
Petrograd: hundreds of thousands 
attend mass meetings to endorse 
Soviet power
24 October Provisional Government attempts 
to suppress insurrectionary 
movement 
25 October Military Revolutionary Committee 
completes takeover of Petrograd








Battle of Caporetto: 
Italian defeat and rout
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1918
5–6 January Constituent Assembly dissolved 
by Soviet authorities
3 March Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed
29 October German naval mutiny 
triggers German 
Revolution
9 November Revolution in Berlin






Russian Civil War (period of 
intensive fighting) 
1919





21 January Start of Irish War of 
Independence
31 January ‘Battle of George 
Square’: street battle 
between striking 
workers and police in 
Glasgow
March First Congress of Third 
International
March–July Egyptian anti-colonial 
revolt
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Republic under Bela 
Kun
April–May Bavarian Soviet 
Republic
4 May Start of Chinese 
Revolution
1919–1920 Biennio Rosso (‘Two 
Red Years’) in Italy
1920
13 March Kapp Putsch in 





July–August Second Congress of Third 
International
August 1920 General strike and 
factory occupations by 





Tenth Party Congress: ‘War 
Communism’ abandoned, ‘New 
Economic Policy’ adopted, 
internal factions banned
June–July Third Congress of Third 
International
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1922
October Mussolini’s ‘March on 
Rome’: Fascist seizure 
of power in Italy
November–
December
Fourth Congress of Third 
International
1922–1925 Trotsky’s ‘Left Opposition’ active
1923
March Lenin suffers third stroke and is 
incapacitated 
April Twelfth Party Congress
1924
21 January Death of Lenin
May Thirteenth Party Congress
December 
1925
Fourteenth Party Congress: 
adoption of policy of ‘socialism in 
one country’
1925–1927 Trotsky and Zinoviev’s ‘United 
Opposition’ active
April 1927 Shanghai Massacre of 
Chinese Communists
1927–1928 Alliance between Stalin and 
Bukharin disintegrates
1928–1933 ‘Third Period’ ultra-left 
strategy and tactics 
imposed on foreign 
Communist parties
January 1933 Hitler takes power in 
Germany
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Date Events in Russian history Events in the wider world
1933–1939 ‘Popular Front’ alliances 
imposed on foreign 
Communist parties
1936–1938 Moscow show trials and execution 
of Old Bolshevik leaders
May 1937 Stalinist counter-
revolution destroys 
workers’ movement in 
Barcelona, Spain
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